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 This thesis, based on field research in Lebanon, explores how the confessional 
nature of the Lebanese state affects the construction of civil society. It elaborates on the 
state's role as a social service provider and its legal and bureaucratic relationship with the 
Lebanese NGO community while also exploring how the state's role as a service provider 
is perceived in the Lebanese media. 
 Pulling from a variety of archival sources in Lebanon, this thesis surveys 26 
Arabic language newspaper articles published between 2006 and 2008. It also utilizes a 
myriad of primary sources including government and donor documents, unpublished 
NGO studies and statistical data. 
This thesis argues that confessionalism inhibits the state's capacity to provide social 
services efficiently. The politicization of these services conditions the relationship between 
the state, sectarian political parties and the NGO community. This phenomenon is 
reproduced in the Lebanese media and allows confessional relationships to infect civil 
society. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis investigates one way in which confessionalism acts as the predominant 
obstacle to socio-political reform in Lebanon, interacting with a variety of other factors to 
stymie the growth of civil society and true democratization. It explores the relationship 
between the state and the NGO community in Lebanon, and investigates the economic, 
bureaucratic, and legal contexts which frame the interaction between the state and the 
NGO community. This thesis also analyzes the way the state, confessionalism, NGOs, 
and social services are discussed in the Lebanese media. This project builds on recent 
scholarship done in other countries in the Middle East that elucidates the way that 
politicized social services are used to shape identity and reinforce the legitimacy of 
political parties. It also adds to the scant literature that currently exists concerning civil 
society and the state in Lebanon.  
This literature generally asserts that the primary obstacle to strengthening civil 
society in Lebanon is the corrupt confessional state. I contend, however, that 
confessionalism not only corrupts the state but also, and more problematically, civil 
society. In this vein, I argue that sectarian NGOs act as a conduit between the 
confessional state and civil society, allowing service provision to become politicized. 
Sectarian NGOs explicitly politicize service provision, undermining the state's ability to 
expand upon its existing social service portfolio.   
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 In an effort to explore how the politicization of social services impacts the 
perception of the state and civil society, I also investigate how the media portrays 
sectarian NGOs, the state, and confessionalism. Focusing on articles from the period of 
political unrest that enveloped Lebanon between December 2006 and May 2008, I argue 
that although various newspaper sources seem to view confessionalism as a socio-
political problem, they also use the need for confessional reform to advance either thinly 
veiled sectarian agendas or conceptions of Lebanese citizenship premised on sectarian 
affiliation. In the end, I argue that to truly understand the failings of Lebanon's 
confessional system, we cannot simply focus on the corruption of the state apparatus. 
Rather, we need to understand confessionalism as an endemic social problem; its 
corrosive effects pervasive in Lebanese civil society as well as the state. 
 
Framing the Project: Research Questions 
 Lebanon is a confessional society. This means that every Lebanese person must 
belong, officially, to a sect. In my experience, most Lebanese, when asked about 
Lebanon's socio-political problems, respond with political answers, superficially 
implying that political agendas occupy a more important sphere in Lebanese political life 
than sect or confession. However, invariably, if one probes further, sectarian attitudes or 
confessional weariness surface in a passing remark, in the way a person talks about what 
it means to be Lebanese, or even in the way he or she discusses Beirut's geography. 
Confessionalism and sectarianism shape Lebanese politics in an existential way, leading, 
in my experience, most Lebanese to blame them for all their problems. Likewise, 
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literature on Lebanon usually seeks either to render sectarian groups political, separating 
sectarianism from its political expressions, or it simply assumes that confessionalism is 
the primary source of Lebanon's socio-political difficulties.   
 My project stems from a desire to understand how confessionalism creates many 
socio-political problems in Lebanon. I chose to explore how social services are 
politicized through sectarian NGOs because of my interest in Hezbollah and other 
confessional parties in Lebanon. These sectarian organizations use social service 
networks to build political capital and reinforce sectarian political ideologies. The 
politicization of social services therefore provided me a discreet way of accessing the 
relationship between confessionalism in the state and sectarianism in civil society. In 
reviewing the academic and development literature on social services in Lebanon, I 
noticed that a robust discussion of the state was largely absent. When it is mentioned in 
the scholarly literature, the state is portrayed as a purely bureaucratic, often corrupt organ 
that does not warrant much systemic analysis. On the other hand, the international donor 
community invariably views the state as an intentional obstacle to the growth of civil 
society, attempting to scale back rights of free association in its effort to promote a statist 
political program. 
 I chose to investigate how the state is perceived as a social service provider rather 
than on a specific confessional group or set of sectarian NGOs. Following from this line 
of reasoning, my thesis project explores three interrelated research questions:  
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1. In Lebanon's recent political context, does the Lebanese government present itself 
as committed to socio-economic development through the provision of social 
services? If so, why does the state view social service provision as important? 
How do sectarian social services undermine the state's ability to assert itself as a 
legitimate social service provider? 
2. What is the legal and administrative relationship between the state and the NGO 
community? Does the state actively infringe on the rights of NGOs as 
associations? Do sectarian NGOs exploit the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the 
state by politicizing social services?   
3. If identity is contested relationally in local contexts through service provision and 
the press is a major vessel for articulating disparate identity constructs, then how 
does the Lebanese press influence, reinforce or create perceptions of 
confessionalism, the state, and civil society? 
 These three questions map on to the major thrust of my research project, which is 
to explore how confessionalism, through the provision of social services by sectarian 
NGOs, creates a sectarian civil society. 
 
Confessionalism and the Ta'if Accord: Lebanon's Political Context 
 Lebanon is technically classified as a consociational democracy. Consociational 
states proportion parliamentary seats according to internal ethnic, linguistic, or religious 
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demographics and divisions. Each distinct socio-cultural group is called a confession. In 
Lebanon, confessions are explicitly sectarian, meaning religious affiliation defines the 
structure of the Lebanese state. Sectarianism does not mean that there are not a plurality 
of political parties and party alliances in Lebanon, but it does mean that these parties 
work within a discreet sectarian framework with implied power arrangements. This 
structure contrasts with other consociational states such as the Netherlands that are 
constituted by pluralities of confessions, containing multiple ethnic, religious, or even 
political confessions. For this reason, I sometimes use the term confessionalism 
interchangeably with sectarianism. 
 
The Origins of Lebanese Confessionalism 
 In 1943, Lebanon gained independence from France. This independence was 
based on an informal agreement between Shi'a, Sunni, and Maronite Christian leaders 
called the Mithaq or National Pact. This pact defined Lebanon as a multi-confessional 
state. Though the pact was never actually written down, this handshake agreement 
continues to define the contours of the Lebanese state. According to the National Pact, 
the President of Lebanon is always a Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister is always a 
Sunni; and the speaker of the Parliament is always a Shi'a. This type of designation 
extends to other high government offices as well; however, at the ministerial level, 
sectarian representation changes with each new government. Together, the ministers form 
a cabinet called the Council of Ministers. In Lebanon, this affiliation is generally 
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generated from a complicated and unstated patronage network.1 Parliamentary seats are 
proportioned based on sectarian demographics. These demographics came from a 1932 
census conducted by Maronite officials, under French auspices. Even at the time, the 
study was questionable at best. The Maronite leaders and French authorities used 
demographics that ensured a Maronite majority, allowing them to leverage more power in 
Lebanon's fledgling government. Additionally, the Sunni population was also 
overrepresented, and the Shiite community, now estimated to be Lebanon's largest single 
confession, was only marginally represented. These flawed demographics also affected 
the power-sharing arrangement between the President and the Prime minister, giving the 
President disproportionate power in the Lebanese government. This arrangement 
governed Lebanese political life until the civil war began in 1975 (Khalaf 214-220; 
Mackey 137-138). 
 The Ta'if Accord, which ended the war, was meant to resolve the methodological 
flaws of the National Pact and the Lebanese constitution. The Accord redistributed power 
between the President and Prime Minister. The President was turned largely into a 
symbolic figure and the Prime Minister's power was proportionally expanded. The 
Accord also made the Prime Minister the leader of the Council of Ministers (Mackey 
139). The President of the Chamber of Deputies remained designated for a Shi’a 
representative, but the term of office was extended from one year to four and the office’s 
responsibilities were increased (Hudson 27). Representation was made equally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1This implicit network of patronage definitely warrants further research. However, that research is outside 
the scope of this project. 
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proportional at a 5:5 ratio and 8 seats were added to Parliament for a total of 108. 
Proportions were changed to reflect the reality that the Maronite population had shrunk, 
eclipsed by both Sunnis and Shi'a. However, these new proportions were not the result of 
a new census. Once again, Lebanese political realities were determined behind closed 
doors by confessional leaders. The Ta'if Accord asserted that confessionalism was merely 
being maintained temporarily, recognizing the need to end confessionalism in Lebanon in 
order for the state to become a functioning democracy.  The newly amended Constitution 
also echoed this sentiment in Article 95, which states, "The first Chamber of Deputies 
which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians takes the 
appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a 
transitional plan" (Article 95; clause 1) However, this transition has never been achieved. 
  
Methodology  
 I conducted my research between June and November 2010 in Beirut. For the first 
six weeks of my stay, I participated in the American University of Beirut's summer 
Arabic program. Afterwards, I began an internship at the Arab Center for the 
Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (ACRLI). Though I began my participant 
observation during the summer, my research did not begin in earnest until completing 
AUB's program and starting my internship.  
 Given the difficulty of navigating Lebanon's complex political system and the 
highly politicized nature of economic and demographic data, gaining access to such 
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information proved quite problematic. Fortunately, I made contact with Madame Sawsan 
Masri, the UNDP's representative to the Ministry of Social Affairs. Madame Masri put 
me in touch with Mr. Omar Traboulsi with the Collective for Research and Training on 
Development-Action NGO (CRTD-A). Mr. Traboulsi and his colleague Hind Younes 
graciously gave me access to CRTD-A's archives. In addition to many previously 
unattainable working papers from Donor conferences along with other primary 
documents and unpublished academic papers, the archive also had a vast collection of 
media resources. It was through Mr. Traboulsi that I learned of and gained access to the 
archive for The Monthly magazine,2 a resource which has proved uniquely capable of 
providing me current economic and statistical data about Lebanon. I have worked hard to 
attain information that is not only credible, but also timely. Without The Monthly, I am 
not sure this would have been possible.  
	  
Media Selection 
 Though the document analysis is conducted in a relatively straightforward 
manner, I found that choosing second-language media sources was difficult to do in a 
timely manner when I was in country. Before leaving for Beirut, I decided that I would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2The Monthly is a periodical that focuses on publishing raw statistical data. It has a unique reputation in 
both Lebanon and the Arab world for providing reliable statistics. However, it is not always clear where 
these statistics come from. Usually, articles reference government reports and studies. I chose the Monthly 
because of its reputation within the NGO community. For more information about the magazine, visit 
http://www.iimonthly.com/default.asp. 
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select articles from the period of general unrest between December 2006 and May 2008.3 
While in Lebanon, I discussed this plan with several people in the NGO community. 
After this discussion, I decided to focus my research not only chronologically, but also 
topically. I chose to review articles that dealt with the relationship between the Ministry 
of Social Affairs (MoSA) and the NGO community. This choice significantly narrowed 
the kinds of articles I was searching for as well as changed my notion of how many 
articles needed to be sampled. Using the CRTDA's archive, I intentionally pulled as many 
articles as possible (over 400 in all). I used articles from four Lebanese-Arabic dailies: 
An-Nahar, Al-Safir, Al-Mustaqbal, and Al-Akhbar. They represent a good overview of 
sectarian and political opinions, which I will expand upon in my discussion of the media 
in Chapter V. Upon returning to the U.S, I translated the titles of all the articles and 
discarded the ones that were tangential to my research. This process left me with 80 
articles. 
 I chose my final articles in two ways. First, I divided the protests into 5 distinct 
periods: Early/violent (December/06-March/07), Stalemate (April/07-August/07), 
Ramadan (September/07-October/07), Eid Al-Adha (12/07), and Escalation 
(February/08-April/08). After deciding on this timeline, I went about selecting articles, 
which corresponded to these time periods. Additionally, I only chose months during these 
periods that had at least one article from each of my four papers. This final process left 
me with 25 articles. Though I am a third-year Arabic student, translating 25 articles 
remained quite difficult. I simply did not have the skill level to do the translations in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3A summarization of this period of unrest is offered in Chapter V. 
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timely manner. Therefore, I chose to translate two of the articles myself and I gave 18 to 
a translator recommended by the Arabic department at the University of Oregon, Hassan 
Saleh Shiban. Five of the articles were summarized by a different Arabic instructor at the 
University of Oregon, Hanan Ahmad. 
 
Limitations of Media Research 
 Obviously, the selection process described above was not scientific. Articles were 
chosen based on pre-determined criteria regardless of their content. Though I pulled 
many articles, I focused on those that contained Arabic words that I felt were related to 
my research such as budget, citizenship, society, NGO, nationalism, sectarian, and 
confessionalism. This process, though rigorous, was certainly inexact and I may have 
indeed discarded articles that would have added to the substance of my project. However, 
I feel that despite these limitations, the final articles correspond well with the timeline I 
devised and the conceptual issues that I am exploring in this thesis.  
 
Organization of Thesis 
 This thesis consists of six chapters including the introduction and the conclusion. 
Chapter II reviews academic literature about the composition of civil society in Middle 
Eastern countries with a specific emphasis on the development of voluntary associations 
in relation to the state. It also engages with literature that focuses on how identity politics 
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are contested and negotiated through the media. Chapter III looks at the current role that 
social services play politically in Lebanon. In doing so, it investigates how much 
emphasis the state places on social services and why state officials believe them to be of 
crucial political importance. Chapter IV outlines the bureaucratic, administrative, and 
legal relationship between the state and the NGO community in Lebanon in an effort to 
understand how the state relates to civil society in a confessional atmosphere. This 
chapter also elaborates how social services are politicized through sectarian NGOs. 
Chapter V reviews the findings from my close reading of 25 media sources with my 
conclusions presented thematically.  
 In my conclusion, I argue that sectarian NGOs politicize social services, thereby 
undermining the state's ability to provide them. As a result, the media perceives the state 
as weak, incapable of providing the services its citizens need. However, this situation also 
highlights confessionalism's corrosive effects as a system of government. Rendering the 
state a mere composite of sectarian interests, confessionalism creates space for sectarian 
NGOs to foster political legitimacy through service provision. These sectarian services 
allow confessional agendas to take root in civil society through a certain sector of the 
NGO community.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Lebanon is a unique case study that complicates and challenges traditional 
definitions of civil society in the Middle East in two ways. Lebanon's Confessional 
government creates space for the emergence of sectarian NGOs, a problematic form of 
association for regional paradigms. Additionally, literature on civil society in the Middle 
East primarily engages with associations in authoritarian states. Lebanon is neither an 
authoritarian nor a democratic state. Therefore, Lebanon's unique status as a confessional 
state and consociational democracy force a reevaluation of how we define civil society 
and the state. The second part of this review explores how nationalism and other identity 
constructions are politicized, reproduced, negotiated and contested in the media. I argue 
that nationalism is not a monolithic, ideological construct. Rather, it is one of many types 
of identity constructions that are dynamic and contextual. I also argue that in Lebanon's 
case, the manner in which the media engages topics such as confessionalism, citizenship, 
and the state is demonstrative of confessionalism's systemic infection of Lebanese 
society. Taken together, both of these discussions supply the analytic framework for my 
discussion of the relationship between the state and NGOs in Chapter IV as well as the 
analysis of identity and the media in Chapter V. 
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The State  
 Rather than delving into a comprehensive discussion of the state, I focus 
specifically on Lebanon and its place in the literature about civil society in the Middle 
East. Lebanon's consociational system recognizes that it is composed of subnational 
entities (Butenschon 24). These subnational entities are given proportionate 
representation based on sectarian demographics with high government offices designated 
for each sect. However, many critics assert that Lebanon's confessional system does not 
constitute an authentic democracy. These criticisms are best understood through a 
discussion of the condition of the Lebanese state after the civil war.  
 After the end of the civil war, the constitution was amended. It asserted along 
with newly elected state officials and sectarian parties themselves, including Hezbollah, 
that the Ta'if Accord was meant to be a transitional document that would peacefully 
facilitate the end of confessional rule in favor of true democracy (Krayyem 421-424; 
Mackey 139-140; Hudson 27). However, this transition never happened. Therefore, the 
resultant reforms never really addressed the inter-sect conflict that started and prolonged 
the civil war. The Ta'if Accord also reinforced sectarian boundaries leaving the state a 
confessional composite, where sectarian groups use the idea of a unified state as a 
method of solidifying their own political legitimacy; while continuing to monopolize the 
state's limited resources to achieve their own agendas (Alagha 231-236). In this system, 
sectarian actors in Lebanon find their own security and survival linked to the continued 
existence of the confessional state. Since these groups are technically the polity, they 
actively subvert any real efforts to reform confessional bureaucracy in favor of 
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democratic institutions. This reality creates a multitude of at once sectarian, but also 
national political agendas, contested and negotiated in the press that are meant to inhibit 
the creation of a traditional, unified nation-state.   
 Literature on the relationship between the state, NGOs, and civil societies in the 
Middle East has primarily focused on authoritarian states. In authoritarian states such as 
Bahrain or Egypt, power and legitimacy are predicated on both organic and 
programmatic qualities (Butenschon 18). The state's control is "organic in the sense that 
the constituent community is considered an indivisible whole whose existence and 
interests have a superior moral value. It is programmatic in the sense that the state is 
considered to have an historical mission in the realization of the constituent community's 
fundamental aspirations (Butenschon 18)." States such as Egypt and Turkey therefore use 
civil society as a way to maintain their hegemony and control reformist movements and 
ideological contestations within their own nations (Alhamad 38-40). However, Lebanon 
is not an authoritarian state. As such, I argue that it is difficult if not impossible to 
understand the Lebanese state as an institutional hegemonic actor. Confessionalism in 
Lebanon renders the state a composite of actors interested in maintaining the current 
system so as to ensure their own legitimacy. This project is aided by sectarian NGOs that 
connect discreet political ideologies with the public. In addition to the very real gap in 
literature that addresses the Lebanese state through the lens of service provision and 
NGO activity, the case of the Lebanese state also challenges the normative idea that 
Middle Eastern States, no matter how they are labeled, can be understood in authoritarian 
terms. Confessionalism, in this sense, forces a redefinition of the relationship between the 
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state and civil society, while creating new implications for identity construction in 
Lebanon. 
 
Civil Society: Voluntary Associations and the State 
 The literature surrounding civil society is vast. For the purposes of this discussion, 
I focus on literature concerning civil society in the Middle East. Definitions of civil 
society in the Middle East generally involve two components: voluntary associations and 
intermediary space (Abootalebi 1; Abdo 3-4; Whaites 127-129). I define civil society as a 
space where "clubs, syndicates, guilds, associations, unions, and political parties provide 
a buffer between the polity and the individual (Hassassian, 253)." This definition allows 
civil society to be an intermediary space where a myriad of associations interact with the 
state on behalf of a political public. This softer formulation of civil society does not 
engage overly theoretical conceptions such as Gramsci's formulation that posits it as a 
discursive space where the state's hegemony is negotiated and institutionalized (Pratt 
125).  It also is not a purely instrumental definition in that civil society is not simply 
viewed as a component or symptom of true democracy as some of the development 
literature contends (Abdo 1-3; Pratt 124)4. Rather, the definition speaks to the two 
implicit components of both theoretical and practical formulations of civil society: 
voluntary associations and the state (Whaites 127-129; Alhamad 36-40).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Both Pratt and Abdo critique this optimistic viewpoint, while also acknowledging its prevalence. 
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Voluntary Association: NGOs as Civil Actors 
 In regional literature, various authors give NGOs special consideration as primary 
representatives of civil society due to their relationship with democratic reforms and their 
relative newness (Abootalebi 1-3; Alhamad 33-37; Ghosh 476-477). Since most Middle 
Eastern regimes are authoritarian, NGOs are either viewed as symbols of state opposition 
or more critically as simply another manifestation of state hegemony (Abdo 3; Sa'id 63-
65). This viewpoint can be understood both empirically and theoretically. During the 
1980s and 1990s, issue-oriented NGOs exploded throughout the MENA, providing 
service delivery, advocating for human rights, and fighting for women's rights among 
other issues. Authoritarian states found that these new types of organizations challenged 
their control. (Alhamad 37-40). Accordingly, states, particularly Egypt and Jordan, 
employed new methods to undermine the impact of these new NGOs including 
"intimidation, co-optation, the creation of parallel government organizations with greater 
resources, and bureaucratic requirements" (Alhamad, 38). These strategies created the 
appearance of reform while also marginalizing and dividing the organizational capacities 
of the NGO community. Issue-oriented NGOs were pigeon-holed and forced to fight for 
resources in a climate that pits issue versus issue rather than the state versus civil society 
association. State strategies were reinforced by the international donor community, which 
also provided resources based on issue-oriented priorities, further marginalizing and 
dividing the NGO community (Whaites 127-133). In authoritarian Middle Eastern states, 
NGOs are no longer uniformly perceived by academics, individual citizens, and states as 
representatives of a robust societal consciousness, emanating from individuals to the state 
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through civil society (Demirovic 214-15; Sa'id 63-68). Rather, NGOs are perceived as 
articulating the specific agendas of a multitude of voices within an increasingly 
differentiated civil society.  
 This process mirrors the theoretical literature about the role of civil society. 
Emblematic of this viewpoint is Gramsci's view that civil society actors are used by states 
to maintain their hegemony whether explicitly or discursively. Explicitly, civil society 
actors, in this case NGOs, work to reproduce institutionalized power relationships, thus 
maintaining state hegemony. Discursively, authoritarian states use NGOs to manage 
attacks on their hegemony. In this conception, the state determines what reformative 
aspects are acceptable and uses civil society to integrate them peaceably into institutional 
processes, allowing it to maintain structural and discursive power while appearing to be 
reformist and responsive to the concerns of citizens and the international community 
(Pratt 125-127).  
 Given the prevalence of authoritarian states in the MENA, other than Turkey, 
regional literature usually has only one type of state with which to engage. When 
addressing democratic, rather than authoritarian states, these arguments do not change as 
much as their vocabulary does. Democratic states integrate, incorporate, and respond to 
the concerns of civil society. Issue-oriented NGOs are not divided for the sake of state 
hegemony, but rather for the sake of a true democratic representation of individual 
concerns. This difference in vocabulary is coupled with a difference in the types of issues 
represented. In developed democracies, the NGO community does not have to act as a 
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primary service provider and gap-filler for the state (Pearce 19-24; Whaites 126-127)5. It 
does not have to advocate for basic human rights. In short, authoritarian states in the 
Middle East, though coercive and politically strong, are almost uniformly economically 
and infrastructurally weak (Whaites 131-134). I contend that Lebanon, despite its 
democratic designation, still has a weak state. Its NGOs still provide services and 
healthcare and advocate for human rights and basic civil liberties. I argue that for these 
reasons Lebanon complicates the dichotomy that is traditionally drawn between NGOs in 
democratic and authoritarian states.  
	  
Associations in Lebanon: civil association in a confessional atmosphere 
  The Lebanese NGO community suffers from many of the same issues that NGOs 
in authoritarian Arab states do. For example, international donors divide secular NGOs 
by creating issue-oriented priorities, forcing NGOs to address foreign concerns rather 
than indigenous ones. Politically-affiliated NGOs and NGO consortia enjoy classic 
patronage relationships with the state, calling into question if these organizations 
legitimately represent Lebanese citizens (Kingston 16-21; "Lebanon's Non-Governmental 
Organizations" 2008). However, confessionalism also creates a special and unfortunately 
prevalent class of sectarian NGOs, which make Lebanese civil society a unique case in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Both of these authors' critique the notion the NGOs operate differently in democracies, specifically 
relating to neo-liberal development agendas. Though, the attitude towards NGOs roles in democracies is 
changing, the above discussion still resonates with certain development literature. I offer this footnote 
simply to clarify that both Pearce and Whaites are critiquing these notions and in no way advocating them. 
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the regional literature. In Lebanon, sectarian parties form the substance of the state and 
therefore compete with each other for communal resources. Multitudinous, 
undifferentiated political parties are not simply generated by the state to maintain power 
through a corporatist strategy as they are in most authoritarian states in the MENA 
(Albrecht 30).6 NGOs affiliated with sectarian organizations and political parties 
effectively blur the line between political ideology and service provision, politicizing the 
latter in an explicit way ("Agency and Ideology in Community Services: Islamic NGOs 
in a Southern Suburb of Beirut" 243-245). This reality calls into question the applicability 
of definitions of civil society which understand NGOs as "non-politicized autonomous 
service providers ("Agency and Ideology" 234)."  To illustrate how sectarian NGOs 
politicize service provision, thus reinforcing the political legitimacy of sectarian political 
parties, I review the case of Hezbollah's NGOs in the southern suburbs of Beirut.  
	  
Hezbollah, Resistance and Social Services: Blurring the line 
 In "Agency and Ideology in Community Services: Islamic NGOs in a Southern 
Suburb of Beirut," Mona Fawaz argues that Hezbollah has framed service provision as 
part of a larger project of resistance. This resistance identity is premised not only on a 
resistance to perceived Israeli aggression and historical occupation, but also on resistance 
to confessional patronage and the sectarian state. Hezbollah articulates this in its own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6This citation refers to footnote 13 in Albrecht's endnotes. He cites Peter J. Williamson's definition of 
corporatism in Williamson's "Corporatism in Perspective." 
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literature, speaking of the importance of creating a sphere of resistance within Lebanese 
society ("Faith Based Organizations as Development Partners" 222-224). According to 
Hezbollah official, Hajj Kassem Aleik, "the resistance society is our vision. It is the task 
to build a society that will refuse oppression and fight for its rights. All the rest-water 
provision, garbage collection, and agricultural training-is only a working strategy 
("Agency and Ideology" 235)." Hezbollah's NGOs, though affiliated with the party, are 
not directed by the party. However, through their structure, responsiveness, and 
flexibility, they are the embodiment of Aleik's "working" political strategy (234-239). 
Using a complex and pioneering network of female volunteers, Fawaz details how 
Hezbollah's NGOs have been able to respond and tailor their service provision services 
and micro-credit strategies to the needs of their constituencies. She also demonstrates 
how they have reframed participation in service programs as vital to the resistance. She 
argues successfully that this reframing reduces the stigma traditionally associated with 
obtaining social services and receiving loans within the Shiite confession, positing 
participation, instead, as a positive assertion of Hezbollah's desired resistance identity. In 
this manner, Hezbollah's NGOs have blurred the line between service provision and 
political ideology (249-253). 
 The example detailed above illustrates the challenges that sectarian-oriented 
NGOs present to traditional conceptions of the relationship between voluntary 
associations and the state. It complicates the idea that NGOs are issue-oriented 
intermediaries between a monolithic, hegemonic state and the Lebanese citizenry. The 
NGO community in Lebanon is partially composed of traditional NGO actors such as 
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politically-related advocacy groups and local instantiations of international NGOs. 
However, sectarian NGOs that explicitly link their services to a political ideology blur the 
line between their own political legitimacy and the state's. When analyzing the 
relationship between the NGO community and the state, I argue that sectarian NGOs 
challenge arguments that portray Lebanon's weak confessional state as an authoritarian 
sheep in democratic clothes. Also, this more nuanced understanding hints at the way both 
service provision and political identity can be contested and negotiated in the Lebanese 
media.  
 
Reproducing Identity 
 The complex network of sectarian parties and their affiliated NGOs in Lebanon 
articulate political identities premised on a variety of ideological constructs, including 
nationalism, which are politicized through social service provision. Outside of specific 
strategies like Hezbollah's, how are these various identities presented to the political 
public? Geographic Literature about identity negotiation and contestation focuses 
specifically on how nationalism is reproduced across multiple scales through the media. 
This discussion understands nationalism non-ideologically, and sees it as an historical 
construct, constantly negotiated and reproduced relationally through the media. The 
discussion of the Lebanese media in Chapter V emphasizes the relationship between 
identity and service provision in the same way. Newspapers help sectarian parties 
politicize service provision in order to reproduce and negotiate identity in an effort to 
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establish their own legitimacy and reinforce the perception of the state as corrupt and 
weak. 
 
Nationalism as an Idiom: Mac Laughlin and the rise of Irish Nationalism  
 Jim Mac Laughlin, in Reimagining the Nation-State, traces the process by which 
nationalism became a powerful idiom in both the Irish nationalist and unionist 
movements in the 19th century. Using Gramsci and the larger input of cultural Marxism, 
he posits that the poor play a crucial role in how nationalism is defined and articulated. 
Rather than a monolithic idea introduced by a landed elite, who then leveraged it on the 
mass of the Irish and Ulster populations, Mac Laughlin asserts that nationalism in Ireland 
took shape slowly (Mac Laughlin 242-249). Instead of seeing nationalism as an ideology, 
he is interested in showing that nationalism gradually became integrated at local scales as 
an idiom of contestation. Nationalism becomes a powerful rhetorical tool for both Irish 
nationalists and unionists (242-247). It is, in his conception, a dynamic frame capable of 
encompassing divergent political aspirations and a myriad of epistemological categories.  
This non-ideological formulation of nationalism allows him to hypothesize how it is 
reproduced, reified and abstracted through local interaction (250-271). Mac Laughlin's 
discussion is reminiscent of Fawaz's project described earlier. If you replace nationalism 
with resistance, Fawaz's project explains how Hezbollah uses resistance as a dynamic and 
positive identity construct to simultaneously encourage participation in their service 
programs while still engendering political legitimacy. Hezbollah's NGOs' tailoring their 
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service projects to their constituencies is a physical representation of how identity can be 
constructed dynamically. This formulation easily translates to a mutable and robust 
conception of resistance, which can accommodate and articulate multiple meanings, all of 
which are related to Hezbollah's reputation as a service provider. 
 Turning back to Mac Laughlin's work, he explores the role that new media played 
in Ireland during the 19th century in order to tease out his analytical framework. For him, 
print journalism played a powerful part in articulating the nationalist sentiment being 
reproduced on local scales.  Mac Laughlin turns to the work of Benedict Anderson to 
help him explain the power of the press. For Anderson, the advent of the press in 
capitalist societies allowed class to be rendered and rearticulated "across time and space 
(Mac Lauglin 195)." In doing so, Anderson provides methodological tools for looking at 
how specific organizational structures allow for the re-articulation of identity constructs 
across class boundaries (193-197). Coupled with Mac Laughlin's understanding of 
nationalism as a rhetorical frame, the press allowed class concerns, echoed in the 
vernacular of specific regions, to be expressed across geographic scales. Rather than 
assert that the new medium simply allowed the instrumental use of media for the 
purposes of the bourgeois and other elites, he argues that the newspaper acted as the 
primary conduit for cross-class nationalist negotiation (190-205). Mac Laughlin's 
understanding of the media's role in the relational reproduction of nationalism maps 
easily onto to the Lebanese case simply by replacing class with sect. In Lebanon, identity 
constructs, premised on confessional political ideologies, are contested in a sectarian 
press which uses, among other things, social services as a means for affirming and 
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articulating political legitimacy, while attacking the state's credibility and confessional 
nature. 
 
Reproducing nationalism across scales  
 Geographic literature has further situated the reproduction of nationalism within 
work on scale and territory. This work fully strips nationalism of its monolithic, 
ahistorical qualities, situating it in thoroughly relational contexts. Carwyn Fowler and 
Rhys Jones, for example, in discussing the reproduction of nationalism in Aberystwyth, 
Wales, succinctly posit the case for local scale nationalism. They begin their discussion 
by noting the difference between scholars who look at nationalism as something 
represented and those who explore it as something reproduced. They maintain that a 
focus on reproduction allows one to truly investigate how nationalism is mobilized in 
everyday life (Jones and Fowler 334-349). They quote John Agnew to clarify their 
argument:  
The overall focus is on relating national identities to the geographical scales and 
contexts in which they are embedded rather than presupposing a nationalist 'wave' 
that washes over a territory from either a center or the margins wiping out all 
other identities in its path. In this view, the national is always forged in and 
through 'the local' (Jones and Fowler 335).  
 While Mac Laughlin argues against nationalism as a monolithic ideological 
operator, Jones and Fowler broaden his line of reasoning to argue against most inductive 
or deductive accounts of ideological nationalism. For them, the reproduction of 
nationalism is profoundly relational and therefore it is intimately tied to the interaction 
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between local actors. In a similar vein, Alon Confino and Ajay Skaria, in the "Local Life 
of Nationhood," undermine any attempt either to explain nationalism or use it as an 
explanatory model without first examining scaled territorial contexts. In this formulation, 
nationalism becomes part and parcel of the dynamic processes of local scale identity 
formation. Using cases from Europe and India, they thoroughly explicate how local 
territorial contexts affect the content and gravity of nationalist reproductions (Confino 
and Skaria 8-20). Using territory and scale, Carwyn and Fowler along with Confino and 
Skaria demonstrate that nationalism is reproduced relationally through the interaction of 
local actors. In Lebanon, this understanding again echoes Fawaz's exploration of how 
Hezbollah engenders political legitimacy through their social services ("Agency and 
Ideology" 243-253). Given the fact that Lebanon's confessional context simultaneously 
multiplies the number of possible identity constructs while also limiting their scope, this 
literature's emphasis on nationalism can be broadened to include other forms of identity 
premised on political aspirations tinged with sectarian affiliation. This discussion frames 
one of the primary research questions of this thesis: if identity is contested relationally in 
local contexts through service provision and the press is a major vessel for articulating 
disparate identity constructs, then how does the Lebanese press influence or create 
perceptions about both sectarian groups and the state?  
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Conclusion 
 This review explores two diverse sets of literature. I argue that confessionalism in 
Lebanon infects both civil society and the state, creating a unique form of association, 
sectarian NGOs. These NGOs connect political ideology with, among other things, 
service provision, thus politicizing civil society and using it as a vehicle for maintaining 
the confessional system. This process renders the state a composite of sectarian parties, 
which use reforming the confessional system as a means of maintaining its existence; 
thus, ensuring their own power. This understanding frames the discussion of how NGOs 
interact with the state both bureaucratically and legally in Chapter IV. In the second half, 
I review geographic literature that argues that nationalism is reproduced relationally 
through the media and the interaction of local actors. This literature attacks the notion 
that nationalism is a monolithic ideological operator. Instead, I argue that it is a dynamic 
construct constantly contested and negotiated. I broaden this discussion to include other 
identity constructs, substituting the aforementioned literatures' emphasis on territory, 
scale, and class for service provision, sectarian NGOs. In turn, these emphases form the 
basis for the thematic discussion of identity politics, the state, and confessionalism in the 
Lebanese media in Chapter V.  
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CHAPTER III  
SOCIAL SERVICES AND THEIR HISTORICAL ROLE 
 Social service provision has always played a vital role in the confessional life of 
Lebanon. Sectarian leaders have historically used social services, provided by state 
money, to quell unrest within their respective communities. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, during the run-up to the civil war, as the state went bankrupt and the gap between 
confessional leaders and their constituencies grew larger, a lack of services splintered 
sectarian communities, realigning the population along class lines (Khalaf 210-220; 
Rigby 170-177). During the war, however, war-torn neighborhoods became increasingly 
dependent on sectarian militias to provide basic services such as water and food delivery 
(Kfoury 142; Hamzeh 329-331). After the war ended, the country was devastated 
economically, leaving fractured communities still dependent on sectarian organizations 
for their services. Economic reconstruction was premised on macroeconomic strategies 
geared towards revitalizing the country's financial sector and capital markets. Implicit in 
these strategies was a commitment to rebuilding the country's economic and physical 
infrastructure, which would eventually lead to an increase in both the quality of and 
access to social services (Saidi 249-257). However, nearly 10 years after the 
implementation of these strategies, the UNDP and the Ministry of Social Affairs found 
that social development continued to lag in Lebanon with regional poverty pockets 
limiting access to a variety of vital services ("Poverty, Growth, and Income" 14-19). In 
turn, the state has clearly recognized the importance of social service provision not only 
in securing donor funds but also in ensuring state legitimacy, territorial integrity and 
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spurring economic growth ("Recovery, Reconstruction, Reform" 8; 13-14). The state 
understands that sectarian organizations use expansive social service networks to 
maintain control of communities and foster confessional legitimacy. Despite this 
understanding, the state is also limited by both its confessional nature and its budget. 
However, the government's recognition of the importance of social development frames 
both its bureaucratic and legal relationships with the NGO community, while the 
historical significance of social services to the citizenry of Lebanon influences the way 
that service provision is contested and discussed in the Lebanese media. 
 This chapter begins by looking at how a lack of social services acted as an 
underlying cause of the Lebanese Civil War, and it very briefly discusses economic 
development after the war. Next, it summarizes the key findings of a joint report 
produced by the UNDP and the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2005 called "Poverty, 
Growth, and Income Distribution in Lebanon." This study elaborates the scope and scale 
of poverty in Lebanon within a social development framework. The discussion then turns 
to the Social Action Plan (SAP) presented by the Lebanese government at the Paris III 
Donor's conference in January of 2007. This SAP continues to frame both the 
governments and the UNDP's national development plan for Lebanon. The SAP 
presented a comprehensive agenda for both reforming and expanding the state's role in 
the social service sector. In the SAP, the state's strategies for reform coalesce almost 
uniformly with the suggestions made in the UNDP's joint-report The state, therefore, 
presents itself as an institution attempting to cater directly to donor interests, while still 
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profoundly aware of the important role that social services play not only in ensuring the 
state's legitimacy. 
 
Social Services and the Lebanese Civil War 
 In the late 1960s, Lebanon was thriving economically as a global tourist 
destination. Sectarian tensions were swept under the surface as an oligarchic elite held 
power over both their respective confessions and the government. The confessional 
arrangement created solidarity among the leaders of different sects. This solidarity, 
premised on a power derived from state control, created dissonance between the interests 
of confessional leaders and those of their communities (Gordon 110-114; Khalaf 212-
215; Rigby 170-175). This gap alienated everyday people from their government and 
confessional leaders from their sectarian constituencies. In an effort to close this gap, 
sectarian leaders used social services as a salve to calm political dissidence. For example, 
if Christians in the north were upset with their president, then the Council of Ministers 
would approve funds to build a hospital or school in the region.  
 However, the Lebanese population urbanized throughout the 1960s and access to 
higher education and information expanded among people of all socio-economic classes 
(Khalaf 217-220; Farris 17-20; Rigby 170-175). The Lebanese became the most well-
educated, well-informed population in the region, exposed to new social and economic 
ideas. As a result, unionized workers and students engaged in widespread protests, 
articulating a unity premised on class solidarity rather than sectarian loyalty (Khalaf 212-
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17; Gordon 110-113). These protests were emblematic of the growing gap between 
sectarian leaders and their constituencies and revolved around social development issues, 
which acted as an expression of a new nonsectarian class consciousness. These protests 
included strikes by judicial administrators, public school teachers, and public utility 
workers as well as students rallying against the raising of tuition fees (Khalaf 212-220). 
As these protests escalated, confessional solidarity amongst elites fractured. As the 
patronage networks fell apart, the government stopped providing services altogether, 
inflaming class consciousness further. Without access to state money, confessional 
leaders fought to reestablish trust by realigning with their confessional communities and 
painting other sectarian groups as the enemy and chief obstacle to political reform and 
service access. Social services and social development thus acted as an important rallying 
point during the run-up to the civil war (Rabinovich 32; Rigby 170-175).  
 Social services continued to be used to engender sectarian loyalty to militias 
throughout the conflict. Hezbollah, for example, built its first hospital in 1984. In 1988, 
intense fighting between Hezbollah and its chief intersect rival, Amal, ravaged the 
Dahiyeh, the impoverished southern suburb of Beirut. In response, Hezbollah began 
providing garbage collection to the area, formally replacing the Lebanese Sanitation 
Department for nearly five full years. In 1989, they opened the al-Rasul al-Azam 
Hospital there. Though the hospital was initially supposed to just help with war-related 
injuries, it quickly began providing other health services also. In fact, along with two 
other Hezbollah hospitals in the area, the party became the sole provider of health 
services in the area (Harik 83-86; Kfoury 142; Love 168-169). From 1988-1990, 
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President Michel Aoun, the Maronite Christian leader of the fledgling government, cut 
off water and electricity services to the Dahiyeh. In response, Hezbollah built several 
4000 liter reservoirs in and around Dahiyeh and filled them daily. It also mounted 
generators on the backs of trucks, creating a mobile and constant source of electricity for 
the area (Harik 86-96). The ease with which Hezbollah integrated itself into the 
community after the war can be traced back directly to the political legitimacy they 
gained during the war as a social service provider to the massive, underserved, 
disenfranchised Shiite population in South Lebanon, the Bekaa, and southern Beirut 
(Harik 84-96; Hamzeh 335-336; Warn 112-114). 
 Though social services play an important role in the politics of any state, given 
the fractured nature of confessional politics, they have perhaps played a more explicit 
role in fostering political loyalty in Lebanon then other Middle Eastern states. In a 
confessional system, social services become political weapons used to undermine rivals 
within the same sect. For example, Hezbollah's social service network continues to 
undermine Amal, as it did during the war (Warn 112-115). However, confessional re-
entrenchment after the war complicated the way social services are contested between the 
state and sectarian organizations. Rather than a network of confessional solidarity, 
sectarian leaders are now free to use the state's coffers to fund social service projects 
under a confessional banner, fostering the impression that the state plays almost no role 
in providing services. 
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Post-War Reconstruction 
 Although the Taif Accord was signed in 1989, fighting in Lebanon did not 
formally end until 1992. After nearly 17 years of fighting, the country was devastated 
economically. The war resulted in nearly 150,000 casualties, 300,000 severe injuries, and 
it displaced nearly 750,000 people (mostly technical workers and skilled labor) (Saidi 
253-257). In 1992, the country endured an inflation rate of 120% and faced 
reconstruction costs estimated at 18 billion dollars for the public sector and between 35-
40 billion dollars for the private sector (287-295;). Saddled with massive public debt, a 
low GDP, a marginally operational government, and a dependence on foreign loans, 
Lebanon's leaders focused their reconstruction efforts on rebuilding the economic sector, 
the country's physical infrastructure, and restoring foreign confidence in the country's 
political stability (260). Though some forecasters emphasized the importance of social 
service implementation to repatriation efforts, the government under the leadership of 
Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri initiated fiscal reforms through privatization and neo-
liberal economic policies (250-254). These policies were controversial at best and remain 
the subject of intense interest to those who would accuse the late Prime Minister Hariri of 
corruption. I do not want to delve into the minutiae of this history. The point here is that 
during the 1990s, Lebanon was saddled with extensive rebuilding after a period of 
extended conflict, the resolution of which did not address its underlying causes. After the 
war, new and old sectarian groups established themselves as political players, particularly 
Hezbollah. While the new government struggled to articulate its power, the confessional 
leaders of which the state was composed fought over political turf and the loyalty of their 
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constituent communities (Mackey 174-177). This period saw the expansion of 
international NGO activity in Lebanon with the YMCA rising to prominence, the rise of 
sectarian charitable associations, and the entrenchment of both Hezbollah's and the Sunni 
Future Movement's massive social service networks. Given this context, the state was in 
little position to assert itself or its interests as a social service provider, which led to 
stagnation in social development.  
 
Poverty in 2007 
 The national report, "Poverty, Growth, and Income Distribution in Lebanon," was 
produced jointly by the UNDP and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) in 2005. 
Rather than using purely economic indicators for assessing poverty, it used a money-
metric measurement for poverty based on household consumption.7 It also used the Gini 
index for inequality to develop a more comprehensive portrait of poverty. Deriving its 
poverty line from both of these indicators allowed the study to explore social 
development in Lebanon (31-39). Using this paradigm, the report found that in 2004-
2005, 28.5 percent of Lebanese are poor and 8 percent fall into the category of extremely 
poor. In this case, the upper poverty line translated to 4 U.S. dollars a day and the lower 
poverty line measured 2.4 dollars a day. These numbers indicate that slightly more than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7The purpose of my project is not to investigate the validity of economic indicators for measuring poverty 
or inequality like the using household expenditures or the Gini index. Therefore, the use of these indicators 
will not be questioned in this chapter.  
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1/4 of Lebanon's population was living below the poverty line (45). Poverty percentages 
are also broken down regionally.  
 Beirut has a very low incidence of extreme poverty at 2% and sports an overall 
poverty rate of between 5-8 percent. Mount Lebanon and Nabatieh also have a low 
prevalence of extreme poverty of between 2-5 percent and a lower than average incidence 
of overall poverty at 20 percent. However, as expected, when you look at traditionally 
underserved Mohafazas, the numbers jump. In the Bekaa and the South, the extreme 
poverty rate is between 10-12 percent. The overall poverty rate in the Bekaa is 29 
percent, which is still quite a bit lower than the overall poverty rate in the South which is 
42 percent. The North has both the highest extreme and overall poverty rates at 17 and 52 
percent respectively (47-48). These raw numbers suggest that poverty alleviation 
strategies should be focused regionally rather than nationally, while also demonstrating 
that macroeconomic development does not translate into equitable, social development.  
 
Poverty Distribution and Inequality 
 Poverty is also assessed regionally by looking at differences in inequality using an 
average of real per capita consumption. The mean real per capita consumption was 3,911 
thousand LBP in 2004-2005. The overall inequality coefficient using the Gini index for 
Lebanon was .375 in 2004-2005. This coefficient is comparable to that of other middle 
income countries and is much lower than the .55 average of most Latin American 
countries. Overall consumption rates help to elaborate this data more. The bottom 20 
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percent of the population consumed 7.1 percent of the country's total consumption and 
the richest 20 percent consumed 43.5 percent. This leaves a middle portion of the 
population consuming at a rate of 50.4 percent (42-43). Correlating this data with 
regional consumption patterns creates a clearer picture of poverty and inequality across 
Mohafazas. Beirut had the highest overall rate of average consumption at 5,706 LBP and 
one of the lowest Gini coefficients at .341 for any Mohafaza. When you compare this 
with the Northern Mohafaza, the regional disparity in both poverty and inequality is 
obvious. The average per capita consumption in the north was 3,045 LBP and its Gini 
coefficient was .37, the highest of any region. These numbers indicate that though the 
North only consumed 60 percent of the nation's average amount of consumption, it also 
had the greatest disparity in terms of expenditure inequality (43-44). This type of regional 
disparity indicates that there are "poverty pockets" within Lebanese Mohafazas. 
Therefore, when addressing poverty alleviation in Lebanon, the best strategy would be to 
confront it on an inter-governorate level rather than on an intra-governorate or a national 
one (77-78). Furthermore, the data demonstrates the failure of macroeconomic policies 
focused solely on the development of Beirut's financial sector.  
 
Poverty, Survey Sampling and Demographics 
 There is little demographic data for Lebanon. The last census conducted in the 
country was in 1932 during the Mandate period. There has been no census since because 
population data is extremely sensitive given that parliamentary representation is dictated 
by confessional demographics (Maktabi 220-225). The World Bank estimated population 
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of Lebanon is around 4 million ("Country Brief"). The lack of accurate demographic data 
makes the limitations of the UNDP's study transparent. It also makes it difficult to assess 
the severity of its conclusions. The study relies on a random sample of 14,948 
households, which filled out the general Household Living Conditions questionnaire. Out 
of the 14,948 households, 9,623 were selected on the Mohafaza level to fill out additional 
materials. 7,341 households responded to these additional questionnaires with some 
disparities between Mohafazas. In all, the final sub-sample represented 32,417 
individuals. Though this data represents easily the most exhaustive study of economic 
and living conditions in Lebanon in the last ten years, it is by no means comprehensive 
("Poverty, Growth, and Income Distribution in Lebanon" 83-85). 
 
Education, Health, and Poverty 
 In an effort to assess social development, the report uses its poverty data to target 
certain social indicators indicative of economic vitality. In particular, the report 
emphasizes education, unemployment, child services, and health. In 2004-2005, the study 
found that 8.7 percent of the population above 10 years old was illiterate, 29 percent had 
completed their elementary education, and 15 percent held university degrees or higher 
(60-61).  This national data was broken down both regionally and in terms of economic 
status. Despite there being regional disparities in educational attainment, for example 
Nabatieh and the Bekaa had the highest illiteracy rates; there was a higher correlation 
between overall income level and illiteracy as the most significant difference in 
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educational attainment was between those categorized as extremely poor, poor, and the 
better-off (60-62).  The study then coupled both of these markers together and found that 
a region's educational attainment rate correlated with its overall economic development. 
Therefore, the more economically developed a governorate was, the greater the impact 
education had on living standards. The report also found that the incidence of female 
illiteracy was double that of males, at 11.8 and 5.6 percent respectively. However, it 
found that these numbers correlated more significantly to economic status than to gender. 
For example, 3 percent of males within poor families were university graduates and this 
number rose to 19.8 among better off males. Similarly, only 3.6 percent of females in 
poor households were university graduates; whereas, this number rose to 17.5 percent 
among better-off women. Finally, the study discovered that there was a large correlation 
between the educational level of the heads of a household and that of their children. For 
example, children of poor families reached the same level of education as their parents 75 
percent of the time (61-62).   
 Philosophically, the report sees a lack of education as the greatest driver of 
poverty other than unemployment. In this view, education is the process by which 
poverty is transmitted across generations. Therefore, the report makes educational reform 
an intrinsic part of its poverty alleviation plan and encourages the state to focus on 
improving school enrollment and lowering drop-out rates. The study states clearly that 
education is not only a vital part of any social development strategy, but it is also crucial 
in increasing work productivity and ensuring economic growth in the country. It favors 
regional implementation suggesting that geographical targeting in order to ensure 
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equitable development across governorates is vital to the success of any poverty 
alleviation strategy. Though the report finds in its discussion of the educational sector 
that there is a greater correlation between economic development and educational 
attainment, its continual emphasis on intra-governorate disparity demonstrates the 
lopsided benefits that Lebanon's more urban governorates enjoy, implicitly indicating the 
need for targeted, social development strategies in Lebanon (59; 77-82).  
 
 Social Action Plan 
 During 2006, the Lebanese government worked with donor agencies and the 
UNDP to develop a plan to facilitate the country's economic development. In January of 
2007, the donor community held the 'International Conference for Support to Lebanon,' 
despite the devastation caused by the July War with Israel in 2006. Though augmented 
due to the war, the plan still echoed the UNDP's report, emphasizing social service 
delivery as an important mechanism for Lebanon's economic development. The plan 
paints a picture of the state as an actor enthusiastically accepting the donor communities' 
priorities, while also acutely aware of the important role that social services play in both 
perpetuating economic growth and securing state legitimacy ("Recovery, Reconstruction, 
and Reform). 
 In fact, the state devoted 17 of its 134 points to outlining its plan for social sector 
reforms. The plan proposed the creation of an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate a 
social development strategy, expanded the role that MoSA would play in creating social 
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policy, and outlined mechanisms for ensuring financial accountability with regards to the 
dispersal of donor funds. Additionally, the strategy also emphasized, much like the joint-
report did, the need for educational, health, and pension reform (13-16). In terms of 
education, the state asserted specifically the need for "strengthening the educational 
policy-making and planning capability at the Ministry of education, the installation of a 
sector management information system to monitor key sector outcomes, and the 
development of evaluation tools for the instructor's development program." The state 
further stressed that education costs exacerbated poverty. In response, the state vowed to 
reduce "the burden of the education cost on the poor households in targeted areas… (15)" 
Additionally, the state promised that it would expand technical training in certain 
disciplines, increase educational studies, and reduced student drop-out and repetition 
rates (15-16). In terms of an educational strategy, the state based not only their priorities, 
but their reform strategies on donor-derived development philosophies.  
 The state also echoed the general tone of the joint report in the plan. In article 32, 
the state discusses the importance of comprehensive approaches to economic recovery 
and reconstruction after the war (8). In article 64, the state uses almost verbatim the 
report's language to discuss the challenges of inter-governorate development:  
The government will also work to reduce regional disparities through promoting 
local development as an efficient tool for balanced regional development and 
poverty reduction (15).  
 It aimed to accomplish equitable regional development through both the 
expansion of MoSA as well through increased coordination between donors and local 
development groups. These are phrased as efforts to improve accountability and reform 
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bureaucracy (9; 13-14). The state's SAP, therefore, is not simply premised on, but also 
written in the spirit of a donor-derived agenda.  
 Though the state clearly understands that social development plays an important 
role in the funding decisions of donors, it also clearly believes that social services play an 
important role in ensuring its own legitimacy. In article 32, this point is clearly made:  
…[S]ocial sector reforms and strengthening social safety nets become a critical 
element of a strategy aimed at ensuring the prevalence of the State over all 
Lebanese territory, to the benefit of all denominational groups (8). 
 In these ways, the state recognizes in its SAP the important role that social 
services play in not only creating political legitimacy, but also in engendering non-
sectarianism and ensuring territorial control.   
 
Conclusion 
 Historically, social services have played a crucial role in establishing the political 
legitimacy of sectarian organizations and confessional leaders. They have also acted as a 
rally point for those protesting government corruption and confessional patronage. After 
the war, social service provision was marginalized both because of the extent of 
reconstruction and the fragility of Lebanon's new government. The result of the war not 
only reestablished old sectarian patronage systems, but also saw the arrival of powerful 
new confessional representatives like Hezbollah (Mackey 141; 174-178). These groups 
capitalized on the dysfunction of the government by creating powerful social service 
networks, thus ensuring post-war legitimacy in their constituent communities.  
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 As Lebanon gradually began to emerge from its reconstruction project in the early 
2000s, a renewed emphasis was placed on social development and service provision by 
both the donor community, to which the state was heavily indebted, and the government. 
This emphasis resulted in, at least philosophically, a new commitment by the state to 
expanding its role as a social service provider to curry favor with the donor community, 
confront powerful sectarian networks such as Hezbollah, and ensure state legitimacy. 
However, this new stance is confused and complicated by the fact that the confessional 
networks the state is supposedly trying to undermine are those of which it is composed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE STATE AND NGOS 
 How are NGOs regulated by and how do they interact with the state and each 
other in Lebanon? This discussion outlines the relationship between the state and the 
NGO community by elaborating the structure, finances, and administrative capacities of 
the Ministries of the Interior and Social Affairs. It also explores the history of NGO 
coordination in Lebanon in an effort to look at the internal dynamics of the NGO 
community there. These different topics work together to describe and problematize the 
reciprocal relationship between NGOs and the state. They also create space to assess 
what the explosion of NGOs implies about the strength of civil society in Lebanon. 
 NGOs are regulated by both a legal and a bureaucratic framework. Their legal 
registration is managed by the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). The relationship between 
the MoI and the NGO community is both contentious and ambiguous ("The Role of 
Lebanese NGOs" 8). NGOs complain that the MoI has systematically expanded its 
regulatory role as overseer of NGO registration in direct violation of both the constitution 
and the law ("Lebanon NGOs Mushrooms or Civil Society" 2009). Each of these 
explicitly provide for freedom of association and assembly (Makarem and Ball-Lechgar 
13-16). In addition to this legal relationship with the government, NGOs are 
bureaucratically integrated into the Lebanese state through at least three different 
ministries: the Ministry of Education (MoE), the Ministry of Health (MoH), and the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) ("The Role of Lebanese NGOs" 9-10). This 
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discussion of state bureaucracy focuses on how NGOs interact specifically with MoSA. I 
chose to focus on MoSA because of the wide scope of its duties and services and the 
scale of its partnerships with NGOs. Finally, I consider how NGOs have tried to 
coordinate amongst themselves in an effort to outline some of the failings of the NGO 
community. While the overall project in this chapter is to draw a picture of the tense and 
often ambiguous relationship between the Lebanese state and the NGO sector, it also 
draws attention to the inherent difficulties of assessing the strength of civil society in 
Lebanon. I argue that a one-sided portrayal of the state as a corrupt and monolithic actor 
presents only one aspect of the systemic problems that confessionalism creates. It is clear 
that there are NGOs that play a complicit role in supporting the sectarian tone of service 
provision by taking advantage of state bureaucracy and exploiting Confessional 
relationships.  
 Before moving onto the substance of this chapter, I want to note that much of the 
information here comes from the magazine The Monthly. Before finding The Monthly, the 
most recent data I had about NGO registration was from 1999. The fact that all my 
statistical data comes from one source is a drawback, but the magazine usually presents 
the data with little commentary. Accordingly, I have tried to focus on the numbers 
themselves rather than the opinions of the magazine. 
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Legal Framework 
 The registration of NGOs in Lebanon is governed by the law of Associations 
passed in 1909, when the Ottoman Empire controlled a territory called Greater Syria 
composed of modern day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. This law is also known as 
the law of the 29th Rajab or the law of Medhat Pasha. It consists of 19 articles and is 
divided into two sections. It has been amended twice since its adoption, in 1928 and 1932 
("Lebanon's Non-Governmental Organizations" 2008). This legal code is quite detailed 
covering virtually all aspects of what constitutes an association. However, despite this 
rigorous legal language, the law defines primarily the administrative parameters for 
establishing an association, rather than detailing the legal relationship between the state 
and an association (Makarem and Ball-Lechgar 13-20). For example, Article 6 states, 
"Accordingly, upon establishing any association, the founders must submit a signed and 
sealed statement containing its address, goals, objectives, main office, and the names, 
capacity, and position of those entrusted with its governance" (14). The law goes on to 
reiterate that this information needs to be filed with the Ministry of Interior (14). 
However, it is unclear whether this process is really necessary because as Article 2 states, 
"Establishing an association requires no prior permit, but by virtue of Article 6, notifying 
the government of its establishment is a prerequisite" (13). There is an obvious gap in 
defining what kind of documentation really needs to be submitted in order to notify the 
state of an organization's establishment since Article 2 is incredibly colloquial about its 
requirements. The rest of the articles go on to detail the appropriate ages of prospective 
members, provide dictums against forming nationalistic or clandestine organizations, and 
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define how an organization can be incorporated as a public utility (13-16). Outside of the 
law of Associations, several other laws provide guidelines for the regulation of NGOs, 
including the Lebanese constitution, which provides for the freedom assembly in Article 
13: "the freedom to express one's opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, 
and the freedom of assembly" (16). However, despite other regulations, the Law of 
Associations provides for an organization's basic right to exist. Therefore, other laws 
cannot supersede this one, making it very difficult for the state to dissolve or regulate 
organizations (16-20).  
 Though the Law of Associations is often praised for being modern in its 
allowances, it is also vague and lacking in punitive measures. The minor limits set on 
associations are virtually unenforceable within its framework because the law gives the 
government no right to dissolve an organization which is found in violation. The punitive 
measures that the law does provide for are a posteriori (Makarem and Ball-Lechgar 29-
37). For example, each year an organization is required to submit "a list of names of all 
the members, signed by the secretary and the chairperson [and] a copy of the annual 
budget and the accounts, signed by the secretary and the chairperson" (36). After these 
are submitted they are subject to review by the MoI. However, if the MoI finds that the 
records are not in order, the organization is not summarily dissolved nor can the MoI 
move to investigate the organization. Instead, the organization is simply fined. In fact, an 
organization can only be dissolved by a decree of the Council of Ministers (CoM). The 
CoM can only dissolve an organization if it has violated the law or code of ethics, 
disturbed the integrity of the state, tried to overthrow the state or divide its ministries, or 
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its members have been involved in acts of terrorism. Furthermore, when an organization 
is found guilty of any or all of these charges, its activities cannot be suspended without a 
court order (33-37). So not only is the process of registering or dissolving an association 
vague and bureaucratically complicated, investigatory processes are almost implicitly 
lacking in definition. This situation works both for and against NGOs in Lebanon. While 
on the one hand, NGOs can exploit this legal ambiguity, it has also allowed the MoI to 
illegally expand its regulatory role. 
 The major failing of the law is that it does not classify different types of 
organizations. As is, the law sees no difference between an NGO like the YMCA and a 
local sports club. The current law runs contrary to efforts by successive governments 
during the 20th century to introduce classification into the legal code. These efforts 
created autonomous regulations for foreign associations, associations with mentorship 
authority, cooperatives and mutual benefit organizations, trade unions, and religious 
associations. However, after the war ended in 1989, the Lebanese constitution accepted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UNDHR provides for freedom of 
assembly and association in Article 20 (Internal Governance, 16). Thus, the constitution 
reestablished the Law of Associations as the fundamental guideline for registering all 
organizations, including NGOs and other CSOs. As stated above, the MoI is responsible 
for handling the registration of NGOs in Lebanon. Since the Law of Associations was 
reestablished, the MoI has introduced two "circulars" that contradict the law in an alleged 
effort to more explicitly regulate NGO activity in Lebanon ("Lebanon NGOs Mushrooms 
or Civil Society," 2009). 
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 In 2006, the MoI introduced Circular no. 15/AM/2006. This circular requires the 
founders of an association to submit a request for a "factual certificate" to complete their 
registration ("Lebanon NGOs Mushrooms or Civil Society" 2009). This document 
includes the "name of the association, its address, by-laws, and the identity of its 
founders" (2009). These certificates are issued at the leisure of the ministry. This circular 
effectively created an NGO license.  A second circular issued in 2008 asserted that the 
dissolution of an organization required the retrieval of its factual certificate (2009). This 
circular directly contradicted Article 3 by bringing dissolution under the purview of the 
MoI (Makarem and Ball-Lechgar 13-14). Through these circulars, the MoI has taken the 
parameters created by the law of Associations and integrated them into its own 
bureaucratic mechanisms. The MoI has reinforced the validity of these circulars by 
becoming increasingly active in the monitoring of NGOs. This increase in regulatory 
activity has brought accusations of rampant corruption within the MoI, manifesting in its 
dissolving oppositional administrative boards under threat of dissolution and strong-
arming votes in general elections ("The Role of Lebanese NGOs" 3-10). These circulars 
are representative of the drawbacks of a vague framework like the Law of Association 
that does not provide classification schemes for different types of associations. Without 
classification and explicitly defined investigatory procedures, the law is easily exploitable 
by those who know how to navigate the confessional bureaucracy. 
 Though the actions of the Ministry create serious issues for NGOs operating in 
Lebanon, it must be reiterated that the law's lack of classification and its vague 
investigatory processes also create issues for the state. For example, Article 8 of the Law 
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of Associations stipulates the procedure for an association opening a bank account. 
According to Article 8, the bank needs proof of the organization's legality (which it gains 
through the process detailed earlier in this section). The bank will then ask for several 
other documents including the electoral record of the administrative board, the 
association's statutes and by-laws and the minutes of the meeting where the 
administrative board decided to open the bank account, identification and signatures of 
the account signatories, and occasionally some bank specific documents. The bank 
basically requires the organization to supply the same information that the MoI needs to 
register the NGO. Therefore, an association's official legal status plays a central role in an 
NGO's or a nonprofit's financing. This law also allows for an association to apply for a 
bank account while still waiting for the MoI's final decision regarding registration, 
meaning that an organization could at least in theory open a bank account and not receive 
legal status. Indeed, very little is required of an organization to become registered. If a 
bank allows this registration to play a crucial role in financing an association, then it is 
tacitly agreeing that the state has performed its due diligence in verifying the information 
provided. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the additional documents that a 
bank usually requires are either the same or quite similar to those required by the state in 
the first place (18-20). 
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Registration Increase 
 One might expect that the MoI, given its expanded powers limits NGO 
registrations. In fact, the opposite is true. In 2004, the MoI registered 125 organizations. 
This number increased in 2005 to 323 and exploded in 2006 to 518. In 2007, the number 
dropped back to 252, but then 2008 saw a record 560 NGOs register (493 of them in the 
last six months of the year). In total, 1,878 NGOs were established between 2004 and 
2008. Most sources from 2009 conservatively estimate that there are 5,000 NGOs 
operating actively in Lebanon ("Lebanese NGOs Mushrooms or Civil Society" 2009). If 
this is true, then nearly 40 percent of all types of NGOs were registered in the preceding 
four years. For now this data suggests simply that the Ministry is not using its power to 
stall NGO and CSO registration, which in some sense would stymie the creation of civil 
society. Outside of the ministry, the UNDP has also become increasingly active in 
Lebanon since 2000. Part of the UNDP's mission is to encourage the growth of civil 
society through NGO activity. However, this data combined with the accusations of 
corruption at the MoI raises questions about whether an increasing number of NGOs 
necessarily means a stronger civil society, whether the UNDP encourages the growth of 
the NGO sector or not.  
 
MoSA 
 The Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) is the primary, if underfunded, state 
ministry, responsible for financing NGOs and humanitarian organizations. Since being 
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established as an autonomous ministry in 1993, MoSA has taken a prominent role as the 
state's primary partner with the NGO community ("The Ministry of Social Affairs" 
2011). Between 1997 and 2003, MoSA dispersed 100 million Lebanese Pounds (LBP) to 
organizations focused on geriatric care as well as on health and social projects that 
involved partnerships with CSOs. In 2003, this 100 million represented nearly 1.82 
percent of the operating budget of the ministry and was nearly ten times the amount that 
the Ministry of Public Health handed out to non-state actors ("The Balance Sheet" 2003). 
As the chief representative of the state, MoSA has come under increasing fire concerning 
the accountability of the NGOs with which it partners, sectarian collusion, and general 
corruption ("The Role of Lebanese NGOs" 6-10).  
 
History 
 In 1983, nearly eight years into the Civil War, legislative decree #91 combined 
the Ministries of Public Health and Social Affairs, while placing the Ministry of Social 
Welfare under the power of the Directorate of Social Affairs. This situation remained the 
case until after the end of the civil war in 1990. In 1993, Law no. 212 officially split the 
Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs into separate entities. This 
decree also dictated that MoSA incorporate the Directorate of Social Affairs. From 1993-
2009, MoSA changed leadership 11 times and was represented by ministers from 4 
different sects. Ministerial leadership changed with each new government based on 
implicit inter-sect arrangements. The breakdown of sectarian leadership was 5 Shi'a, 4 
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Maronite, 1 Catholic, and 1 Armenian Orthodox. Though this type of turnover is not 
unusual for Lebanese ministries, it demonstrates that the ministry explicitly operates 
under the purview of a constantly changing sectarian authority ("The Ministry of Social 
Affairs" 2011). This ideological shift in leadership has overt implications for every facet 
of the ministry's operational agenda including the types of organizations with which it 
partners in joint projects. 
 
Structure 
 According to Law 212, MoSA is comprised of 3 separate directorates consisting 
of the Directorate of Social Affairs (DoSA), the Directorate of Social Development 
(DoSD), and the Director of Social Services (DoSS). DoSA is charged with managing the 
Bureau Authority, the Accounting Authority, and the Planning and Research Authority 
("The Ministry of Social Affairs and Its Beneficiaries" 2010). The Bureau Authority 
oversees "the Secretariat and Archive Department, the Department of Legal Studies, the 
Department of Administrative Affairs, and the Department of Public Relations and 
Conferences" (2010). It is also in charge of investigating NGOs that are accused of 
embezzling funds or otherwise obtaining them under false pretenses. The Planning and 
Research Authority manages the creation of statistical data, social training and program 
planning. The Accounting Authority oversees the finances for MoSA projects including 
those involving partnerships with NGOs and other CSOs. The Directorate of Social 
Affairs houses the Department of the Disabled, the Social Care Authority, the Civil 
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Society and Associations Authority, and the Family Affair's Authority. The Civil Society 
and Associations authority is in charge of nonprofits, joint projects, and public benefit 
associations. Finally, the Social Development Directorate consists of the Social 
Development Authority, the Handicrafts and Handmade Products Authority, and the 
Development Services Authority. In all, MoSA employs 470 people with each position 
being designated category 1-5 (1 being reserved for its minister) ("The Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Its Beneficiaries" 2010). 
 
Mission   
 MoSA is charged with a wide range of duties including creating a social 
development plan for Lebanon, regulating non-profit organizations that provide social 
services, implementing service projects that the state administers on its own (including 
providing care for the disabled, orphans, victims of war, and the mentally handicapped), 
and contracting joint projects with CSOs. MoSA acts as an umbrella ministry responsible 
for navigating and regulating a wide range of actors that provide social services. While it 
does not actively implement health or education projects, it provides these services in 
emergency situations and oversees those that provide them privately. A look at MoSA's 
sample budget from 2009 gives a clear picture of the types of projects that it funds. It 
spent nine billion LBP on Social and health-oriented project partnerships; 300 million 
LBP on reproductive health; and nearly a billion LBP on projects to fight against 
delinquency ("The Ministry of Social Affairs and Its Beneficiaries" 2010). That MoSA 
funds such an array of projects, which involve a variety of organization's spread across a 
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myriad of locations, stretches the organizations meager physical and financial resources 
very thin. 
 
Budget 
 In 1993, MoSA's initial budget was about 38 billion LBP, according to the 2010 
draft budget law that took effect in March 2011; MoSA's budget is now almost 143 
billion LBP ("The Ministry of Social Affairs" 2011). This budget increase has created 
outside interest in the types of organizations that receive MoSA funds. According to The 
Monthly, "the majority of [MoSA's] budget (137 billion) is allocated to social care 
institutions, which are either affiliated with religious or confessional bodies, or civil 
society organizations related to political leadership ("The Ministry of Social Affairs" 
2011)." This reality is made clearer by looking at two more of MoSA's budget items from 
2009. MoSA gave 400 million LBP to Caritas Lebanon, a branch of Caritas International, 
an NGO that implements various types of community development projects. 
Additionally, MoSA itemized one billion LBP for development project expenses. When 
this one billion is combined with the nine billion spent on partnership projects and the 40 
million given to one organization, the need for project accountability is obviously 
pressing ("The Ministry of Social Affairs and Its Beneficiaries" 2010). MoSA's 
accountability issues also crystallize when we look at where foreign funding goes in 
Lebanon. Though the Ministry of Education and Higher Education received 225 million 
LBP from foreign actors, the Ministries of Public Health and Social Affairs received 
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nothing from the international donor community ("Who Benefited" 2010). The lack of 
foreign funding indicates a general lack of trust by the donor community in the MoH and 
MoSA. 
 
Partnership & Accountability 
 Every year MoSA enters into partnership agreements with many NGOs and other 
CSOs to conduct educational and social health projects. These projects are a primary 
focus for critics of MoSA because the contracts are perceived to be largely unenforceable 
and generally lacking in transparency. To become a partnering agency with MoSA, an 
NGO must endure an 11-step process. Each year the Ministries of Finance and Social 
Affairs issue a joint decree calling for project proposals. These proposals are submitted to 
the Bureau Authority in the Directorate of Social Affairs, who in turn submits them to the 
Authority of Civil Society Associations in the Directorate of Social Services. At this 
point, a team of two government social workers carries out a study to decide on the 
legitimacy of the application. After this process, the application is either recommended or 
denied by the DoSS. If it is recommended, the NGO submits eight required documents 
including a registration statement to the MoF and MoSA. The application is then sent 
back to the Directorate of Social Affairs where a contribution amount is decided upon 
and allocated to the NGO. Funded projects are supervised by a team composed of people 
from the DoSS and DoSA. Together, they draft yearly reports, which assess the degree to 
which the project is fulfilling the contractual obligations of the partnership. After 
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contracts are approved by the ministry, they are submitted to the Audit Bureau for 
approval. The Audit Bureau cannot base its decision to approve or deny the contract on 
whether MoSA conducted a full investigation of the applicant organization ("The 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Its Beneficiaries" 2010). So, if MoSA does not perform its 
due diligence in ascertaining the applicant's legitimacy, the Audit Bureau cannot ask for 
proof of the association's legitimacy. The Audit Bureau can only ask for copies of 
administrative documents and recommend that MoSA reevaluates its regulatory 
procedures. However, this recommendation is usually ignored because MoSA lacks 
follow-up capabilities. The bureau can also ask the MoI for names on the administrative 
board of the organization. Therefore, if the bureau is properly registered, this alone acts 
as evidence that the organization is legitimate ("The Ministry of Social Affairs and Its 
Beneficiaries" 2010).   
 This process obviously has systemic flaws. It is inherently biased towards projects 
with political or sectarian backing because the process crosses ministerial and inter-
ministerial lines. The labyrinthine bureaucracy at work also makes assessing projects 
essentially impossible. Therefore, though the project is put through a complicated 
application process, it is actually a purely administrative undertaking, creating only 
symbolic obstacles to a partnership ("The Ministry of Social Affairs and Its 
Beneficiaries" 2010). Finally, the bureaucratic relationship and lack of accountability 
between the MoF, MoI, and MoSA is indicative of the failure of the legal framework for 
NGO registration both substantively and instrumentally. If NGOs are required to simply 
notify the MoI of their existence to gain legitimacy as an association, then their 
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administrative boards are implicitly approved by the government. Therefore, when they 
submit a contract to MoSA, particularly if they have sectarian backing, it is impossible 
for the ministry to figure out if the organization is actually legitimate according to its own 
rules and regulations because they have already been given legal status by another 
Ministry in the government.  
 
NGO Coalition Building in Lebanon  
 In "Struggling for Civic Space: NGOs in Postwar Lebanon," Paul Kingston argues 
that two early examples of NGO coordination during and just after the civil war are 
emblematic of the political and sectarian tensions, which envelop the NGO community 
and undermine its ability to articulate a non-sectarian message. These examples 
demonstrate the difficult challenges that continue to plague the NGO community in 
Lebanon. The first example focuses on a non-sectarian group from the late 1980's called 
the National Forum on Social Development (NFSD). This organization failed because of 
its internal power dynamics and the fact that it lacked a unified message. The second 
example is the Lebanese NGO Forum (LNF). Though the LNF endures, it is 
representative of the difficulties inherent in separating sectarian interests in a 
confessional bureaucracy as well as the dangers in associating civil society with large and 
powerful bodies with overt political agendas. A discussion of both these groups suggests 
that the sectarian flavor of service provision and civil society itself in Lebanon is not 
simply the result of a corrupt government. 
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NFSD 
 At the height of the civil war, a group of NGOs called 'The Solidarity NGOs' met 
in the offices of Oxfam-Lebanon in hopes of coming together to promote non-
sectarianism and encourage development cooperation. At the time, a lack of foreign 
funding and a completely functionless state left local and international NGOs 
underfinanced and understaffed in the midst of massive conflict. This lack of centralized 
service provision resulted in sectarian groups using social services to further their own 
political and military agendas (Kingston 11-12). These NGOs sought systemic changes 
focused on "a sense of solidarity rather than charity (12)." For example, the group's 
members shifted their focus from distributing medicine to providing primary healthcare. 
The group kept their membership small and held two conferences in Cyprus in the spring 
of 1987 and 1988. These conferences gave rise to the National Forum on Social 
Development (NFSD). On the surface, the organization represented a real awareness that 
the civil war created an opportunity for real change. However, internally, the organization 
was flawed from the very beginning. Core members knew that the fledgling outfit needed 
more members, but refused to integrate organizations they saw as being part of sectarian 
power networks. This decision kept the organization deliberately small and in a time of 
increased sectarianism, relatively weak. Also the organization suffered from an inflated 
air of self-importance, which cloaked it in a mask of unreality (11-14). For example, the 
NFSD tried to assert itself as a 'forum' "for the exchange of information…" (14) 
However, in reality, the organization was more of a cartel controlled by its larger and 
more powerful members. These flaws, coupled with external interference from the 
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International Committee for Voluntary Agency (ICVA), led to the dissolution of the 
NFSD. The ICVA decided to come to Lebanon and assess the NGO situation there. 
Viewing the NFSD as a marginal coordinating entity, its members met with 
representatives of the newly formed Lebanese NGO forum and confessional emissaries. 
Additionally, despite the urging of both Oxfam and the NFSD, it focused its efforts in 
Beirut and failed to visit other regions in Lebanon. This failure to understand the 
geographic scope of the war resulted in an overemphasis on Beirut and therefore 
overemphasized the importance of the Beirut powerbrokers that comprised the LNF (14-
16).  
 The NFSD is an instructive if disappointing example of the difficulties of 
articulating a non-sectarian message in Lebanon. Devastated by the worst violence of the 
period, the country suffered from an increased sense of sectarianism as inter-confessional 
rivalries ripped the Christian and Shiite contingents apart. This fact meant that the NFSD, 
if it was to maintain a non-sectarian message, would have to be small. This decision, in 
turn, reduced its influence. Despite Oxfam's endorsement, the organization was also 
plagued with in-fighting and internal power struggles. This meant that it could not clearly 
articulate or embody a message of systemic change and non-sectarian cooperation. 
Finally, the organization also failed because an external actor, (the ICVA), recklessly 
sanctioned the LNF. This first attempt at NGO coordination is unfortunately emblematic 
of several recurring problems that continue to inhibit the growth of the NGO sector in 
Lebanon: political in-fighting and power struggles, the difficulty contextualizing a 
nonsectarian message, and external meddling.  
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Lebanese NGO Forum (LNF) 
 The LNF was started by the head of the YMCA, Ghassan Sayagh. The 
organization rose to prominence after the ICVA endorsed it as the chief NGO 
coordinating body in Lebanon. Throughout the early 1990s, the LNF positioned itself as 
the primary organization in Lebanon concerned with raising the profile of social welfare 
issues and building a community of NGOs. Its strategy included organizing national 
conferences on social needs and the need for cooperation between NGOs and the state in 
1991 along with a conference on child welfare in 1992. Notably, it began a high-profile 
NGO training program, funded by CIDA, designed to reach out to other NGOs, 
particularly those associated with the Palestinian NGO forum. Projects like these were 
also emblematic of the LNF's attitude towards confessionalism. Whereas the NFSD 
refused to include NGOs associated with sectarian parties, the LNF, composed of much 
larger and more influential NGOs, sought to include parties regardless of their 
confessional associations. This strategy allowed Sayagh to paint the LNF as a 
'progressive organization' that encouraged cooperation while recognizing that real reform 
in Lebanon cannot happen without engaging confessional groups. The understanding that 
sectarianism was a reality that simply had to be faced allowed the LNF to align itself as a 
political organization rather than a simple sectarian mouthpiece (Kingston 16-21).  
 However, there were and continue to be recognizable problems with the LNF. 
Though these problems did not destroy the organization, they are indicative of core issues 
confronting the development of a strong NGO sector in Lebanon. These problems 
revolve primarily around the role of Sayagh and the YMCA. Ghassan Sayagh is a 
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charismatic figure in Lebanese politics and the YMCA remains today among the most 
powerful NGOs operating in country. The prominent role that he plays on the board of 
the LNF (his official status according to the LNF website lists him as being part of the 
board of directors, but only as a member) raises the suspicion that the LNF is merely a 
vehicle for the YMCA.8 However, in addition to the YMCA, seven out of the ten 
members of the LNF represent the social welfare arms of powerful religious groups. The 
other two organizations, the Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped and the 
Lebanese Union for childcare have powerful political connections to the Lebanese 
government (18-21). Considering these facts along with the YMCA's international and 
religious affiliation, the legitimacy of the LNF as a coordinating body comes into 
question. Instead of being a powerful symbol of the growth of civil society in Lebanon, 
the organization looks to be another example of the re-entrenchment of sectarianism. It is 
also unclear whether the organization represents real coordination between its 10 
constitutive NGOs or whether its influence is symbolic and rests on the autonomous 
strength of its members. Despite its longevity, the LNF is a cautionary example for those 
enthusiastic about NGO coordination and growth in Lebanon. Studying the LNF 
reinforces the notion that those organizations that are politically, religiously, or externally 
connected are firmly embedded in the political fabric of the Lebanese state and will 
perpetually dictate the parameters of social service provision in Lebanon. 
	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8The LNF's official website can be accessed at http://www.lnf.org.lb/ 
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Geography and Sectarianism: NGO Distribution in Lebanon 
 I have alluded to the difficulty of assessing civil society growth in Lebanon. I 
have illustrated the multiple meanings implied by the growth of Lebanon's NGO sector 
by discussing the legal and bureaucratic frameworks for NGO regulation and internal 
dynamics of NGO coordination. The suggestion that NGO growth is synonymous with a 
stronger civil society is complicated by looking at both the geographic distribution of 
NGOs and, in a limited fashion, their sectarian affiliations. The point is that more NGOs 
does not necessarily equate to less sectarianism or an equitable distribution of NGO 
activity throughout Lebanon.  
 
Geographical Spread 
 Lebanon is divided into five governing and electoral districts called Mohafazats: 
North Lebanon, the Beqa'a, South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, and Beirut. Figure 1 is a 
political map of Lebanon featuring transliterated Arabic names for each Mohafazat: Ech 
Chimal (North Lebanon), El Bekaa (the Beqa'a), Al Jinoub (South Lebanon), Jabal 
Loubanane (Mount Lebanon), and  Beyrouth (Beirut). 
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Figure 1. A map of Lebanon showing the five governing and electoral districts. 
 
 The Monthly counted 4,175 registered NGOs in total among the five Mohafazats. 
1,969 of the NGOs were active. These numbers suggest that 47.2 percent of registered 
NGOs in Lebanon are active. Table 1 details the total number of NGOs and the active 
number of NGOs in each Mohafazat.9  The vast majority of registered NGOs in Lebanon 
are in Beirut or its surrounding area, Mt. Lebanon. This fact is not a surprise because  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9The data in Table 1 comes from a series of Monthly articles published in 2008. North Lebanon's date 
comes from the article, "Lebanon's Non-governmental Organization." The data for South Lebanon comes 
from the article "Non-Governmental Organizations in South Lebanon." The data for the Beqa'a comes from 
"Non-Governmental Organizations in the Beqa'a."  The data for Mount Lebanon comes from "Non-
Governmental Organizations feature predominately in Mount Lebanon." The data for Beirut comes from 
"NGOs in Beirut: their Activities Cover the Entire Country."  
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Table 1. NGOs by Mohafazas 
Mohafazas Total Number of 
NGOs 
Active number of 
NGOs 
North Lebanon 707 390 
South Lebanon 457 238 
Beqa'a 363 188 
Mount Lebanon 1,478 744 
Beirut 1,170 409 
	  
Beirut's NGOs and to a lesser extent those in Mount Lebanon have a much wider scope 
and scale then the NGOs in other Mohafazats ("NGOs in Beirut" 2008).  However, 
strangely, all the Mohafazats except Beirut have more than 50 percent of their NGOs 
active.  Only 34 percent of Beirut's NGOs are active. 
Also, one would have guessed that Beirut would have the highest number of 
registered NGOs since it is the seat of the Lebanese government. However, it is second in 
terms of registered NGOs to Mt. Lebanon. Despite its relatively low activity, Beirut along 
with Mt. Lebanon, easily the most affluent and urban parts of Lebanon, account for more 
than 60 percent of the total NGOs registered in the country10. It is not surprising that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10This data was gathered from a 4 issue spread the Monthly did in 2008 on the geographic distribution of 
NGOs in Lebanon. I totaled the data and calculated the percentages using those issues, 70-74. 
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South Lebanon and the Beqa'a, two of the poorest areas of Lebanon, receive the fewest 
NGO services. Both of these Mohafazas are also perceived as areas where voting 
behavior is dictated by sectarian affiliation. The infrastructure in South Lebanon and the 
Beqa'a has also been decimated repeatedly since the civil war, limiting the ability for 
service delivery. North Lebanon, by far the poorest part of the country, receives more 
attention from the international community, despite its own sectarian unrest ("Poverty, 
Growth, and Income Distribution in Lebanon" 43-46).  
 These numbers suggest several interesting realities about NGO activity in 
Lebanon. First, communities in north and south Lebanon as well as the Beqa'a are being 
underserved by an active NGO community. Though the large number of registered NGOs 
in Mt. Lebanon and Beirut is not surprising, the fact that Beirut has such a low rate of 
activity is. At 34 percent, Beirut's NGOs are markedly less active than those in 
surrounding areas ("NGOs in Beirut" 2008). This fact remains true despite the larger 
scope, scale, and finances of many of Beirut's NGOs. This low activity rate begs several 
questions: Why are Beirut's NGOs, given their proximity to the government and their 
financial resources, not more active? How does one determine whether an NGO is active? 
Does the government ever give money to inactive NGOs? 
 
Sectarian Distribution 
 In 2008, there were nearly 4,400 NGOs registered in Lebanon. Of these, 87 were 
designated social welfare associations ("Associations of Social Welfare" 2008). A social 
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welfare association is an organization which is recognized by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs as one that "seeks to fulfill any of society's needs" (2008). This classification is 
not elaborated in the Law of Associations. Rather, it is the result of a legislative decree 
from 1977 (before MoSA really existed). However much like MoSA's partnering 
procedures, organizations that are recognized as social welfare associations are still 
subject to license renewal by an audit court and need a factual certificate from the MoI 
(2008). Social welfare associations are usually non-profit groups and they are usually 
involved in charitable giving projects. In 2008, only 59 of the 87 applications were 
submitted for renewal to the MoI (2008). It is much easier to ascertain the sectarian and 
civil affiliations of these groups than it is other, often inactive, NGOs. Many NGOs are 
extremely reticent to reveal anything about their affiliations, budget, or staff. This means 
that exhaustive records of who caters to whom are non-existent and the handful of studies 
that have been carried out do not make affiliation their main focus.  
 Thirty Four of the officially recognized social welfare associations had explicit 
sectarian or confessional ties. Nine of them were Shi'a non-political foundations; four 
were Hizbullah-affiliated associations; three were Druze non-political groups; seven were 
Christian organizations; and 4 were Sunni-affiliated.11 57 percent of all social welfare 
associations had a sectarian or explicitly political orientation. The 25 remaining 
associations are classified as civil organizations. However, interestingly, many of these 
organizations are associated with international groups such as Lions International and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1112 others were affiliated with smaller confessional groups and political movements including the Popular 
Nasserite Movement and the PSP.	  
66 
Red Cross of Lebanon (2008). This fact indicates that the majority of social welfare 
associations are not the response of an active civil society but, rather, the expression of 
confessional power or the manifestation of external influence.  
 Obviously, the social welfare association is a rare categorization encompassing 
only about two percent of registered NGOs. However, even among this small group of 
organizations, sectarian affiliation is an obvious factor. Of the 34 organizations with 
obvious sectarian attachment, 13 were Shiite affiliated, 7 were Christian and only 4 were 
Sunni. MoSA is almost always presided over by either a Christian or Shi'a. This fact 
cannot be a coincidence. The confessional orientation of a ministry can dictate who gets 
money and who gets a designation (2008).  
 In the section detailing the geographic distribution of Lebanese NGOs, we saw 
that NGO activity varied depending on Mohafaza. Here we see that even in a special 
category of organizations, sectarianism still plays a powerful role in determining 
government recognition. This section has in a small way tried to complicate the notion 
that a growth in NGO activity necessarily indicates a strengthening of civil society as 
both the geographic distribution and the sectarian scope of some of these organizations 
suggest that the status quo is merely being maintained. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the legal and bureaucratic regulations which govern 
NGO activity in Lebanon. Legally, NGOs are classified as an association under the Law 
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of Associations. This law does not classify organizations based on their type, creating a 
situation where a youth soccer club and a charitable NGO are somewhat identical in the 
eyes of the law. Furthermore, this framework fails to articulate clear investigative 
procedures or putative measures in regards to NGO registration or the dissolution of an 
association. Though the law is deliberately vague in these aspects, in an effort to ensure 
freedom of association, both the Ministry of Interior and the NGO community have 
exploited the ambiguity of the law.  
 Bureaucratically, NGOs are largely regulated by one of three ministries: the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Health, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
This discussion focused on MoSA because of its extensive partnerships with the NGO 
community. MoSA's poorly-defined partnering procedures have allowed NGOs to take 
advantage of government resources. MoSA, as a result, is perceived as lacking in 
accountability or as out-right corrupt. This perception is circumstantially corroborated 
when one looks more closely at MoSA's itemized budget. It is also telling that MOSA 
does not receive any funds from foreign donors, when others do such as the Ministry of 
Education. Both bureaucratically and legally, NGOs are given space to exploit 
confessional bureaucracy. Sectarian NGOs more effectively and more profitably 
negotiate this space given their explicit confessional ties.  
 The rest of the chapter shifted its focus from the state to the NGO community 
itself. Two examples of NGO coordination were used to demonstrate that in-fighting, 
external interference and sectarian patronage plague the NGO community in Lebanon. 
These examples also undermine the notion that an explosion in NGO growth between 
68 
2004 and 2008 necessarily indicates a stronger civil society. The final section analyzed 
the geographic and sectarian distribution of NGOs in Lebanon. This data supported, at 
least superficially, the notion that an increase in NGO registration does not simply signify 
the growth of civil society in Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE MEDIA AND CONFESSIONALISM 
 In the preceding chapter, I elaborated the bureaucratic and legal relationship 
between the state and the NGO community in Lebanon. This chapter discusses how 
social services, the state, and confessionalism are perceived in the Lebanese media. I 
have chosen to arrange my findings in three themes: the state as an actor; the political 
promise of social services; and confessionalism in Lebanese society. I have placed a 
special emphasis in each thematic discussion on how sectarian NGOs impact each theme. 
My argument in this chapter is that confessionalism affects the perception of the state, 
civil society and Lebanese identity. The articles allow us to observe how perceptions of 
the state demonstrate the politicization of social services and the NGO community. If it is 
difficult to gather the overt sectarian affiliations of many NGOs, the press provides 
excellent insight into the interplay between sectarian NGOs and social service provision 
in the public sphere. Before turning to the themes, I outline the time period from which 
the articles came and briefly introduce each of the newspapers that I have selected.     
 
Time Period 
 On May 21, 2008, Lebanese political leaders signed the Doha Agreement, 
drawing 18-months of protests, government closures, and sectarian struggle to a close. 
This period of unrest began in December 2006, when six members of Prime Minister 
Fouad Siniora's government quit his cabinet. Afterwards, widespread protests began, 
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including a sit-in in downtown Beirut that effectively turned the area into a tent city. The 
period that followed brought the country to the brink of civil war. This outbreak of 
sectarian strife came after nearly two years of general political turbulence following the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, the withdrawal of Syria 
from Lebanon during the spring of that same year (known as the Cedar Revolution), and 
the July War of 2006. The 18-months of protests ostensibly pivoted on two basic issues: 
election reform and opposition veto power. The turbulence also represented a showdown 
between the March 14th and March 8th alliances. The March 14th alliance continues to 
be led by Saad Hariri, leader of the "Movement of the Future,12" current Prime Minister, 
and son of Rafik Hariri. The March 8th alliance forms the parliamentary opposition and 
includes political parties such as Hezbollah and Michael Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement 
(a Maronite political party). The political chasm between the March 14th and March 8th 
alliances continues to define Lebanese political life today. It is also emblematic of the 
divide between the three dominant sects in Lebanon: the Sunni (March 14th), the Shi'a 
(March 8th), and Maronite Christians (split between the two coalitions March 8th and 
March 14th)13 ("Lebanese rivals set to elect president after historic accord;" "Lebanese 
leaders clinch deal to end crisis"). I chose this time period because of it still lingers in the 
memory of all Lebanese. The upheaval and violence of 2005 and the July War crippled 
the country economically and drew sharp, confessional borders around communities and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12Officially called the "Movement of the Future," this party is more generally know as the "the Future 
Movement." 
13The Maronite Christian church is politically split in Lebanon between the Kataeb party and Michel 
Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. The Kateab party supports the March 14th alliance and Aoun's movement 
controversially currently supports the March 8th alliance. 
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politicians alike. I believed articles written during this time period would highlight the 
politicization of social service provision, the confessionalization of civil society and more 
specifically the NGO community, and the fractured and paradoxical relationship Lebanon 
has with confessionalism and their national identity.  
 
Newspapers 
 For this project, I sampled articles from four Lebanese dailies: An-Nahar, As-
Safir, Al-Mustaqbal, and Al-Akhbar. I chose these papers because they represent several 
of the predominant viewpoints that define the everyday politics in Lebanon. I did not pull 
articles from any English language daily or The Monthly14. Below, I give a brief 
background of each paper, a general synopsis of its orientation, a brief summary of the 
type of articles I found, and my impression, if any, of how people viewed each paper 
based on my own conversations, interactions, and observations with Lebanese taxi 
drivers, Arabic teachers, journalists, wait staff, various other professionals, and NGO 
staff. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14As previously noted, I tried not to use The Monthly as an editorial source. Rather, I focused on the rare 
statistical data that it published.  
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An-Nahar 
 Established in 1933, An-Nahar, meaning "the day," is the oldest daily in Lebanon. 
Over the years, An-Nahar has continuously changed its aesthetic look, attempting to 
connect with different generations and sects of the Lebanese population ("In Beat with 
the Times"). The newspaper is generally considered centrist, placing an emphasis on 
Lebanese sovereignty and the need for Confessional reform. After the assassination of 
Rafik Hariri, the paper's editor and chief, Gebran Ghassan Tueni and one of its most 
notable journalists, Samir Kassir, were assassinated after they advocated for a special 
U.N. Tribunal to investigate Syria's possible role in the killing ("Assassinations that 
rocked the country since 2005"). Tueni and Kassir are emblematic of the newspaper's 
advocacy for Lebanese sovereignty, rooted in its anti-Syrian stances. The four articles 
that I sampled from An-Nahar covered a variety of topics from a number of different 
perspectives, crossing sectarian lines by stressing the importance of cultural dialogue, 
civil society, and a spirit of service. The articles selected gave special emphasis to the 
connection between NGOs, civil society, and national values, stressing the role an active 
civil society can play in fostering citizenship. 
 
As-Safir 
 As-Safir, meaning "the Ambassador," was launched by Talal Salman in March 
1974 just before the start of the Civil War. The newspaper is noted for its distinctly 
regional outlook, which attempts to connect Lebanese life with the larger Arab world 
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("About Ambassador"). This outlook is summed up by the newspaper's famous slogan 
"the newspaper of the Arab World in Lebanon and the newspaper of Lebanon in the Arab 
World." Talal Salman continues to edit the paper, and is a vocal proponent of secularism 
and the end of confessionalism (Hasmea 2008). The four articles that I sampled reflected 
an outlook committed to elaborating a Lebanese identity from multiple perspectives 
including those that detail Hezbollah's plan for socio-economic development in the south, 
explore the connection between secularism and Lebanese identity, and emphasize cultural 
dialogue and Lebanese citizenship. Like An-Nahar, As-Safeer also connects social service 
projects with a strong national identity. However, it also details and lauds Hezbollah's 
NGOs, emphasizing the fact that they are Arab-Lebanese owned and address the needs of 
the Lebanese people. In this sense, the newspaper uses sectarian NGOs, their social 
services, and civil society more broadly as representative of both Lebanon's distinctive 
qualities and its indigenous capabilities. In my experience, people found As-Safir to be 
the 'best newspaper' for finding news that challenges existing political viewpoints while 
maintaining a non-sectarian perspective. 
 
Al-Mustaqbal 
 Al-Mustaqbal, meaning "the Future," is the official press organ of Saad Hariri's 
Movement of the Future. Founded by Rafik Hariri, the newspaper is allied with the 
March 14th alliance ("Legal Loophole used to snare journalist"). In accordance with this 
orientation, the newspaper covers a variety of topics that reinforce the views of the party. 
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However, since the March 14th alliance forms the majority in parliament, Al-Mustaqbal 
also espouses the viewpoint of the government. The articles I sampled reflect the paper's 
dual role as mouthpiece of both the parliamentary majority and a political party. While 
some articles promote the agenda of the Future Movement, others discuss the disruptive 
effects of confessional opposition on the state's ability to govern. The fact that the 
newspaper is officially associated with a sectarian group colors its approach to issues of 
sectarianism and citizenship. In this vein, social services are at the core of the party's 
promise to its electoral base and therefore are explicitly politicized. Though it does not 
emphasize Arab identity, Al-Mustaqbal also strongly advocates for Lebanese sovereignty. 
The newspaper provides a unique insight into the tenuous relationship between a political 
party as a standing government and a political movement as a party trying constantly to 
win the loyalty of its political constituency.  
 
Al-Akhbar 
 Al Akhbar, literally meaning "The News," was founded in August 2006, just after 
the end of the July War, by veteran Lebanese journalists Joseph Samaha and Brahim El 
Ameen. Perhaps the most controversial daily in Lebanon, the newspaper aligns itself with 
the March 8th alliance. This association leads many people in both the U.S. and Europe 
to assume that the Al-Akhbar is in some way the mouthpiece of Hezbollah ("Al-Akhbar 
newspaper lays off 20 of its staff"). However, this affiliation has been challenged by 
Hezbollah's Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who has said that Al-Akhbar is 
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"not run by [Hezbollah], and [is] not committed to [the party's] policy or ideology ("Al-
Akhbar")." Despite these remarks, Al-Akhbar, due to its alignment with the opposition 
alliance, is considered a far-left newspaper and it is often criticized for its political 
polemics. In the many articles I sampled, Al-Akhbar presented stories that were 
consistently critical of the government, emphasizing alternative forms of socio-economic 
development while critiquing confessional corruption and external interference by 
western governments. Social services and the NGO community are corrupt when 
proffered by the March 14th alliance; however, they are also symbolic of the alternative, 
indigenous development that the opposition envisions for Lebanon. In a similar fashion to 
Al-Mustaqbal, Al-Akhbar's attacks on sectarian alliances and interference by western 
governments and donor agencies have to be understood in terms of the newspaper's 
political stance. Al-Akhbar and Al-Mustaqbal highlight the difficulty of discussing 
sectarianism in Lebanon because both newspapers render confessional agendas through a 
political lens.   
 I will now discuss the findings of my close reading of articles from these four 
newspapers. Again, my conclusions are arranged into three themes: the state as an actor, 
the political promise of social services, and confessionalism in Lebanese society. 
 
Theme: The State as an actor 
 An obvious theme that emerges from reading the sampled articles is the 
overwhelmingly negative portrayal of the state. Rather than critiquing the explicit 
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sectarianism of the coalition government, several of the articles attack the government's 
dependence on foreign actors and foreign development priorities. Articles also blame the 
state for its failure to allocate funds properly, foster a unified Lebanese identity, or 
spearhead socio-economic projects and democratic reform in a timely or efficient 
manner, effectively making the state the "fall guy" in confessional politics. Though these 
articles attack the governing coalition or in some cases the political opposition, they 
assign agency to a conceptual state, creating the impression that this "state" is responsible 
for Lebanon's problems, allowing writers to ridicule the governing coalition without 
overtly invoking sectarianism. This impression is reinforced by articles that advocate for 
NGOs to take charge of civil reform by detailing the state's lack of services and other 
bureaucratic failures. Paradoxically, these assignations are tempered by a resigned 
understanding that the state is composed of sectarian groups, rendering it a uselessly 
bureaucratic entity. The state, therefore, is simultaneously portrayed as a corrupt, 
dependent, externally-oriented actor, failing to take care of its citizenry as well as a 
farcical composite weakened by a dependency on sectarian interests and their foreign 
patrons.  
 Al-Akhbar attacks the state for its dependence on foreign governments. In 
"Democracy or Progress: Which Comes First," Abdul Haleem Fadlallah premises his 
attacks on the ruling coalition on the fallibility of western modes of democracy (1-2). He 
begins by critiquing western development models for undermining Lebanese sovereignty, 
asserting that "in some cases, the idea of democracy chalks up to the exchange of power 
between small, exclusive circles--experienced social and financial elite who manage to 
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acquire power through manipulating the polls and evading the law" (2). This type of 
comment is typical of Al-Akhbar's veiled attacks on the ruling coalition. The article 
contextualizes this accusation by critiquing western conceptions of economic progress, 
which in turn force governments to become corrupt (1-3). Another article from Al-Akhbar 
states, "the current government, through undermining the constitution…through its 
corruption, impotency, and subordination to foreign powers…, and through its efforts to 
make Lebanon a nation subservient to the hubs of the global capitalist system…is 
indicative of a crisis of the ruling class" (Musallam 1). Al-Akhbar's criticisms thoroughly 
conflate the current government with the state apparatus, allowing the writers to promote 
their own political agendas while forcing the reader to see the state and the ruling 
coalition as synonymous. The conception offered by Al-Akhbar elucidates just how 
confessionalism weakens the state by making it a composite of political interests. It also 
highlights the way that social services and socio-economic development become political 
tools. In this case, alternative indigenous development acts as an authentic reaction to 
western development practices. The newspaper's sympathy with the Hezbollah-oriented 
resistance stance lends even more weight to the author's criticism of western development 
tropes because it relates alternative socio-economic practices to the values of Hezbollah 
and its NGOs ("About the Social View of the Resistance"). This representation gives 
political legitimacy to the opposition's social services and development strategies, which 
are, in turn, premised on Hezbollah's confessional ideology and political agenda.  
 Al-Mustaqbal is interested in using it's party's status at the governing coalition to 
conflate the state's resources with the party's. In "The Hariri Foundation Opens the 
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Ukroum Health and Social Center Aaklar," the author, Zeiad Monsour, uses the opening 
of a health center as a method of demonstrating the strength and beneficence of the 
Future Movement. For example, He quotes Husein Al-Masri, the general coordinator for 
the Future Movement in Aaklar, as saying, "[t]his is the true way of interaction between a 
leadership and a people who are united by love and loyalty" (2). Strangely, he does not 
say it is typical of the interaction between a state and its people or even a government and 
its people. Instead, Al-Masri uses leadership and loyalty to invoke the party and in turn 
build political capital for the party, not the governing coalition. In the same article, 
Monsour also quotes Sheikh Zeiad Adra, a spokesman for the people of Mt. Ukroum, as 
saying, "[t]he martyr, president Rafik al-Hariri, wanted Lebanon to be a country of the 
Lebanese, and for reform to prevail in every region and in every corner of the nation 
without a concern for ideological, racial, or class-based distinctions" (1). Here, Adra 
equates the Lebanese state with the politics of Rafik Hariri15. This quote creates the 
impression that the government and the state are synonymous with the Future Movement 
and that to be Lebanese means to be affiliated with the party.  
 The article is also indicative of the same paradoxical understanding of the state 
found in Al-Akhbar's articles. Both newspapers enjoy using the state for their own 
purposes. Al-Akhbar wants to create the impression that the state is a corrupt platform 
that is manipulated to force sectarian political agendas and foreign governing ideologies 
and development priorities on the Lebanese people. However, the newspaper also uses 
this conception to promote the political strengths of the March 8th alliance, namely a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15It should also be noted that Adra referred to the former Prime Minister as the President. 
79 
vision of indigenous service provision premised on resistance similar to the services 
offered by Hezbollah's NGOs. However, it never offers an alternative form of 
governance. Al-Mustaqbal associates the benefits of state infrastructure with the Future 
Movement's political power, creating the impression that to be Lebanese means to be 
aligned with the party. However, the article also emphasizes the importance of the party 
over the importance of the ruling coalition. The newspaper is much more interested in 
building political capital for the Future Movement than maintaining the power of the 
March 14th alliance. Interestingly, none of the articles I reviewed from An-Nahar, the 
newspaper considered the most centrist among the four that I surveyed, used "the state" 
as a vehicle for any specific political agenda, focusing instead on confessionalism's 
negative effects on society and the positive relationship between civil society, 
development, citizenship, and national identity. 
As-Safir highlights the state's inefficiency in providing social services in articles 
that discuss civil society and NGO activity. In one article, the newspaper details  Jihad 
Al-Binaa's, Hezbollah's construction NGO, plan to rebuild the southern suburbs 
("Hezbollah launches Project Promise" 1). In doing so, the article questions not only state 
accountability, but also the state's ability to finance reconstruction, saying, "…the 
reparations from the state will not be sufficient to cover all the costs of reconstruction" 
(2-3). The article goes on to detail that the NGO's funds will come from philanthropic 
organizations throughout the Arab and Islamic world, couching donor confidence in 
terms of the NGO's proven expertise (3). The article juxtaposes the state's ineptitude with 
the professional experience of Lebanon's NGOs. In describing the quality, character, and 
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context of the project, this article also creates an extraordinarily negative impression of 
the state. It also always refers to it as the state and not the government (1-4). As-Safir 
praises Hezbollah's project at the expense of the state. As a result, Hezbollah emerges as 
positive example of alternative, Lebanese development. However, As-Safir is not 
interested necessarily in advancing Hezbollah's sectarian political agenda. Instead, it is 
trying to explicitly demonstrate the basic failings of a confessional state. Bizarrely, one 
method of devaluing the state is to highlight a sectarian NGOs social health project, 
equating Lebanese development with Hezbollah and the resistance.  
 Another As-Safir article recounts the proceedings of a conference of civil forces 
who met to undermine political factionalism, call for cultural dialogue, and foster 
national unity. The conference included a number of prominent nonsectarian NGOs 
including the Lebanese Human Rights Organization and the Lebanese Women's Council 
("Domestic Forces" 1-3). This article articulates a nuanced understanding of state politics 
in Lebanon, recognizing the difference between the government and the state. In quoting 
one of the conference presenters, Jemaa J.D., the article asks the Lebanese "…to stop 
playing this game of constitutional interpretation and heretical legislation where 
adherents of some party or other set up for battle according to alignments which strip 
away whatever was left of state institutions" (2). However, other presenters focus on a 
"schism in the state's overall conception (2)," devolving the conversation into a 
discussion of who is to blame for the current situation. The article never engages in any 
criticism of the proceedings, making its agenda the same as the conferences. Together, 
the author and the conference attendees believe that it is necessary for "Lebanese civil 
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authorities that believe in modernity, secularization, and social justice… to save the 
nation before it is too late" (3). These articles use NGOs and civil society to demonstrate 
the manner in which confessionalism makes the state weak. Another As-Safir article 
details the rise of a formerly powerful organization in the Maronite community called the 
Maronite league. The Maronite league supports neither the March 8th nor March 14th 
alliance, blaming the country's problems on both coalitions. Instead, the Maronite league 
seeks to reunite the Maronite community, prioritize social services over a political 
platform, and end confessionalism in Lebanon (Hadad 2008). Again, As-Safir is willing 
to highlight the work of an organization explicitly affiliated with a sect in order to 
articulate the failings of a confessional state. However, the most casual indictment of the 
state's ineptitude comes from Al-Mustaqbal. While the article, "Tuesday's Conference on 
Society's Role in Lebanon's Revival," details the state's role in coordinating another NGO 
conference, it leaves one overwhelmed by the state's inability to supply basic services 
such as "agricultural development, basic social services, education, and health…" (1). 
Furthermore, the article also discusses the state's lack of transparency and accountability 
and the need for civil supervision mechanisms (2). In these ways, even the ruling 
coalition's newspaper undermines a positive perception of the state. This lack of faith in 
the state's ability to provide services creates space to politicize social services provided 
by sectarian NGOs. 
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Theme: The Political Promise of Social Services 
 Social service provision plays a prominent role in many of the articles. Some of 
them discuss service provision positively, emphasizing the preponderance of services 
offered by various sectarian organizations including Hezbollah and the Future movement, 
while some stress the state's failure to provide them. Generally, this negative portrayal 
comes from Al-Akhbar. It uses the issue of service provision to critique neo-liberal 
development projects, undermine western notions of democracy, portray the state as 
corrupt, and articulate the benefits of non-western development strategies. Al-Mustaqbal 
positively details the Future Movement's social service projects, emphasizing that 
constitute the fulfillment of a political promise. However, it does not attempt to link the 
political benefit garnered through these projects with the state. Instead, it emphasizes that 
the services came from Hariri's movement, ensuring that constituents maintain a 
connection with the party and not necessarily the government. In these ways, social 
services are used both as tools of sectarian political differentiation as well as a platform 
to ensure political support. Interestingly, the state plays a negligible role in the latter case 
and is a symbolic sectarian punching bag in the former. In neither case is the state seen as 
a positive or autonomous entity. Services, primarily in An-Nahar, are also portrayed as 
intrinsic to the development of civil society. These articles stress NGOs and volunteerism 
as being integral to creating a spirit of service, which is foundational to any alternative 
notion of Lebanese citizenship. 
 In Al-Mustaqbal, there is a persistent emphasis on social services as representing 
the fulfillment of a political promise. In the article previously discussed, "The Hariri 
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Foundation Opens the Ukroum Health and Social Center Aaklar," this theme is echoed 
several times. For example, the author again quotes Husein Al-Masri the representative of 
the Future parliamentary bloc, saying, "[t]he guarantors of Hariri's estate have promised 
to realize his dream and honor his fondness for Aaklar and its peoples, and here we are, 
celebrating the fulfillment of one promise among many, innumerable promises, which are 
soon to be fulfilled as well" (2). Going further, Al-Masri also says,  
…we will be at a crossroads celebrating the realization of another dream and the 
fulfillment of another promise by establishing another similar health center in 
Bire. And after that, not a week will go by…without another project being 
launched in every municipality and village of Aaklar without exception (2).  
 Al-Masri praises these new health centers as fulfilling the promise of the Future 
Movement only with no mention of the state's role in helping coordinate services. Along 
with Al-Masri, the article also offers the view of Dr. Nour al-Din al-Koush, 
representative of Mrs. Nazik al-Hariri. Dr. Al-Koush describes the services that will be 
provided by the health center including pediatric services, women's health services and 
vaccinations. He also notes that the center will provide primary health care by employing 
local physicians. Finally, he describes how the Ukroum Health Center will be coordinated 
with other health centers around Lebanon using technology proffered from the Social 
Health Directorate (3). This statement is the only connection made to the state, and it 
merely portrays it as a coordinating entity. The doctor, as a representative of the Hariri 
family, is creating the perception that medical expertise and health services are integral to 
the politics of the party. The article also describes the residents of Mt. Ukroum as Rafik 
Hariri's true kin (3). Social health services are presented here as a political windfall for 
those who support the Future Movement. These services are thoroughly politicized, 
84 
downplaying any strong connection to the state. They are also used as a way to connect 
the Future Movement's leaders in Beirut with the people in Mt. Ukroum and Aaklar. This 
article is a pertinent example of how social services are used by sectarian leaders to 
maintain a connection with their constituencies through the press. In this article, social 
services are value solely for the political loyalty they engender. This position differs 
significantly from the way the Maronite League frames social service provision, 
dissociating it from and prioritizing it over any political agenda or ideology (Neez 2008).  
 On the other hand, Al-Akhbar leverages the legitimacy of their own services by 
attacking the ruling coalition's development politics. As recounted earlier, Al-Akhbar 
frames the state's corruption in terms of its dependence on neo-liberal economic 
development strategies. In "Lebanon…A Crisis of Governance or a Crisis of the 
Regime," Ghalib Abu Musallam states, "The [Lebanese] crisis is not born from some 
fleeting state of affairs…rather, it is a product of financial, economic, and monetary 
policies that have had catastrophic socio-economic effects. It is simply upsetting that 
there is a faction in power in Lebanon that believes that the way out of this crisis is to 
continue along the same path that got us into it" (1). The article goes on to relate this 
development strategy to neo-liberalism and the West, framing democracy as an 
imperialist system that runs counter to the "interests and welfare of the overwhelming 
majority of the population" (3). This article politicizes service provision negatively, using 
the state's dependence on foreign donors as a means to undermine its legitimacy. This 
criticism creates space for the reader to infer that there is an alternative system of 
development. In another article, the newspaper explicitly relates this alternative system of 
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development to the resistance, inherently politicizing social services and relating them to 
the sectarian ideology of Hezbollah and the March 8th alliance ("About the Social Views 
of the Resistance").  
 The article, "Democracy or Progress: Which Comes First," attacks western 
notions of democracy using the UNDP's Human Development Report (1). The article uses 
"the right to development," as a platform to critique developed democracies' human rights 
records (1-3). The article claims that sovereignty is integral to human development and 
asserts its own summation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, saying,  
…our conception of human rights must evolve to reach a full recognition of a 
person's practical needs. A person has the right to adequate wages; he has the 
right to work in appropriate conditions. He has the right to healthcare, to 
insurance against poverty and disease, and the right to be protected from war (3).  
 In short, a person has, among other things, a right to basic social services. These 
are services that need to be supplied by local providers with regional funding. The ruling 
coalition is infected by western influence and, therefore, there needs to be an alternative 
vision of development that stems from indigenous Lebanese (3). It is this vision that is 
detailed by As-Safir in the aforementioned article about Hezbollah's NGO and their plan 
to rebuild the Southern suburbs of Beirut ("Hezbollah launches 'Project Promise'"). 
Whereas Al-Mustaqbal politicizes social services in a deliberate attempt to maintain 
political power, Al-Akhbar negatively qualifies these services, thereby implying that the 
opposition is free of western corruption with a more authentically Lebanese 
understanding of social development and a stronger connection to the surrounding region 
that is premised on resistance ideology. 
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 As-Safir and An-Nahar portray social services differently from Al-Akhbar and Al-
Mustaqbal. In both of these newspapers, social services are understood as a platform to 
build civil society and citizenship awareness through volunteerism and NGO activity. As-
Safir presents articles that emphasize the importance of a secular, Arab-oriented 
Lebanese identity. Even in discussing Hezbollah's NGO project, the newspaper frames it 
as authentically Arab and stresses indigenous expertise and regional support rather than 
the political platform of the March 8th alliance ("Hezbollah launch 'Project Promise'"). 
However, the issue with this article is that it gives the impression that it supports 
Hezbollah, confusing the reader and creating the impression that Hezbollah is 
representative of an authentic Lebanese identity.  An-Nahar also focuses on the positive 
role that international NGOs like Caritas play in building Lebanese civil society, detailing 
how the organization, after the July War, "made a commitment to support the 
impoverished and the marginalized without any consideration for their political or 
religious orientation" ("Projects carried out by Caritas" 2). Another article called 
"Certificates for Fifty Volunteers for their Work in the Community," connects civic 
participation in local NGOs with positive, sustainable development stating that "the spirit 
of volunteer work in the schools will be a means of moving forward, since the 
unproductive society is the one that is unable to develop" (1). These articles clearly want 
to connect the concepts of a nation and a citizen to something other than confession and 
sect, stressing instead participation, sustainability, and connecting the international with 
the local free of the domestic political context and confessional agendas. 
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Confessionalism in Lebanese Society 
 Confessionalism is perceived as Lebanon's defining problem in numerous articles 
throughout all the newspapers. These pieces stress that confessionalism is inhibiting the 
development of unified concepts of citizenship, the state, and the nation, among other 
things. According to many of the articles, the idea of the Lebanese citizen is emblematic 
of the need for substantive reform in the country, as opposed to the incremental structural 
reforms brought about by amendments to the constitution. There is also a widespread 
recognition that without some sort of unified national identity, Lebanon cannot achieve 
true democracy. The Ta'if Accord is portrayed as an easily-manipulated document, used 
to keep sectarian elites in power.  
 Confessionalism also frames the discourse about tradition and modernity in 
Lebanon. In this discourse, secularism is usually portrayed as diametrically opposed to 
sectarianism with the former being associated with modernity and progress and the latter 
meaning traditional and backwards. Similarly, Lebanese political identity stresses the 
value of democracy, freedom of choice, and cultural dialogue. Confessionalism is thus 
the predominant undercurrent running throughout the articles, where it is generally 
represented as an endemic social ill, forever creating chaos and inefficiency in Lebanese 
political life. Despite this fact, many of the articles, while still asserting this viewpoint, 
use their advocacy for an authentic Lebanese identity as a method of making thinly-
veiled sectarian attacks or advancing discreet political agendas. This unfortunate reality 
reflects the corrosive nature of confessionalism and the degree to which it is embedded 
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within the press and perhaps Lebanese society, giving some of the articles a detached 
attitude and a tone of weary desperation. 
 Confessionalism is often seen as weakening Lebanon as a nation. Al-Akhbar, for 
example, quotes the famous Lebanese philosopher, Michel Chia, who characterizes 
Lebanon as a" bridge, station, shop, store, or hotel," where its strength lies "in [its] 
weakness; that is, by [its] being necessarily occupied, and by its being made subordinate" 
(Musallam 2). The newspaper also differentiates the Lebanese state from formalist 
democracies, asserting that the Lebanese have real freedom to choose what to worship 
and what to trade (2-3). Al-Akhbar develops its conception of Lebanese identity out of the 
negative qualities of the ruling coalition, urging citizens to participate in policy decisions 
through grassroots efforts despite the failure of the Lebanese parliament to truly represent 
them ("The Citizen's Part in Policy Making"). The newspaper also asserts, despite its 
alliance with the March 8th alliance that it advocates for the end of confessionalism and 
modern reforms, while indicting the ruling coalition as a mere vehicle of sectarian 
agendas (Bules 2007).  
 While Al-Akhbar develops its understanding of citizenship negatively, Al-
Mustaqbal does it through a nuanced, but somewhat convoluted call to true citizenship. 
Bassam Do, in an editorial for the newspaper, urges sects to "build their statements upon 
the foundation of Lebanese nationalism" (Do 4). He elaborates from confessional 
cohabitation a spirit of compromise that is a fundamental quality of the Lebanese people 
(4). Interestingly, he critiques the resistance for "falling into contradiction between what 
it appoints itself to do, [and] what the national community can tolerate…" (4). He also 
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calls for substantive debate about citizenship rather than superficial dialogue about 
reforming the office of the presidency, the government, or the election law (4-5). Though 
this editorial can be read as a sophisticated call for national dialogue, the explicit political 
affiliation of Al-Mustaqbal indicates that it is also interested in using confessionalism to 
obscure the failings of the current government. He makes significant distinctions between 
secularism and sectarianism, asserting that there is a middle ground between the two and 
urges a non ideological conception of resistance identity and Arab nationalism. Though 
he is sensitive to the need for national dialogue, he asks for it in a tempered way that does 
not actually address bureaucratic problems (1-5). In doing so, he identifies 
confessionalism as the predominant problem in Lebanese society, but by placing it 
outside the bounds of the government, he also allows the ruling party to evade any 
responsibility for exacerbating sectarian tensions. Al-Mustaqbal wants to dissociate 
confessionalism from both the state and the party. This dissociation allows 
confessionalism to be an omnipresent political reality for which neither the governing 
coalition nor the party can be blamed. Both Al-Akhbar and Al-Mustaqbal advocate for a 
new type of Lebanese citizen while condemning confessionalism, but it is unclear 
whether or not this is done in an effort to encourage real dialogue or simply for the 
benefit of their respective political agendas. Both agendas use social services as a way to 
create political legitimacy, advance confessional ideologies and political agendas, turning 
civil society and the NGO community into another sphere of entrenched sectarian power.  
 As-Safir and An-Nahar, on the other hand, call for civic reform along secular 
lines. As-Safir does so more emphatically, painting confessionalism as backward and 
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political secularism as modern. In doing so, the newspaper describes in devastating detail 
the ramifications of political sectarianism:  
So the sectarian system prevails, closed in on itself and detached from the people.  
Citizens are unable but to resort to sectarian leadership for guidance. Sectarian 
leaders are aware of the dangers of sectarianism, but they play the game because 
that is the easiest way to hope for the best ("Secularization" 4).  
 The same article attacks the Ta'if Accord, noting its easy manipulation, while also 
discussing the vertical disintegration of sectarian unity in contemporary Lebanon (4). It 
states that political sectarianism infects civil society, creating profound societal discord 
(3). The newspaper grounds its concept of citizenship on the voluntary participation of 
Lebanese who are interested in overcoming sectarian hurdles in the interests of becoming 
part of a "modern and advanced nation (3)." Creating a spirit of voluntary contribution is 
up to civil associations who connect citizens with reform agendas ("Domestic Forces 
Call" 1-3). As-Safir's perspective is largely sympathetic with a regional outlook that 
emphasizes Arab identity. In this light, though some of the newspaper's articles present 
sophisticated descriptions of the destructive effects of confessionalism, it is also 
presenting a discreet viewpoint on the issue of Lebanese citizenship tied to the Arab 
culture of Lebanon. Bassam Do, in the Al-Mustaqbal article, critiques this viewpoint 
saying, "[t]his society would preserve Arab identity without turning Arabism into a 
pretext for excess Lebanese nationalism" (Do 4). Finally, As-Safir, despite its attacks on 
sectarianism, does not want to isolate religion from secularism. The newspaper carefully 
understands that Lebanese secularism cannot abandon religion; instead it must embrace it 
as a sphere separate from national politics (Hasmea 2008). Social services act as a means 
of mobilizing indigenous identity towards a nonsectarian version of Lebanese citizenship, 
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grounding this concept in grassroots economic development, service provision, civil 
society growth, and civic participation. 
 Asaad Qitan, in an editorial for An-Nahar, articulates another sophisticated call 
for cultural dialogue. Qitan's sketch of the controversial Christian Orthodox thinker, 
Kosti Bendali, is a deliberation on the need for Christians in Lebanon to engage in 
cultural dialogue. This philosophical piece also asserts that cultural dialogue encourages 
religion to become bold and novel with real freedom only coming through learning how 
to synthesize one's culture, which includes other religious traditions, with one's own 
beliefs (1-7). An-Nahar's inclusion of this type of opinion piece is indicative of the 
newspaper's commitment to creating a national culture premised on being Lebanese, 
while still recognizing sectarian cultural norms. This conception links clearly with other 
An-Nahar articles that focus on participation, volunteerism, and Lebanese sovereignty. 
An-Nahar's multicultural understanding of Lebanese citizenry is also evidenced by the 
inclusion of religious, non-sectarian international NGOs like Caritas in their vision of 
Lebanese civil society. For An-Nahar, service provision and the NGO community act as a 
conduit between Lebanon and the international donor community as well as a method of 
creating a conception of Lebanese citizenship not premised on Arab cultural values or 
confessional ideology, but instead on the values inherent across confessional lines. This 
conception of citizenship is premised on Lebanese nationalism, volunteerism, civic 
participation, and youth education.  
 
92 
Conclusion 
 Throughout all the articles, the state is paradoxically portrayed as a corrupt 
political tool that fails to provide for its citizenry in any comprehensive way as well as a 
mere composite of sectarian interests, making it a useless and inefficient administrative 
organ. This perception of the state allows sectarian groups to politicize social services 
and development policy, thereby allowing confessional ideologies and political agendas 
to enter civil society through sectarian NGOs and competitive service provision. 
Confessionalism's pervasive influence on Lebanese society is negatively regarded by 
nearly all the papers, facilitating a discourse on citizenship and civil society that contests 
what it means to be Lebanese in a multi-sect nation. However, this discourse is flawed 
because the newspapers' political and sectarian agendas undermine their ability to 
advocate for honest dialogue, turning calls for reform into veiled political attacks that 
reinforce confessionalism's power and pervasive reality in Lebanese society. The 
discussion also highlights the fact that in Lebanon, It is very difficult to differentiate 
between political and sectarian motivations. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 This thesis argues that confessionalism is an endemic social problem in Lebanon. 
To explore this claim, I use social services and the NGO community to explicate the 
relationship between the state and civil society. Confessionalism is usually seen as the 
source of state corruption. However, in reality, though state agencies are certainly 
sometimes corrupt, confessionalism's base effect is to inhibit the state's capacity to 
efficiently allocate resources. Excessive bureaucracy, competing ministries, and the 
politicization of the budget stand in stark contrast to the cohesive state structure that is 
presented at international donor conferences. The gap between the state's message and its 
actual activities is perceived within the donor community and Lebanese society to be 
indicative of either a weak state or a corrupt one.  
 That analysis misses what the state's failure to administer services actually 
indicates, which is that confessionalism is not merely corrupting the state, but civil 
society as well. The failure to allocate resources creates space for social services to be 
politicized through sectarian NGOs. It also creates a climate where confessional 
relationships condition interactions between NGOs, other CSOs, and the state. It is this 
relationship, premised on the need for service provision, that acts as merely one avenue 
for confessionalism to infect civil society. Furthermore, sectarian NGOs, because of 
confessional relationships, stand a better chance of receiving government funds to enact 
service projects. These NGOs use these projects as a platform for confessional agendas, 
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creating political loyalty for their party and reinforcing the people's dependency on 
sectarian political parties. Confessionalism's pervasive effects can be seen in the way that 
the media portrays the state, sectarianism, secularism, NGOs, social services and civil 
society. Through these topics, various newspaper articles demonstrate the exhaustive 
effects that confessionalism has in nearly every sphere of Lebanese society. Though the 
media attacks confessionalism as the primary obstacle to political reform in Lebanon, it 
also uses confessional reform to leverage sectarian agendas, reinforcing the composite, 
but fragmented nature of both the Lebanese state and Lebanese society. The above 
formulation is just one way that confessionalism acts as a pervasive socio-political 
problem in Lebanon, limiting the opportunities for state reform, the development of a 
non-sectarian concept of Lebanese citizenship, and the growth of civil society. 
 
Conceptual Limitations 
 Lebanon presents a truly unique case to regional literature on civil society and the 
state in the Middle East. This thesis analyzes one aspect of this case, focusing on social 
services and their politicization in a confessional society. Accordingly, it uses NGOs as a 
paradigmatic example for all of Lebanese civil society, limiting my ability to draw any 
real conclusions about how confessionalism influences everyday Lebanese interactions 
and the workings of non-service based, voluntary associations. There is, therefore, great 
space for future research on Lebanese civil society that includes other types of 
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associations. Also, there is a need to situate Lebanon's case within literature on civil 
society in democratic states such as Turkey. 
 
Methodological Limitations and the Media 
 Though I already detailed the limitations of my media research in the 
introduction, I feel it is important to reiterate them here. My thesis' article review was 
limited by my inability to read fluently in Arabic. A more exhaustive study of the media 
by a native or fluent speaker would provide a more robust portrait of how social services 
and confessionalism influence perceptions of the state and civil society in Lebanon. I 
used a targeted archive that also limited the types of articles I was able to access. It is 
unclear how this filter actually affected my thesis, but it is clear to me that they did affect 
it negatively in some sense. In general, the Lebanese media is a medium starving for 
more exhaustive research as it reflects the cross-section of people who call themselves 
Lebanese and often works at the service of a variety of international, regional, and 
sectarian actors. I think that, in the very least, a comparative study of the Lebanese media 
across time periods would prove useful in elucidating persistent obstacles to confessional 
reform in Lebanese society. I also believe that research that surveys what Lebanese 
citizens read and why would be extraordinarily helpful in distilling the actual influence of 
the print media in Lebanon.   
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The Economy, the State Bureaucracy, and NGOs 
 Statistical data is extremely political in Lebanon. I said in the introduction that I 
had difficulty gathering it. Without The Monthly, I probably would have been forced to 
use data from the mid to late 90s. Despite the useful UN reports and donor papers I was 
able to access, the fact remains that Lebanon is still without a current budget because of 
political differences. It is difficult to truly assess the government's attitude towards 
service provision without a current budget.  
 The state bureaucracy in Lebanon is the stuff of legend, even in other Middle 
Eastern countries. It is a labyrinth of sectarian ministries and implicit political 
associations. Successfully navigating this bureaucracy seems to be largely based on luck. 
Therefore, I was fortunate to actually get in touch with both the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and the UNDP's representative to MoSa. However, without exhaustive contacts in the 
government, it is nearly impossible to comprehensively describe the inner-workings of 
Lebanese ministries. Therefore, future research needs to develop a more comprehensive 
picture of the institutional workings of the Lebanese state that includes an elaboration of 
the administrative relationship between ministries. This relationship also needs to be 
contextualized within a current budget. Explicating the complex patronage relationships 
that define the Lebanese state would be helpful not only to academics, but also to the 
Lebanese citizenry.  
 As a result of both government bureaucracy and confessional mistrust, NGO data 
is also limited. Most, if not all, my NGO data came from studies conducted by The 
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Monthly. However, this data did not include any budget information. To more fully 
understand how political associations and sectarianism dictate NGO activities, there 
needs to be a comprehensive review of NGO financial records with a specific focus on 
the source of their operating budgets. Also, my study focused specifically on the 
interaction between NGOs and the Ministry of Social Affairs, largely eschewing the need 
to discuss specific types of service. However, service specific case studies would help 
elaborate a more comprehensive picture of other factors inhibiting service provision in 
Lebanon. Though some of these, like Mona Fawaz's excellent exploration of Hezbollah's 
NGOs, do exist, there is still room for more. Finally, more studies such as those carried 
out by the CRTD-A on how individual Lebanese citizens see service provision, are 
desperately needed. I would like to conclude this section by saying a brief word about the 
CRTD-A. They are doing groundbreaking work on the scope, scale, and politicization of 
social services in Lebanon. I encourage any researcher going to Lebanon, who is 
interested in social services, the media, or frank political conversation, to contact them 
and ask for their help. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 Confessionalism is a failed system. This fact is not a mystery to anyone with even 
a passing interest in Lebanese politics or Lebanese society. Though confessionalism is 
understood as an existential reality in Lebanon given the continuous sectarian violence, 
the fragility of confessional alliances, sectarian geography, and external interference, it is 
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important for us not to take a fatalistic approach to confessional reform. This thesis has 
offered an explanation of one way in which confessionalism enters Lebanese civil 
society. This explanation provides a platform for a variety of more exhaustive studies of 
the Lebanese bureaucracy, the media, and the everyday importance of social services to 
the Lebanese polity such as the ones being carried out by the CRTD-A. Awareness of 
how confessionalism impacts various spheres of Lebanese life can open avenues to 
reform. I am certainly not overly optimistic that this study will, or even should, have any 
impact given its limitations, but it does in a narrow way try to understand at least one 
systemic function of confessionalism in Lebanon. 
 I believe special attention should be given to the existence of sectarian NGOs. 
This unique type of NGO obviously has a particular prevalence in Lebanon given its 
confessional government. Sectarian NGOs act as a conduit for bringing confessional 
politics into Lebanese civil society. Though this thesis is critical of these types of NGOs, 
it is important not to dismiss the social services that these organizations provide. 
Hezbollah and the Future Movement each provide healthcare, education, sanitation 
services, and water delivery to many people in Lebanon who otherwise would not receive 
them. It is true that these services engender a political loyalty to these and other parties in 
Lebanon, but this does dismiss the need for these services nor make the people who help 
administer these services for sectarian NGOs mere puppets of a confessional ideology.  
 Outside of Lebanon, I think sectarian NGOs warrant further investigation in 
academic literature which explores political NGOs, international NGOs, and the 
interaction between grassroots NGOs and the international donor community. For 
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example, the UN works with Hezbollah's NGOs because of their expertise. Does this or 
should this impact the international perception of either organization? How can one 
separate sectarian service providers from the political or paramilitary arms of their 
parties, which in some cases are considered terrorist organizations by prospective donors? 
Do sectarian social services provide a different way of accessing how organizations foster 
political legitimacy in Lebanon, particularly in relation to the Resistance and its 
motivating ideologies? 
 The Lebanese media is representative of just how paradoxical the Lebanese 
attitude toward confessionalism actually is. Though the media is critical of 
confessionalism, it is also weary of prospects for real reform. Therefore, calls to 
Lebanese nationalism, true citizenship, indigenous development, and democracy often 
mask, acknowledge, or openly advocate for confessional agendas, indicating that many in 
the media often find themselves participating in a blame game that essentially boils down 
to accusing the other side of being confessional and corrupt. While As-Safir obviously 
does not want to participate in this game, it understands that sectarianism shapes a basic 
part of the Lebanese identity. Therefore, one cannot dismiss sectarian projects like 
Hezbollah's or the Maronite League's just because they are affiliated with a confessional 
group. Instead, it is important to highlight what makes these organizations similar, and 
more importantly, authentically Lebanese. However, in each article, the lasting 
impression is that Hezbollah's NGOs are good or the Maronite League should be the 
voice of the Maronite community. In other words, As-Safir explicitly and the other 
newspapers more generally walk a fine line between advocating for confessional reform 
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through alternative indigenous development and supporting confessional ideologies and 
party politics.    
 In the end, this thesis argues something small and in many ways obvious. The 
confessional state is a composite of sectarian interests rather than a monolithic and 
corrupt actor. Sectarian NGOs act as one avenue for confessional politics to enter 
Lebanese civil society. A confessional civil society uses social services to advance 
sectarian political agendas and reinforce confessional loyalties. This situation is 
reproduced in a media that either explicitly politicizes social services or frames them as 
playing a core role in elaborating a nonsectarian Lebanese identity. Often these 
newspapers also struggle with the existential reality of sectarianism in the everyday lives 
of the Lebanese people. This thesis explained the workings of this process. In doing so, it 
suggests that one cannot simply focus on the state as the primary obstacle to confessional 
reform in Lebanon, because confessionalism plays a pervasive role in all aspects of 
Lebanese society. 
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APPENDIX 
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ARABIC-LANGUAGE MEDIA ARTICLES 
 
Translation Note 
As noted in my thesis, I did not translate the majority of the articles in this 
appendix. The two that I did translate are entitled "How do I lead the Community?" and 
"Lebanese Society for Rural Development." Hassan Saleh Shiban translated the rest of 
the articles contained here. Additionally, there are five articles cited in the bibliography 
that were dictated to me by Hanan Ahmad, my Arabic teacher at the University of 
Oregon. These articles are: "About the Social Views of the Resistance," "A Year Since 
Discussion by the Maronite League," "National Challenges and the suffering of the cities 
of Al-Fayet and Tripoli- over Iftar," “The Romance of Secularism in the Absence of a 
National Identity," and "In a Changing Lebanese Social System." As such, there are no 
translations of these articles, merely my notes, which are not included here. Due to 
formatting issues, the original Arabic articles are not contained in this appendix. If you 
would like access to those articles, please email me! My email address is 
Patrick.Jones4@gmail.com.  
 
 
 
102 
Friday, December 29th 2006 No. 10589 
 As-Safeer Newspaper 
 Domestic Forces Call for Civil Peace and a Return to Dialogue 
 Emphasizing the Necessity of Agreement and Transcending Alignments 
“Lebanon’s fate is in the palm of an imp.” This expression epitomizes the reasons 
that the civil forces held their conference for the second time in the press syndicate, under 
the banner, “Working to affirm domestic tranquility, reject civil strife, preserve national 
unity, and face the risks of escalation and put pressure the factions of the crisis in order to 
return to dialogue and national agreement.” Despite the participants vehement call to save 
Lebanon from the situation it is in, and a restatement of what had they had expressed 
previously, their ideas were many and diverse. There were some who deplored national 
dialogue and some others who pointed out the necessity that there not be any power 
except Lebanese in Lebanon, “which has one army and one security force that alone 
bears arms.” This multiplicity of ideas provoked one of the attendees to leave the 
conference before it was over. The conference ended with a short address delivered by 
the Sheikh Rashid al-Qadi with the title, “Civil Organizations! Wake up! Unite! Lebanon 
is in Danger and the Storm has Come!”  
Present at the meeting were: Press Chairman Mohamed al-Balebki, Southern 
Lebanon Cultural Council Former Deputy Habib Sadiq, Vice President of the Lebanese 
Women’s Council Sana as-Silh, President of the Cultural Movement in Antelias Dr. Isam 
Khalifa, President of the Lebanese Human Rights Organization Nima Jemaa, J.D., 
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Secretary of the Arab Cultural Club Marwan al-Ayoubi, Former Chairman of the 
Confederation of Engineers in Beirut Aasim Salaam, Dr. Antwan Musira of the Lebanese 
Institution for Enduring Domestic Tranquility, Former President of the Union of Tenured 
Professors at the Lebanese University Dr. Sadir Yoonis, member of the Southern 
Lebanon Cultural Council Dr. Abdullah Rizq, and Ahmed Faqih of Muntada Sour16. 
Chairman al-Balebki began by stating that all personal, ideological, sectarian, and 
partisan concerns should be set aside for the sake of more consequential national interests 
and productive discussion, which was generally a shared sentiment.  
Sadiq implored all of the civil organizations as well as those affected by the 
chaotic and deteriorating situation to converge, to enter into a dialogue, and to “devise an 
equitable interim settlement to drive away the specter of civil strife in Lebanon.”  
Al-Silh spoke on the “woman’s role in combating civil strife,” affirming, “that the 
woman works to transcend ideological, sectarian, and class-based issues that threaten 
Lebanon’s solidarity and longevity.” Dr. Khalifa delivered a speech entitled “Sticking to 
the Essential in the National Charters is the Path to the Solution,” in which he addressed 
key crises that the Lebanese peoples face, such as the current one. Jemaa, J.D. called, 
through his presentation entitled “Memory,” for, “us to stop playing this game of 
constitutional interpretation and heretical legislation where adherents of some party or 
other set up for battle according to alignments which strip away whatever was left of state 
institutions.” Al-Ayoubi then took the floor saying that the appeal to one legislator as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16Literally meaning “pictures forum.” 
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well as his opponent to make a decision on the same issue contributes to the exacerbation 
of this political schism and further entrenches it without a due realization of the gravity—
in the current situation or in the future—of this schism on the state’s overall conception. 
Chairman Salaam talked about “who is responsible for the current situation,” 
emphasizing that it is a result of foolish and ill-conceived ways of dealing with the 
changes and developments that took place within Lebanon. 
Dr. Musira remarked upon the rules of expression in the charter and in the 
constitution wherein he explained that the government is a procedural power and not an 
institution of dialogue, and that the parliament is always the place of dialogue. And as for 
dialogue within Lebanon, it has ceased and these dialogues remain in politics.  
Yoonis confirmed that facing these frightening conditions would require a broad 
gathering of the Lebanese civil authorities that believe in modernity, secularization, and 
social justice with the aim to save the nation before it is too late. Rizq spoke about the 
economic situation and its difficulties and invited the civil bodies to acquaint themselves 
with the perils of the current and future situation. He advocated for people to take action 
that would force stakeholders to employ their scuffle for power to instead build up the 
country. 
Faqih opined that there would be no domestic tranquility without first finding a 
way to stop this, “feuding amidst combative sanctifications and censures and 
simultaneous treachery and transcendence17.” He urged a diverse people to not actually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17No one knew what this meant. 
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fight or quarrel with each other. Iskandar emphasized that the true national agreement 
comes, primarily, from the voluntary contribution of Lebanese citizens and through 
whoever rightly represents them in politics and in their citizenship by way of elections, 
irrespective of ideological or sectarian affiliation. 
 Zina Burjawi 
 
Thursday, January 4th 2007; Friday, May 25th, 2007 (No. 10707)  
 As-safeer Newspaper (6) 
 Local News 
 Hezbollah Launches “Project Promise” to Reconstruct the Suburbs: 
 A Mix of Quality, Aesthetics, and Speedy Implementation 
 Hezbollah launched, during a meeting of the developmental organization Jihad 
Al-Binaa, “Project Promise,” which aims to reconstruct the southern suburbs. Present at 
the meeting were the resigned minister, parliamentary member Mohamed Fenish and the 
delegates Ali Ammar, Amin Sharee, Ali Al-Miqdad, Samir Al-Khateeb, and chiefs of the 
municipalities of Haret Hraik, Hadath, Borj Al Brajne, Ghobeiry, and Chiayah. 
 Advisory board member Doctor Mohamed Sharaf Al-Din directed the conference. 
The vice-president of the Federation of Municipalities, mayor Samir Dukash of Haret 
Hraik spoke first, asking: Where is the state accountability for those people whose houses 
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have been destroyed, who live in towns with a dilapidated infrastructure, and who have 
been deprived of their livelihood? They say that there have been many building 
violations taking place in the suburbs: structures built on others’ land and buildings 
encroaching on public property and the projects. This state of affairs warrants apathy and 
negligence, and it even serves to justify harming the community and punishing its 
members because they supported the resistance in driving back Israel. They were sure 
that the violations taking place in the suburbs would be completely dealt with and that the 
state would be responsible for that. 
 The Project Manager: The next speaker was Hasan Jeshee, an engineer and the 
general director of Project Promise. He remarked that Project Promise represents the 
rightful owners and undertakes, in lieu of them, the rebuilding of partially as well as 
completely destroyed buildings, in accordance with a frank and explicit legal mandate. 
From what we have seen, Project Promise does not represent the interests of some private 
company or other; rather, it is one among many plans being undertaken by Jihad Al-
Binaa. 
 After joint consultation with a large number of competent, experienced 
professionals in the fields of architecture and reconstruction, acclaimed on both a 
national and regional level, a task force was formed. The team, consisting of capable 
engineers and administrative specialists, directed its attention to accomplishing those 
goals for which it was created with utmost precision and transparency and began work 
according to the following general guidelines: 
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 The plan should be implemented as fast as possible, and buildings should be 
constructed with an eye for quality. An advanced architectural model should be presented 
that reflects our visions for urban planning, and full cooperation with the law should be 
observed. The project should adopt the principle of integration and complementarity with 
the municipalities as well as with concerned authorities and should encourage people to 
participate and put their opinions forward. It should offer an improvement package 
consistent with available funds and applicable laws and regulations, and it should 
improve the aesthetics of the area by treating any blemishes or flaws that may currently 
exist in the buildings. It should support public peace and protect the economic interests of 
business owners, inasmuch as those interests contribute to public peace and the region’s 
aesthetic appeal. Work should be in the spirit of humanitarian service, and the project 
should distance itself from the usual bureaucracy. The plans should be executed with 
utmost precision, clarity, and transparency, and should utilize the best information 
technology systems. And finally, the best, most efficient, and most reputable cadre 
should be employed. 
 He went on by saying: Accordingly, a clear action plan was set forth. Statistical 
data revealed that 281 buildings were either completely destroyed or in need of 
improvement in each of: Haret Hraik, Borj Al Brajne, Chiayah-Al-Hadath and four 
buildings remained under the investigation of Khatib and Alami to determine whether 
they should be destroyed or rebuilt. The average floor space of one building is 3950 
square meters for all stories including basements. 
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 The sum total of what needs to be reconstructed is approximately one million, one 
hundred thousand meters, and therefore, the reparations from the state will not be 
sufficient to cover all the costs of reconstruction. Project Promise will tolerate this 
disparity in funds with the knowledge that Jihad Al-Binaa will cover the difference and 
property owners will not bear any cost in the matter. 
 He went on to say: And as for covering the difference between the dues of the 
property owners and the actual cost, we hope that it come from gifts and contributions, 
since some of the philanthropic organizations and institutions throughout the Arab and 
Islamic world continued, during and after the hostility, to offer aid packages for 
reconstruction. In this respect, the Kuwaiti Development Fund initiative deserves 
mention for undertaking the reconstruction of twelve buildings in the region extending 
from Haret Hraik Street on the east and Airport Road on the west. The total cost of the 
undertaking was about fifteen million dollars. 
 Along the same lines, work took place after the formation of the advisory counsel, 
which consisted of distinguished elite from experienced and competent professionals in 
the world of architecture. They are: engineer Rahif Fayad, engineer/doctor Maroon 
Dukash, engineer/doctor Mahmoud Sharef Al-Din, engineer Jan Khawan, engineer 
Mohamed Dendeshli, and engineer Suni Jemal. 
 This organization, made up entirely of non-paid volunteers, met continuously 
over the course of three months—without any fatigue or boredom—to draw up a 
preliminary sketch for the most devastated region. After laying down the foundations, the 
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organization collaborated with the engineer Hanaa Ilm Al-Din Jaidar, who wrote the 
plans in accordance with the agreed-upon vision. 
 Additionally, work took place according to the set guidelines, conditions, 
specifications, and improvements according to criteria of peace. 
 Expected Improvements: Engineer Raheef described the nature of the 
improvements that Project Promise would carry out, saying: 
 1 - First, they are civil: We recommend, then, the implementation of those plans 
that allow for the preservation of paths in places of communal memory, according to 
what has been reported, and at the same time, allow for the categorization of the streets 
into “main streets,” “bystreets,” and “internal streets,” as well as paths and wooded 
walkways for pedestrians. These plans would also give each street a special character. 
 They allow for traffic regulation and facilitate ease of passage, and provide a 
place for temporary parking in front of shops, as well as permanent parking for residents.  
 The public space, the most enduring place of communal memory, the soul of this 
quarter of the city, and the meeting place of its residents will be bolstered by: the 
improvement of paths, the broadening and adding trees to sidewalks, the improvement of 
zoning and waste management, and the acquisition of some pieces of real estate suitable 
to build parks on and adjacent parking lots. 
 2 - Second, the improvements are civil-architectural: the suggested urban 
organization urges for the reproduction of city blocks consistent with one another and 
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with their surroundings. They should be organized, simple, familiar, and colored with the 
colors of the earth: the color of the soil, rock, and sand. They should regulate the spatial 
relationship of the buildings with streets. These buildings will be parallel with streets, 
adjacent to one another, and the space between the street line, building line, interior lot, 
and side yard line and rear yard will be constant. These plans give us a plain and 
comprehensive course of action for urbanization. Also, the relationship between the 
buildings and passers-by and the residents is improved. 
 3 - Third, the improvements are human and social: This is because the design for 
these buildings’ reconstruction, in terms of floor space and the functions and tasks 
allocated to the different floors, is only completed with direct participation from property 
owners. 
 
Thursday, January 4th 2007 
 Al-Akhbaar Newspaper 
 Lebanon… A Crisis of Governance or a Crisis of the Regime? (Part 1 of 2) 
 Ghalib Abu Musallam18 
 Most Lebanese people agree that their country is engulfed in a profound crisis. 
This crisis is not born from some fleeting state of affairs; it is not born from the hostilities 
of July and our preoccupation with them, nor is it born from Syria’s former presence as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18Lebanese writer 
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some are deluded to believe. It is not a result of the 1982 Zionist occupation and the civil 
war and resistance that it necessitated; rather, it is a product of financial, economic, and 
monetary policies that have had catastrophic socio-economic effects. It is simply 
upsetting that there is a faction in power in Lebanon that believes that the way out of this 
crisis is to continue along the same path that got us into it. This is pure stupidity. 
 This crisis is not limited in scope to the makeup of the Lebanese government and 
its illegitimacy; rather, the current government, through undermining the constitution, 
interfering with supervisory institutions, evading laws and statutes; through its 
corruption, impotency, subordination to foreign powers, disengagement from national 
interests, and through its efforts to make Lebanon a nation subservient to the hubs of the 
global capitalist system and its local consular agents, is indicative of a crisis of a ruling 
class, which has lost its historical role, and is working vigorously and desperately to 
reclaim this role for itself and extenuate its own existence.  
 This historical role has two faces, a political one and a socio-economic one, and 
they are inseparable. The domestic and foreign political orientation of the ruling class in 
regards to their stance on the resistance and its armaments, as well as on the partisan 
foreign policy towards the Zionist, imperialist enemy, does not stem from 
misunderstanding, miscalculation, or misperception, nor does it stem from overthinking. 
It stems from the nature of interdependence with powers external to Lebanon, and the 
ruling classes’ interest in their own welfare, as well as in the resistance and their policy 
of liberating man and earth. This policy also calls for complete democratization as well 
as total socio-economic development and social equity. The word “imperialistic” here is 
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not meant to be abusive, nor is it an attempt at “stonewalling19,” as some “apostates20” 
from scientific socialism might understand it to be. It is instead, a technical 
characterization of the global capitalist system at its most monopolizing and globalizing 
stage, led by America and a network of international monetary institutions under the 
auspices of dominant neoliberal ideology. 
 Governance in Lebanon represents the interests of the wealthy ruling class, which 
is in turn represented by agents of foreign companies, either exclusive or non-exclusive, 
and bank owners, who trace their ancestry back to moneylenders and usurers, as well as 
exclusive contractors and possessors of domestic monopolies in every sector. This class 
finds its origins in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Mutasarrifate was 
instituted and the feudal system fell in Mount Lebanon. The western colonial powers had 
focused their efforts to establish Beirut as a foothold for their advance on the Arab 
interior and their attempts to control it. France built Beirut, a city surrounded by a 
mountain range settled by its supporters, as a financial center and an economic hub and 
developed the harbor, implemented infrastructural works and set up lines of 
communication and trade between the west on one side and the Arab world on the other.  
 What is the nature of Lebanon’s system of government? The Lebanese 
philosopher Michel Chiha may be the best to characterize it. According to Chiha, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19This contextual translation of what would be literally translated as, “wooden language,” was suggested by 
Xence on Word Reference Forums. For more information, visit: 
http://forum.wordreference.com/showthread.php?t=2129975 
20This translation was selected by Rayloom on Word Reference Forums, as suiting the (negative) 
connotation of the original word, which could also be translated simply as “converts.” For more 
information, visit: http://forum.wordreference.com/showthread.php?t=2129975&highlight=apostates 
113 
Lebanon is not a “nation” as nations are generally accepted and recognized; rather, it is 
according to him, it is a “bridge,” or “station,” or “shop,” or “store,” or “hotel.” All of 
these are, if you will, a sort of “nation.” Their strength lies in their weakness; that is, by 
their being necessarily occupied, and by their being made subordinate. On this, Edwar 
Haneen states, “In independence, Lebanon quakes in discomfort, and in subordination, 
she boasts with pride.” This subordination is, naturally, to the west, the all-powerful 
fulcrum of capitalism. 
 Chiha believes that the Lebanese are merchants by nature, descendents and heirs 
of Phoenician traders. They are too lofty a race to pursue careers in agriculture or 
manufacturing, and they should leave manual labor to those less dignified peoples. The 
Lebanese system of government is a sovereign system that places value on the freedom to 
worship as one pleases, the freedom to trade as one sees fit, and it gives its children the 
“freedom” to emigrate. As for Democracy, it is a formalist system in which sectarian 
loyalties come before the nation itself. A nation is an amalgamation of various sects and 
ideologies, and membership in it should virtually transcend and permeate sectarian-
ideological divisions as well as their traditional leaders and proponents.  
 This system has allowed thirty-six families to rule Lebanon by exploiting their 
assets and monopolies and their foreign, commercial and political agencies. They have 
clung obstinately to a sectarian system that subjugates the masses and casts a veil over 
their interests, and they have prevented the people from realizing legitimate 
parliamentary representation.  
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 During the period of mandatory rule, the Bank of Pharaoh and Shiha appointed 
more than half of the parliamentary representatives and ruled using them. During the 
period of independence, and even until the mid-sixties, Intra bank paid monthly salaries 
to sixty-five Lebanese ministers and delegates and ruled through them. But when Mr. 
American21 showed up, angry with Yousef Beidas, Lebanese politicians broke away from 
him22, and Intra bank was pushed forcibly into bankruptcy. Today, the majority of 
delegates and ministers are members of administrative councils or are liaisons for the 
great banks and monopolies, which dominate by means of them just like in past eras.  
 The interests of this ruling class run counter to the interests and welfare of the 
overwhelming majority of the population. This class is anti-production, anti-agriculture, 
and it even entered into foreign economic contracts to flood the local market with 
subsidized goods. An example of one such contract is the partnership agreement with the 
European Union, which was initiated some five years ago without the knowledge of the 
masses and at the expense of their welfare. This agreement, which went into effect 
several months ago, devastates the Lebanese agricultural sector in favor of highly 
subsidized European produce. Some agricultural goods are subsidized at a rate of more 
than 50% of their value, and the average subsidization rate exceeds 35%. These European 
goods enter the market with tariffs not exceeding 5%, according to the agreement. Every 
European cow earns a subsidy of $2.50 a day. How then, for example, can the Lebanese 
farmer compete with European milk and dairy products, or European fresh and processed 
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22This is a possible reference to the Quran. For more information, visit 
http://forum.wordreference.com/showthread.php?t=2130153 
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meats, or European canned and fresh foods? How can the Lebanese manufacturer 
compete in his local market with high-tech European products from experienced 
manufacturers, which enjoy substantial government subsidies and protectionism? Why 
are Lebanese agricultural exports to Europe being cut off according to a partnership 
agreement made with Europe? Why are they being regulated and limited and only 
permitted to enter the European marketplace during certain months so that they do not vie 
with similar European products like grapes, apples, potatoes, olives, and olive oil. 
 This class has burdened the less wealthy with the heaviest taxes, and has freed the 
rich from direct taxation.  
 
January 9th, 2007 
 Lebanese Society of Rural Development 
 An-Nahar 
 Translated by Patrick Jones 
 The Lebanese Society for Rural Development is holding a party to 
commemorate its anniversary. This party will be held at 6 PM on January 12th at 
the University of Saida al-Louisa (Omitted Word). 
 The party program will include speeches by the former minister of the 
environment, Yakoub al-Saraf, the current head of the Public Relations office at 
the University of Saida al-louisa, Suhail Mater, and the head of Gazeer county, 
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Ibrahim al-Hadad along with speeches by the head of the society for empowering 
women in Lebanon, Hyatt Arslan, and the representative of this association to the 
state, Rodrigue Mater. Katia Shamoun will host the party.  
 
Saturday, January 13th 2007  
 24 Dhu al-Hijjah 1427 
 Al-Mustaqbal Newspaper 
 Tuesday Conference on Society’s Role in Lebanon’s Revival 
The Network of Arab Non-Governmental Organizations for Development and the 
Canadian Social Development Fund: Oxfam Quebec and the United Nations 
Developmental Program arranged a conference addressing, “civil organizations’ part in 
reviving and developing Lebanon.” This conference will be held in the presence of the 
government representative, president of the council on development and construction, 
Nabil al-Jisr and the Canadian ambassador Louis Dolourmieh next Tuesday at the Crown 
Plaza Hotel. 
This conference aims to improve the coordination between civil society and its 
contribution to rehabilitation efforts, as well as promoting partnerships between affiliated 
and concerned stakeholders. It will pose many questions regarding the basic 
infrastructure of local communities, including questions about water supplies, sewage, 
living conditions, and economic development (with the exception of agricultural 
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development). It will also address living conditions, agricultural development, basic 
social services, education, health, reintegration and reconciliation, affected/vulnerable 
groups, the assistance rendered in the process of removing land mines, (urban) civil 
planning, and the environment. It will also participate in harmony with community 
programs with the National Lebanese Initiative for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. 
Additionally, Lebanese and international civil organizations, coalitions of local 
authorities, ministries, and concerned national agencies, international institutions, and 
representatives of foreign embassies and United Nations Agencies will in attendance at 
the conference. 
It also strives to gather active community organizations from various sectors 
together in order for them to exchange knowledge and experience about strategies and 
experiences. This will help to pinpoint shared interests in regards to reviving and 
reconstructing the country. And that is to say nothing of the strengthening of right-guided 
practices, as in the participation of beneficiaries and ensuring their transparency and 
accountability, and discussing a mechanism of civil supervision for the whole operation. 
 
Friday 23rd February 2007  
 Al-Mustaqbal 
 Arranged by the Basil Flaihan Institute and Al-Qiddis Yoosef University 
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 Workshop discusses the role of the urban community in preparing and 
implementing a public budget in Lebanon 
 A workshop was held in the auspices of he minister of finance Jihad Iz’awar, 
representing the ministerial chief of staff Alan Bifani. The workshop was entitled, “Can 
the urban community have an impact on the public budget in Lebanon?” and was 
organized by the Institute for the Political Sciences and the Institute of Finance at Al-
Qiddis Yoosef University and by the Basil Flaihan Institute of Economics and Finance 
with the Ministry of Finance and the State Institute for Administration and Training. 
 The director of the Political Science Institute at the Jesuit University, Fadya 
Kaywan began the workshop by addressing, “the increasingly important function of 
community organizations in partnering with the state and in working together to draw up 
and implement public policies like the public budget.” She added, “Public finances are 
the nerves of the country,” calling attention to the, “anxiety over the current public 
finances which troubles the minds of younger members of the Ministry of Finance and 
the Institute of Finance.” She also emphasized the importance of young people’s role in 
writing public policy. 
 Then Lamya Mbayyid Al-Bsat spoke, indicating that, “The goal of the seminar is 
to reconcile between the academic and applied fields and to benefit from the experience 
available in both.” 
 Jon Deeb Al-Hajj shifted the focus to, “the efforts that the urban community has 
made to assume an active role in setting reformations in motion and in guiding public 
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policies, except that it has not ascribed due attention to the public budget, and it has not 
sought to fully acquaint itself with a mechanism of preparing and implementing it. Its 
influence has therefore, remained limited in this domain.” And he said, “Strengthening 
the urban community’s influence on the public budget is a way of stimulating the 
community to participate in its preparation and implementation, to understand the 
foundations on which a budget rest, and to offer critical suggestions about priorities and 
needs. 
 And he clarified that, “The budget workshop aims to explain the process of 
preparing a public budget and to shed light on the difficulties the government faces in this 
undertaking. It means to acquaint community organizations with the last war’s adverse 
effects on Lebanon as well as on its plan to implement a budget. And it seeks to make 
them familiar with the efforts that the Ministry of Finance has undertaken in order to 
remedy these problems and to discuss community organizations’ potential to prepare and 
implement a public budget.” 
 Deeb Rashid, professor of law at the Jesuit University stated, “The urban 
community can impact the public budget but its influence various between normal 
circumstances and the exceptional circumstances which we are experiencing today. The 
current situation enjoins community organizations to assume a more active role, starting 
with being the source of the powers that draw up laws and legislations—like the 
budget—on their behalf. 
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 He especially emphasized that, “The community must intervene directly and take 
initiatives that suit the current situation,” calling upon the community organizations to 
take a strong and instigating position like in the democratic countries upon which 
Lebanon bases its legislation. 
 Bifani said, “The public budget has lost much of its pivotal role in shaping civil 
and economic policies in Lebanon, and it no longer redistributes wealth in a way that 
guarantees the society’s continuity or its domestic tranquility. This happened because of 
the accumulation of deficit and different expenditures outside of the budget. In other 
words, it was due to a lack of focus on the clear priorities in public policy.” 
 He went on to say, “The budget deficit has been piling up since the end of the 
1975-1990 war, and the public debt grows steadily greater, the largest debt in the world 
in comparison to the GDP. Greatly increasing the tax burden did not essentially change 
the situation, and the lack of comprehensiveness in the state budget itself had been among 
the factors that made solving the budget’s problems impossible from inside out. 
Additionally, estimations of actual interest and deficit lack completeness. 
 Bifani also clarified that, “The tax system in Lebanon in based essentially on 
consumption and only peripherally on income. As for the component based on capital, it 
is almost non-existent and the tax burden is not based on fair participation of the whole 
community in building and developing the country.  
 He also added, “The revenue collected from direct taxation constitutes only a 
small percentage. Telephone fees however, which represent a large part of the country’s 
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revenue, are considered consumer fees. The other part of the country’s revenue is based 
on the incurrence of debts. 
 Addressing expenditures, Bifani said, “Attending to the debt is a major concern 
and it imposes itself by allocating a significant portion of the budget to its own service in 
the form of salaries, compensations, and support costs. Investment expenditures make up 
a miniscule portion of the public budget, consisting of contributions to outside 
organizations that remain far outside the budget’s control. 
 And he said, “As a general principle, nothing inhibits the political power, as it 
faces this increasingly dangerous situation, from developing a program for economic 
growth, from reorganizing and restructuring public organizations through public or 
private financing, from reevaluating the role of the public sector and its size, or from 
ameliorating the state-entrusted function of redistributing wealth, developing the tax 
system, reforming the labor market, reexamining the aid policy in its widest sense, and 
curbing political expenditures to a reasonable degree.” 
 After the introduction, three consecutive sessions were held addressing the 
following points: 
1. The mechanism of preparing and implementing the public budget. 
2. When and where in the public budget can the urban community play an influential 
role? 
3. How can we go about consolidating the urban community’s influence on the 
public budget? 
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Monday, May 21st 2007 No. 231 
 Al-Akhbar Newspaper 
 The Citizen’s Part in Policy Making 
 The third conference of the socio-economic rights watch program in Lebanon, 
entitled, “Legislation, Media, and Public Administration for a People’s Democracy,” 
reached the conclusion that the citizen must participate in defining socio-economic 
policies that directly affect his life. The discussion in the seminar, which was arranged 
yesterday by the Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace in the auditorium of the 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture in Tripoli, revolved around two pivotal 
issues: the reality of socio-economic concerns in daily life, and practical suggestions to 
secure rights, especially those pertaining to housing security, hospitalization, knowledge, 
and consumer rights. Touni Atallah, professor at the Lebanese University, said: “Not only 
have political tensions dominated through the legislative powers; rather, they have 
weakened the supervisory role as a whole and led to escalating prices.” The newswoman 
Sonia Nakd posited, “The economic media does not influence what people think, since a 
citizen constructs his opinions according to current political alignments. Some media 
organizations would rather broadcast something about a congressman as opposed to what 
really matters to people and pertains to their lives. The seminar’s participants demanded 
that the concept of the “active citizen” be reinforced, and called for the monitoring and 
distribution of applied models for attaining these socio-economic rights through the 
judiciary, the public administration, unions, municipalities, and the media.  
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Thursday, May 31st, 2007 
 How Do I Lead the Community? 
 An-Nahar  
 Translated By Patrick Jones 
 570 Lebanese students, coming from different regions, were invited by 
Injaz-Lebanon and Amideast to take part in this workshop.  
 The program of the workshop, 'how can I be leader in my community', 
revolved around how to help students become leaders in their schools, 
communities, and work environments. The workshop discussed leadership 
characteristics from different angles, while also helping participants develop the 
individual skills necessary to initiate their own projects. This workshop also shed 
light on how to implement the knowledge gained from it by starting a 
comprehensive project in different regions of Lebanon. 
 Students were divided into groups that were assigned 27 projects in 
different regions of Lebanon. At the end of each workshop, groups designed a 
project to serve the community. Each student implemented their project in their 
region. These were multifaceted projects: some of them involved planting trees, 
others displayed and marketed goods made by the physically handicapped and 
another collected books to reopen the village library. Volunteers participated in 
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implementing these projects, which found great success in each region and were 
widely supported and admired by everyone in each community. 
 
Thursday, May 31st 2007 
 14 Jumada al-Awwal 1428 
 Al-Mustaqbal Newspaper 
 Maronite Social Institutions Examine their Residential Activities and Projects 
The Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir led the usual annual 
meeting of the general body of the Maronite Social Institution in Bkirke. 
Patriarch Sfeir opened the meeting with a prayer. He then delivered a speech in 
which he indicated that the institution, “has established, up until now, a very considerable 
number of homes that a great many Maronites in particular have benefited from (and also 
non-Maronites). This is a sound indicator of what has been accomplished or what is on its 
way to being accomplished. There are workshops underway in Ain Saade, Blaibel, al-
Majdhoub, Baabdat, Mazhar, Zouk Mosbeh, and Tabarja. Thanks to the curators of this 
project, and for how strenuously and quickly they have worked, for securing some tax 
exemptions: building fees, a fiscal stamp, property tax for building, establishments, and 
al-‘ifraaz23 to what reaches more than a million American dollars. We want to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23This word, which literally means, “secretion,” may have some fiscal meaning that I have been unable 
discover . 
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congratulate you for that, but the surplus value remains and there is seemingly no 
exemption for it.” 
Afterwards, Archbishop Abu Jouda, as the president of the institution’s 
administrative council, read the annual report containing all of the institution’s residential 
projects. He also disclosed the comprehensive report on the activities of the Higher 
Economic Commission, which had joined with the institution after it had been practically 
founded for “papal guidance” “new hope for Lebanon.” 
 
Sunday, September 2nd 2007  
 20 Sha’aban 1428 
 Al-Mustaqbal Newspaper 
 Following the Opening of Centers in Bebnine, Funaidiq, and Aaklar, El Attiqa 
 The “Hariri Foundation” Opens the Ukroum Health and Social Center 
 Aaklar – Zeiad Monsour 
 Under the auspices of the president of the Rafik Hariri Foundation, Mrs. Nazik 
al-Hariri, the Ukroum Health and Social Center was founded in Baldat Qunia, one of the 
villages around Mt. Ukroum. This is the fourth center in a series of centers that have been 
established in Bebnine, Funaidiq, and Aaklar ِِEl Attiqa, and more that will be established 
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subsequently in Aaklar with the support of the Rafik Hariri Foundation—Directorate of 
Social Health. 
Many attended the opening: Dr. Nour al-Din al-Koush on behalf of Mrs. Nazik al-
Hariri, the engineer and general coordinator of the Future Movement in Aaklar Husein al-
Masri on behalf of the president of the Future Parliamentary Bloc deputy Saad al-Hariri, 
Nasser Adra, director of the Government Hospital in Tripoli, on behalf of Abdulghani 
Kebara, the coordinator of the Future Movement in the north, Abdulqadir Abdu on behalf 
of the coordinator of the Future Movement in al-Koura Rasen al-Hasan, Dr. Saad Khouri, 
president of the administrative council of the Halba Government Hospital, a throng of 
medical experts and authorities from the Mt. Ukroum region, municipality chiefs and 
leaders from al-Duraib, and the people of the organization themselves. 
After the national anthem and a reading of the Fatiha in memory of the martyred 
president Rafik al-Hariri, Sheikh Zeiad Adra spoke in the name of the people of Mt. 
Ukroum saying, “The martyr, president Rafik al-Hariri, wanted Lebanon to be a country 
of the Lebanese, and for reform to prevail in every region and in every corner of the 
nation without a concern ideological, racial, or class-based distinctions. Behold the result: 
a radiant tribute to that mentality. In the name of every woman, child, young man, and 
Sheikh, may Deputy Saad al-Hariri and Mrs. Nazik Rafik al-Hariri be granted a long life. 
Shouqi Asbar, representing the Future Current in Mt. Ukroum, talked, indicating 
that the opening of this center was nearly impossible—although it had been a dream for 
generations—because of material difficulties and constraints. But this noble organization 
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founded by the even nobler martyr Rafik al-Hariri, who gives without avarice at all, is 
what made this great achievement possible in such a far-removed Lebanese village.  
Then al-Masri spoke, passing on the president of the Future Parliamentary Bloc’s 
regards to the people of Ukroum and Mt. Ukroum and Aaklar, “The guarantors of 
Hariri’s estate have promised to realize his dream and honor his fondness for Aaklar and 
its peoples, and here we are, celebrating the fulfillment of one promise among many, 
innumerable promises, which are soon to be fulfilled as well. 
And he added: “It was just yesterday when Aaklar’s disparate parts came together 
and united, and had it not been for the "War of Haters" which took place at al-Baarid, the 
final links uniting Akklar would have long ago been joined.24 In spite of this, there are 
only a few weeks that separate us from opening the most important bridge in Aaklar.  
And he said: A week from today, we will be at a crossroads celebrating the 
realization of another dream and the fulfillment of another promise by establishing 
another similar health center in Bire. And after that, not a week will go by—with God’s 
help—without another project being launched in every municipality and village of Aaklar 
without exception. This is the true way of interaction between a leadership and a people 
who are united by love and loyalty. He also passed on the deputies’ greetings to the 
people of Aaklar, acknowledging that they were separated you all physically, but they 
were not and will not be able to separate your daily concerns from them, wherever they 
were continuing and undertaking what is required for you, adding: no matter how much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24This translation owes some credit to Tracer, on Word Reference Forums. 
http://forum.wordreference.com/showthread.php?t=2153795 
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some might try to frighten and drive a wedge between people and loved ones, they will 
not be successful. 
Dr. Nour al-Din al-Koush then spoke on behalf of benefactress Mrs. Nazik al-
Hariri, presenting to the peoples of Mt. Ukroum the Ukroum Social Health Center in 
Baldat Qunia, as the fruit of committing to President Rafik al-Hariri’s campaign for 
social development of our faithful and true kin in the north. 
He went on to say: Yesterday, we were in Khirbet Rouha in western Bekaa. 
Today, we are here in Qunia, and tomorrow, we will be in Bire so that health care will be 
within reach of all citizens in the north, and especially Aaklar. 
He also pointed out that the Ukroum Social Health Center in Qunia would 
guarantee primary health care for the people of the villages of Ukroum by offering 
pediatric services, vaccinations, women’s health services, care for pregnant women, 
family health care, health care for the elderly as well as drugs for chronic illness, and 
orthodontic services. This will be accomplished by appointing local physicians and staff. 
He also said: This center will be associated with other centers that have been introduced 
in the north (centers in Miryata, Funaidiq, Bebnine Tripoli, Aaklar El Attiqa, al-Minie, 
and al-Haddadine) and all of the management centers in Beirut, in the south, in Bekaa, 
and in al-Jebal with respect to the technology that will be proffered by the Social Health 
Directorate. Everyone holding the magnetic health card will be able to benefit from the 
services of these centers that are spread all over Lebanon. 
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After the speeches were over, the ribbon was cut and Drs. al-Koush and al-Masri 
took the attendees on a tour within the center and demonstrated the equipment. 
[The subtext under the picture] Reading the Fatiha in memory of the martyred 
president Rafik al-Hariri at the center’s opening ceremony in Baldat Qunia. 
 
Tuesday, September 4th, 2007  
 An-nahaar newspaper  
 Projects carried out by Caritas since the July war:  
 Caritas has spent Approximately 12 billion liras to assist 84 affected 
communities  
 Yesterday, Caritas Lebanon discussed developmental projects that it had carried 
out in regions overtaken by destruction, a result of Israeli hostility towards Lebanon in 
July of 2006, in cooperation with other world Caritas organizations and especially 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in pursuit of social, economic, and spiritual 
rehabilitation for those affected by the war.  
 Caritas president, Father Louis Samaha, held a press conference called “Caritas 
attests that there is love and solidarity in times of war as well as in times of peace” at the 
central administration headquarters in Sin El Fil.   
 Samaha presented a comprehensive report on the support projects that the 
organization had carried out between September 2006 and September 2007 to aid to 
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the 84 affected small towns and villages in the districts of Bent Jbail, Said, Nabatieh, 
Marjaayoun, Hasbaya, and Bekaa.  
 Caritas’ plan aims to rehabilitate the infrastructure, distribute agricultural and 
nutritional supplies, make available means of individual and collective livelihood, 
organize social and recreational activities, and assist those with handicaps.  
 As many as 84 communities benefited from the infrastructural work, and as many 
as 65,897 people benefited from the availability of alimentary and hygienic supplies, fuel 
oil, school assistance, medical consultations, and medicines. Agricultural supplies were 
provided along with self- employment aid to 9,040 beneficiaries, 761 aid packages were 
distributed the disabled, and 43,885 people benefited from social and recreational 
activities.  
 The total sum spent by Caritas on these projects is 11 billion, 748 million, 217 
thousand Lebanese liras.  
 Documentation of the implemented plans was provided before and after their 
effectuation.  
 Father Abu Kassam spoke, saying, “Wherever the church may be, Caritas will be 
there also, and wherever Caritas may be, the church will be there also. …(?)” 
 He explained that during the last war on the south, “I was in contact with the 
president, Father Samaha, when, just as matters were at their worst, Caritas took the 
initiative to set out for the villages of Rmaich, Ain Ebel, Bent Jbail, Aalma Ech Chaab, 
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and Qouzah. Caritas stopped at the gates of those villages and negotiated with the state 
authorities to provide medicine and water. And after the hostility had ended, Caritas was 
there to offer agricultural support and promote livelihood so that the people might remain 
on their land and Caritas is still there today.” 
 Father Samaha also spoke. He said, “For several months, Lebanon has passed 
through intensely difficult political circumstances and exceedingly complicated 
economic conditions, and a crisis of territorial integrity
25 troubles the global conscience. 
Perhaps this crisis will, through its repercussions, determine the fate of the homeland— 
at least for the foreseeable future. And in this bitter reality political concerns rise above 
all others and impede social initiatives. This distressing state of affairs grieves and pains 
humanitarian organizations in general, and Caritas Lebanon in particular, and it spurs us 
to exert more effort to give and testify for love.” 
 He went on saying, “Caritas Lebanon has followed through with its promise 
with vigor, zeal, and earnestness in a continuous, humanitarian campaign. It has made a 
commitment to support the impoverished and the marginalized without any 
consideration of their political or religious orientation. After the war, Caritas enlisted 
itself to combat the subjugation and pain of the people by contributing to the revival of 
the desperate and the frustrated, by standing beside its brother citizens, and by 
upholding the equality of every poor person. Caritas organized and implemented 
developmental projects in regions overtaken by destruction with the cooperation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25An alternative translation here is, “existential crisis.” The translation provided is inferred from 
context. 
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sister organizations, and particularly Catholic Relief Services (CRS), striving for social, 
economic, and spiritual rehabilitation for those affected.” 
 Samaha concluded, “Caritas Lebanon has confirmed that it is ready to face the 
challenges that afflict the country and is determined to continue its humanitarian and 
social campaign. We have many plans and projects which we hope to implement in the 
near future, and with the contribution of kind and gentle souls in peace, love, and 
charity, and with the participation of Caritas’ sister organization, which has long stood 
resolutely beside the Lebanese people.” 
 The picture: The fathers Louis Samaha and Abdu Abu Kassam in the press 
conference. Hasan Aasal. 
 
Wednesday, September 5th 2007 
 An-Nahar Newspaper 
 Education and Civics 
 The “Spring of Questions” Releases a Summary of their Report 
 Most Think That the Sectarian System Is Responsible for the Problems and Two 
Thirds Fear a Resurgence of War 
 The Taif “Grafts” and Secularization May Lead to “Moral Chaos!” 
 Karim Abu Mari 
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Despite the signing that took place yesterday in the Virgin Megastore in 
downtown Beirut, we cannot consider Beirut’s Spring at the Core of Reformation to be a 
book in the traditional sense of the term. It is primarily a summary of a study conducted 
over the course of two years with the participation of approximately 2500 university 
students, in addition to 2000 online participants, who responded to 31 questions about 
various issues like sectarianism, the sense of belonging, and general freedoms, arriving at 
their relationship with the Arab world and with the West and the nature of political 
systems. 
The “Spring of Questions” taskforce hopes that these initiatives will facilitate a 
broader discussion of these and other subjects in order to “depart from being completely 
absorbed with problems of time, and in order to concentrate on what we consider to be 
the main reason for our blind wandering amidst these ups and downs,” as quoted from the 
foreword of the book.  
The book opens with an analysis of the Lebanese political system and its 
complicated construction, reckoning that, “Lebanon’s deficiency basically stems from the 
diversity of her peoples and the foreign powers’ constant meddling of in the region, even 
if we might think that our sectarian system, endemic in absolutely every dimension of our 
social and political life, is more responsible for this weakness.” Approximately 77 
percent of the university and online participants considered the Lebanese system to be 
inherently contributing to the obstruction of political life. Answers were disparate with 
regards to what influences a communal sense of belonging, where 54.6 percent of 
university participants and 63.6 of online participants thought that the sectarian 
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representation, established since the outset, pushes people to rally around individuals and 
families instead of agendas and ideas (90). The poll posed an indirect question about the 
extent of the capacity of a system similar to the Lebanese one to guarantee stability in 
Iraq. The majority of the participants believed that this was not a possibility. The task 
force concluded that university students are the most critical of the political system, also 
noting that, “the sectarian system is detestable on all levels, and more than two thirds 
consider it responsible for our various problems and feelings.” 
The second theme focused on, “The Dangers of Radical Change in Lebanon.” It 
became clear through the responses that half of the participants fear that Lebanon will be 
divided into small sectarian states (98), whereas the majority of two thirds fears a 
resurgence of war (102). Online and university participants’ responses were 
approximately the same in their determination that the greatest threat to communities is 
the sects and their continuation in Lebanon. Fifty-seven percent of them consider the 
current political system responsible for this, 25 percent attribute the problem to 
secularization, and approximately 17 percent motion to abolish political sectarianism 
altogether. In their summary, the taskforce noted that, “the answers essentially reveal the 
mutual sense of danger and instability among the people. Furthermore, we cannot 
disregard young people’s lack of trust in Lebanon’s future, which may encumber their 
future plans and horizons.” 
The third, fourth, and fifth themes focused on stances on legal reforms related to 
sectarianism, human rights, and election law, where some fears arose concerning the 
abolishment of political sectarianism, while the trend towards secularization was 
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connected with complications and divergent socio-political trajectories. The study noted 
more acceptance of secularization among those well-off students associated with the 
Jesuit University and the American University. With regards to civil marriage, the study 
highlighted the role of pluralism and socialization in the acceptability of this matter, 
indicating that, “the vestige of religious affiliation dissolves during the cultural, 
economic, intellectual, and social interactions that characterize the civil relationship 
between citizens.” As for elections, a question emerged about the population of Lebanon. 
The majority of the participants suggested that it was four million people, 17 percent said 
it was closer to five million, and 12 percent estimated three million. The topics summary 
stated that the questions, “actually expose the problems we face in our efforts to provide 
the people with just representation in the electoral process,” indicating that, “the principle 
of quotas leaves a feeling of discontentment when one of the groups feels that it is not 
adequately represented. 
The three following topics studied the influence of law, the concept of Arabism, 
and religious attitudes. Whereas the majority of the participants did not indicate that 
abolishing political sectarianism is inconsistent with “consensual democracy” (146), 
different groups have obscured the concept of “sect,” despite the fact that the majority 
considered it, “a stopgap… positive because fighting will cease at that time.” Most of the 
participants summarized the concept of Arabism as the Arabic language, while they 
defined the “trend to the West” as the institution of democratic freedoms. The religious 
question evoked a great many answers, where secularization was associated with 
discrepant notions like, “protecting religious practice in its diversity,” and “moral chaos,” 
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but the majority of participants in the poll expressed secularism’s capacity and 
willingness to accept someone who, “does not believe in God.” The book draws a 
connection between supporting secularization and a number of socio-economic and 
linguistic considerations that apply to students without neglecting the principal role of 
religion. 
The last theme focused on faith in democracy. Spring of Questions polled 
opinions, according to political affiliations, on the issue of consensus between the desired 
president and the elected president (in the case of direct popular vote). The result clarified 
that there is a kind of “faith” among the opposition that their candidate will win, whereas 
there are a variety of opinions among the support. The overwhelming majority of 
participants expressed their view that law can be adopted to ensure freedom of belief and 
religious practice in lieu of a sectarian system in Lebanon. The study also pointed out that 
the numbers indicate, “the respondents’ faith in democracy, since it does not seem that 
the principle of universal suffrage facilitates the election of candidates who are subject to 
sectarian favoritism. 
In conclusion, “Spring of Questions” admits that it is difficult to pinpoint, exactly, 
the extent of agreement between the university and online participants’ opinions and the 
opinion of the Lebanese people as a whole. It wagers however, that they are associated 
with a well-to-do, socio-economic segment of society that is more educated in 
comparison and is generally more open-minded and flexible.” It also indicates that, 
“identifying socio-economic factors enables us to infer the influence of religion and 
ideological-sectarian affiliations, which has not yet been indexed clearly, and which 
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accords us with an understanding of the political tilt of the religious or class-based plan in 
order to better estimate the purport of a given political notion connected with the various 
powers. 
 
Thursday, September 6th 2007 (#10793) 
 As-Safeer Newspaper 
 Mahanna: Communty’s Responsibility in Building the State 
 Tyre—Husein Saad 
The Tyre Cultural Forum organized a dialogue with the president of the ‘Aamil 
organization in Lebanon, Kamil Mahanna, addressing the role of the community in public 
life. In attendance was the chairman of the federation of municipalities of Tyre with an 
assembly of civil, social, and cultural activists. After an opening statement by forum 
member Mohamed Farran regarding the importance of the community in building the 
contemporary state, Doctor Mahanna spoke in affirmation about the historical 
responsibility of the community in laying foundations for a lawful, peaceful, and 
prosperous nation. He added: the civil community in Lebanon achieved a real presence 
for the first time through its participation in the last dialogue with France, focusing on the 
responsibility of the public at large to offer resistance and support and in being 
historically responsible, especially considering the sensitive and precarious circumstances 
facing Lebanon at present. 
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Mahanna said that the basic problem contributing to the fracturing of the 
Lebanese infrastructure and the weakening of the society’s capacity to make an impact in 
public policy lies in the commotion between its internal structures and the absence of 
mechanisms of dialogue which provide safe and acceptable means of reconciling the 
mutually disparate interests without favoring one side over the other. He stated that the 
sectarian political administration in Lebanon has, for half a century, undermined attempts 
at reform, which has made the exalted idea of democracy far-fetched and difficult to 
attain.  
He said: the decisive challenges which face Lebanon today, along with the 
aggravation of the livelihood crisis and the impoverishment of the overwhelming 
majority of Lebanese people, make it incumbent upon us to take steps toward a national 
consensus on the formation of a new social contract between the state and the civil 
community and the securing of a real partnership between the state and the private and 
domestic sectors on the condition that policies are formed which facilitate an 
interconnection between economic development on the one hand and social development 
on the other. In conclusion, he called for the adoption of the principle that basic civilian 
rights originate in a person’s humanity through bolstering independence of political and 
cultural decisions on an individual basis, building a culture based on the principle of 
respecting life, setting up a fair economic system, and other essential issues regarding the 
individual and the community. 
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Saturday, September 29th 2007, No. 341 
 Al-Akhbar Newspaper 
 Milestones in the History of “The Mujahid Islamic Movement” 
 Commenting on the installments of “The Secret History of the Jihadists as they 
See it,” by colleague Fidaa Aytaani (see al-Akhbar, nos. 326-339), “The Mujahid Islamic 
Movement” brings us the following:  
 The Mujahid Islamic Movement originated in 1973 in the Palestinian camps in 
Lebanon as a moderate movement under the slogan “The Call for Jihad.” It was a call to 
shed light on true Islam and explain that it is a creed, a means of worship, a system of 
law, a code of ethics, and a culture. It also protested the Zionist occupation of Palestine 
and called for unified effort throughout the Arab and Islamic world to combat it.  
 In 1982, during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, The Mujahid Islamic Movement 
and other factions faced—with their limited resources—the Israeli forces in the region of 
Saida and the encampment of Ain al-Hilweh. Many of the movement’s leaders were 
martyred in this resistance (the martyr Fouzi Aagha, the martyr Munir al-Hafi, and the 
martyr Abulkarim Samara). 
 In 1985, after the Israeli withdrawal from Saida towards the south, the movement 
sought to establish social, cultural, educational, and religious advocacy institutions that 
embraced the coming generations of Palestinians, cared for them, guided them 
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religiously, culturally, scientifically, and ethically, and affirmed that returning to 
Palestine was possible by one road only: Jihad. 
 When war broke out between the encampments and the surrounding region, the 
Mujahid Islamic Movement played an important role in nipping the strife in the bud. The 
movement collaborated with upstanding citizens on all the initiatives they carried out to 
end this confrontation, and especially with the Iranian Islamic Republic’s initiative, 
which conscripted its political and diplomatic energies for this task (i.e. ending the strife). 
His Imminence Abbas al-Mousawi seized the initiative with a band of Shiite and Sunni 
scholars from an assembly of Muslim scholars (Sheikh Mahir Hamoud, Sheikh 
Muharram Aarifi, Sheikh Abdul Hallaq, Sheikh Ghazi Hanina, and Mr. Aisa Tabataba’i). 
After enervating efforts, meetings, and correspondence with Amal leadership and 
Palestinian authorities, in which Mahir Hamoud’s house in Saida transformed into a 
political cell, the Iranian embassy in Beirut set out to mobilize all of its energies and its 
communications and relations with the Sunni and Shiite domain for the sake of making 
the scholars’ efforts successful. It was a great success. The strife, which had been 
increasing in intensity, ended. 
 The Mujahid Islamic Movement also played a distinguished role in actively 
striving to reconcile perspectives between the leadership of Fatah and al-Ansar, and in 
putting an end to the political disputes that had turned into a security concern between the 
two parties. Every now and then, a crisis cell was formed, comprising Sheikh Jamal 
Khitab (Mujahid Islamic Movement director), Mahir Hamoud, the People’s Committee in 
Ain al-Hilweh, and most of the political activities in Saida, in order to find possible 
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solutions to all of the unforeseen problems. These efforts succeeded in bringing peace 
between the two sides, and they were able to enter into dialogue and deal with any 
problem. We should not forget in this matter the contribution of all of the Palestinian 
organizations in pressuring both sides to improve the political situation and state of 
security in the camp and in Saida. 
 
Wednesday, December 12th 2007 
 As-Safir Newspaper 
 Issues and Opinions 
 Secularization… Is it the Solution? 
 Samir al-Tanir26 
The word “secularism” is derived from the word “world,” and not the word 
“science.”27 Philosophically, “secularism” means that the origin of truth is the world 
around us and not what is unseen and unknown (i.e. beyond the world). Furthermore, 
while secularism does not necessarily negate religion, it recognizes that religion is not the 
source of knowledge in this world, and likewise, should not be the source of law and 
power among humans. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26Lebanese writer 
27In Arabic, the words “world” and “science,” although they share the same triliteral root, have different 
etymologies. This is attested for by Hans Wehr, who lists the two words and their derivatives in two 
separate entries. 
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The term “secularism” is not ancient; rather, it is a relatively new term, and we 
can surmise its origin to be in the era of the European renaissance, which burst forth from 
social and industrial development on the continent, as well as from the separation of 
church and state. It stripped the church of those powers that it had arrogated on the 
pretext that the church is God’s shadow on the earth. The church had reached beyond its 
walls and practiced its authority in the social, stratal, and political spheres, all the while 
legitimizing this authority with divine right. This divine authority enabled men of the 
church to interpret religious truths, but also authorized them to grant or strip legitimacy 
from the ruling powers as they pleased. The philosophical substance of secularism was 
that the origin of truth was the world around us, not the unknown, and it called for the 
separation of church and state—as in Europe—, which would ultimately lead to a all-
encompassing cultural achievement. Such a society would boast of the various aspects 
and characteristics of modern civilization. 
Upon the end of the Ottoman Empire and during its dissolution as an intact 
political entity, thought began on a regional level about a new renaissance movement in 
the Arab world. The concept of “secularism” was posited by the elite classes, who had 
been influenced by the western renaissance, as a way to treat problems of socio-economic 
development and power. In fact, we can consider the economic, social, and political 
development of the region after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to be a triumph for 
secularism, wherein a true division between church and state institutions took place, even 
though religion had still held a symbolic influence in some sub-domains of the 
legislature. 
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Since secularism separates church and state, yet does not negate the foundations 
of religion, we can consider Lebanon’s judiciary and legislative system a secular one. It 
does not derive its power, law, or legitimacy from any of the religions that its citizens 
practice, and consequently, the Lebanese system needs to complete and perfect its 
secularization. In doing so, we must take into account sectarianism, as it exists in the 
organization of the state and the Lebanese administration, and in parliamentary 
representation (considering political sectarianism as the foundation in building a state). 
We must also take into account the Status Law of the Lebanese sects, which are a part of 
the nation’s legislative system. These two concerns are pivotal in any plan to further 
secularism in Lebanon. 
The predicament that secularization faces in Lebanon is the following: There are 
those who demand the removal of the sectarian political system, considering it the most 
significant rift in Lebanon’s secularization. They claim that by removing the sectarian 
political system, we will have achieved secularization. They see that the Status Law does 
not detriment this aim because it preserves a necessary aspect of Lebanese social 
diversity, which is associated with numerous religions and sects. They go on to say that 
the removal of the sectarian political system is possible with regards to parliamentary 
elections and on an administrative level, but it is impossible with regards to Status Law 
(why?). We say that this problem is easily solved. Every Lebanese citizen can choose his 
type of Status Law: religious or civil, according to his preference. In such a way, his 
freedom is completely protected, and we satisfy the men of religion who fear losing their 
jobs in the various and ideologically diverse Sharia courts. 
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Secularizing the Lebanese state brings three disparate obstacles to the fore. First, 
Shiite and Sunni Islamic authorities believe that secularization is not concordant with 
Islam. Second, the church remains keen on playing a role in public life in Lebanon, and it 
fears that Lebanese Christians, who represent the last Christian stronghold in the East, 
will stray from their faith on the pretext of secularization. Third, Lebanese politicians, 
whose political positions are built on political sectarianism, fear losing their influential 
role if Lebanese life were to become secular. And apprehensions only deepen with the 
prominence of a liberal, educated younger generation under the influence of movements 
for democracy and social justice. 
The third of those obstacles is a very important one because removing the 
political faction that depends on political sectarianism is necessary with or without 
secularization. And as for the first and second, Lebanon’s sectarian and religious 
foundations will necessitate judicious measures. Some Lebanese sociologists say that 
while Christian authorities may disparage secularization, the resistance is not ideological 
and is easily remedied with the setting down of certain regulations (why?). Contrarily, the 
Islamic resistance is in fact a dogmatic one, and will demand strenuous efforts to 
overcome (again, why?). It is clear that these reservations can be resolved as long as the 
plan for secularization in Lebanon takes into consideration the defining characteristics of 
Lebanese society. 
Political sectarianism remains, along with what ripples out from it in the 
parliamentary elections, state functions, and institutions of civil society, the most 
profound societal deficiency and an impossible hurdle that must nevertheless be 
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surmounted; that is, if we, the Lebanese people, want to build a society based on justice 
and equality in a modern, advanced nation. 
The Lebanese constitution has, in its current form, obstructed the path to political 
progress in the country. Item 95, in its original and amended form, is the cornerstone 
upon which the sectarian make-up is built. It specifies temporary “sectarian justice” in the 
state department and its functions (we believe that this is impossible as experience has 
shown) as the Taif Agreement determined a method to execute this sectarian justice 
through the unjust system of quotas. This entailed equal distribution between religious 
leaders and relative quotas between sects and regions. Politicians heeded this 
constitutional article, and they mastered its application in both letter and spirit.  
The political class has covered up a policy of quotas with undeniable Salafi 
fundamentalism. They have made an ethical décor for it, a verbal blanket, a cosmetic 
powder, and the sectarian quotas have brought about corruption in every domain: 
political corruption, the squandering of funds, and scandalous robbery. 
The Lebanese constitution did open a small window for development through 
abolishing political sectarianism. This alleged window, found in article 95, is suspended 
indefinitely. The National Commission to End Political Sectarianism has not yet been 
born, and if it were granted birth, it would be stillborn, because the sectarian is smarter 
then to secure a noose around his own neck. So the sectarian system prevails, closed in on 
itself and detached from the people. Citizens are unable but to resort to the sectarian 
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leadership for guidance. Sectarian leaders are aware of the dangers of sectarianism, but 
they play the game because that is the easiest way to hope for the best.  
Abolishing political sectarianism would pave the way to remove sectarian leaders 
and dispossess them of their privileges. But article 95 gives us instead an oblique 
framework that leaves no room for growth in the future. What can be accomplished as 
long as the Taif Agreement, a sectarian agreement of the highest caliber, claims to 
endorse “equitable sectarianism,” which is paradoxical?! 
The sectarian political system in Lebanon has collapsed on its own, and the 
vertical divisions taking place within the biggest sects are nothing if not an expression of 
that. Maronites have divided into Aunis, Quwatis, and Kata’ibis. Roman Catholics and 
Roman Orthodox Christians have divided within their respective histories. Sunnis have 
divided between the “future current,” which cannot claim any national heritage or history 
of struggle; rather, it is based on the system of “mutual benefits” between its leadership 
and its followers. The other sect within the Sunnis is comprised of the Nasserites, who 
were joined by numerous movements to other Islamic organizations, from the AHbash 
and al-Tauhid in Tripoli to the Islamist groups—we do not know where they stand. Are 
they in the east or the west, the north or the south? The Druzes are also divided into 
Junbulatis and Orslanis, and followers of Wiam Wahhab. The Shiite sect however, is—as 
an exception—still unified until this day because of the uninterrupted Israeli hostility on 
the south since the year 1978. We belief this democratic pluralism will inevitably reach 
them too in the near future.  
147 
The last settlement, which put an end to a violent political crisis that lasted for 
over a year and preoccupied the Lebanese people day and night for fear of a resurgence 
of civil war, is one that we are surprised could have happened due to the aforementioned 
sectarian divisions. The unification of the sects then, is a collision course and an 
invitation for civil war. This is what was not available. We believe that General Michel 
Suleiman will be a worthy successor to the great leader Fouad Shehab. Through the 
coming 2009 elections, Lebanon can embark on its passage from abonimable 
sectarianism to radiant secularism. 
 
Monday, December 24th, 2007  
 10 Dhu al-Hejja 1428 
 Al-Mustaqbal Newspaper 
 The Lebanese Association for Civil Order Launches al-Hukmiyya al-Mahalliyya28 
in Hammana 
The Lebanese Association for Enduring Civil Order has launched a program 
aimed at improving governance in the Lebanon entitled, “Solidarity, Participation, and 
Initiative on a Local Level: Initiatives, Citizenry, and Supporting the Domestic 
Community for Public Affairs and Municipal Work,” in cooperation with the 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Literally meaning, “rules or guidelines for governance on a local level.” 
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The Association has already organized the first preparatory meeting for the 
program in which it posed the question: “How can Hammana be a model town.” The 
meeting took place in Hammana in the Valley View Hotel, and attendees included 
municipality chief Habib Rizq, program officials, and presidents and representatives from 
town associations and clubs. Participants received program documents and association 
publications. 
The association’s program coordinator Anton Musira affirmed that the program 
aimed to, “assist the community in municipal work by encouraging citizens to take 
initiatives that might seem simple at first glance in order to improve quality of life in the 
town, perhaps by way of neighborhood committees and through committed volunteers. 
The program itself can be summed up with three points that concern the general 
public: citizen-born initiatives, a better quality of life, and moving from mentality of 
support (waiting on the state or the municipality to do something or for foreign aid…) to 
a mentality of development, where citizenry is three-dimensional: I care, I participate, 
and I am responsible. 
Hammana was included in the program, which comprises other towns as well, 
because of its archetypal diversity and the dynamism of its community, and because the 
al-Hukmiyya al-Mahalliyya program is not starting from scratch when it comes to public 
affairs initiatives. The association has already collaborated to arrange a meeting with the 
local tourist club in hopes of reviving Hammana’s popularity as a tourist destination 
during the year as well as the summer. 
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The meeting coordinator Maya Kanaan Saad concerned herself with what a 
(foreign) visitor might see during an excursion in Hammana.  
Rizq confirmed that, “al-Hukmiyya al-Mahalliyya is basic concern, not just for 
the success of the township, but also for its sustainable development. Political problems 
have, for some time, interfered with developmental work. Young people abandon their 
lands, and problems arise from the lack of ambition and a weak sense of devotion to the 
land and they end up selling it. In order for the public affairs initiatives to be successful, 
there needs to be solidarity, participation, and consciousness raising through 
communication with various institutions, and there must be a sweeping and common 
vision to completely oust competitive politics from the developmental sphere. 
Former president of the Hammana Tourism and Rotary Club, Anton Barmaki 
spoke about the need to revive Lebanon’s cultural heritage to pave the way for a national 
museum. Evelyn Bmutri Massara focused on the, “the educational aspects to local 
initiatives,” and suggested that specialists offer a few volunteer hours every month to 
prune trees, whereas children can water saplings to bolster interest in agriculture. 
The president of the Mariam Women’s Association, Suaad al-Masri Abu Shahin 
suggested that a campaign be launched to, “get rid of the construction refuge on the road 
as far as it extends in the direction of Bhamdoun by cooperating with the youth of 
Rotaract and other clubs as well as associations for the revival of an annual charitable 
project that will dedicate its returns to the beautification of the town.” 
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Rabea Qais, program coordinator, spoke about, “the regained trust due the 
performance of sound leadership.” Toni Atallah, lecturer at the Lebanese University, 
illuminated the advantageous of the al-Hukmiyya in developing a culture of voluntarism, 
which no longer cites exceptional circumstances as a pretext to avoid work on a local 
level.  
The meeting ended with the specification of programs that would improve the 
quality of life in the short term. One of these programs suggested implementing, “an 
afforestation campaign in February 2008 (preparation would take place in January), in 
collaboration with local clubs and schools. 
 
Tuesday, December 25th 2007 
 An-Nahar Newspaper 
 Certificates for Fifty Volunteers for their Work in the Community 
The Hariri Foundation for Sustainable Human Development, in collaboration with 
the Volunteer Services Organization, conducted a training session to “build volunteer 
skills in community and civil work.” The session was arranged by those two bodies and 
took place in Sidon over the course of four weeks. Approximately fifty volunteers 
participated in various subsidiary agencies, associations, and bodies in the overall, unified 
framework for volunteer activities in Sidon. 
151 
The meeting took place in Al al-Hariri’s Villa in Majdelyoun with the support of 
the representative Bahia al-Hariri, who called for those trained and graduated to be 
functional nucleus in encouraging our society, Sidon, to move forward, saying that the 
spirit of spreading volunteer work in the schools will be a means of moving forward, 
since the unproductive society is the on unable to develop. She reiterates that we must 
transform every individual into a source of production energy. She said, “I am not afraid 
for you, and I am not afraid for Lebanon at all despite the difficult phase. I say to you all 
that we are determined to built up our community and our country and to fight poverty 
and unemployment and combat misery and extremism… It is our posterity’s right to 
enjoy modern education and benefit from different fields and work opportunities. 
Furthermore, we deserve a nation that cares for us and helps to reach this productive 
state. 
After speeches from the president of the Volunteer Services Organization, Patresa 
Nabti, the association coordinator Safaa Makawi, Manager of Human Development with 
the Hariri Foundation and session coordinator Mohamed Baltaji, and a number of 
trainees, al-Hariri distributed the certificates to the participants. 
 
Sunday, March 23rd 2008 
 An-Nahar Newspaper 
 Religions and Schools of Thought 
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 The Contribution of the Orthodox Youth Movement in Arab Culture 
 Kosti Bendali: Discussing a Cultural Project 
 Asaad Qitan 
“Verily, the death of the Christ and His resurrection represent the dividing line 
between faith and magic, and between symbol and superstition” (Al-Nour29 1981, Nos. 6 
and 7). The author of those lines, Kosti Bendali, is an Orthodox Christian intellectual 
unlike most of his kind, who might consider him unrefined or (ironically) unorthodox. 
Bendali, born in the “Tripoli Harbor,” as he likes to call the port city, works from the 
underlying logic that the Christian faith—were he to have a say in today’s world—must 
enter into a discourse with the various manifestations of human culture. Indeed, it is 
difficult for us to stumble upon, amongst ourselves, an intellectual figure that broaches 
this topic with such range and depth as does Bendali, the intergenerational pedagogue in 
the Orthodox Youth Movement. Bendali is primarily a specialist in analytical psychology 
and an expert in the pedagogical sciences through teaching these subjects in the Lebanese 
University and by virtue of his many informative and inspirational years as an 
educational counselor, but more particularly, through the cognitive achievement he 
realized by way of the doctoral thesis he submitted in 1981 at the Université de Lyon. In 
his thesis, Bendali sets up a new pillar for communication between Christians and 
Freudians by demonstrating how true religion is rooted in maternal and paternal 
experiences, and simultaneously transcends them so that these experiences take up the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29Literally meaning, “The Light.” 
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power of a symbol that reveals their origins and conceals them at the same time. In 
addition to the psychological and pedagogical sciences, Bendali is a shrewd scholar of 
contemporary philosophy from Nietzsche to Paul Ricoeur, which is attested for by his 
utilization of modern philosophical and intellectual notions in developing his theory 
“Symbolism,” if one may call it that, as it relates to the formation of religion. And all that 
is to say nothing of his open-minded discourse with contemporary atheism in both its 
Marxist and Satrean forms. Furthermore, Bendali is an indefatigable connoisseur of the 
ancient and modern literary masterpieces, taking from them what strengthens his analysis 
of psychosocial phenomena. He is convinced that the novelists, through their astute 
perception, have identified many of man’s internal and external movements and 
tendencies. And along those lines, it is appropriate to point out that Bendali belongs to 
the forefront of intellectuals in this country who have turned to the Arabic novel and 
esteemed its role in the analysis of the human personality, and in particular the Arab 
personality; whereas before the seventies, the Arabic novel had not yet established itself 
as the foremost means of expression in the Arab world. 
From this quick overview, and the latter is only a small part of a vast amount 
related to Bendali, we find that we have arrived before a project characterized by what we 
have indicated above as the foundational condition of achieving some sort of cultural 
presence. That is, an abundant understanding of the Other, a serious study of it, and a 
profound respect for it in its otherness and a recognition of its achievements. Bendali’s 
ideas have also spread in unorthodox and non-Christian eastern circles, particularly his 
views on the disadvantages of sectarianism, consumer culture, and the marginalization of 
154 
women in our society. This is comprised within a creative mechanism of critical 
intercourse, which only serves to highlight the authenticity of the cultural dimension that 
is bolstered by this philosophy. But what I want to point out here, as a matter of 
specification, is the essence of this cultural project, which Bendali’s work represents. I 
have indicated earlier that Bendali’s wish to make the Christian be acknowledged today, 
in the community in which he is a member—Bendali is, in this respect, in agreement with 
George Khidr, and with the Orthodox Youth Movement in general—has made him 
believe in the necessity of dialogue between Christianity and contemporary culture. Does 
this dialogue warrant being entitled “Cultural Project?” The answer is, as I see it, that it 
cannot be positive unless we share in Bendali’s understanding of what a dialogue is. 
Indeed, Bendali comprehends dialogue as a great adventure—an adventure that changes 
and transforms. This dialogue is not a search for what might further entrench traditional 
Christianity and assert its dogma through, for example, pointing out the cognitive and 
existential dilemmas that surround our culture. Furthermore, dialogue is not simply a 
declaration of the points of convergence and divergence between Christianity and 
contemporary thought, despite their presence, and especially with what concerns human 
rights and dignity. Dialogue is, in Kosti’s approximation, a process of self-criticism in the 
first degree. It is the willingness to receive right guidance from what appears as plainly 
evident, even if it were to come from dissident culture30. It is, secondly, a preparation for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30“Dissident” here refers specifically to al-khawarijiyya, another sect of Islam that rejected the leadership of 
Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib. They are known for their extreme doctrines and the fact the author is implying 
that guidance could come even from them is a cause for concern amongst most Muslims. I believe he is 
trying to make a point (i.e. we should be open-minded enough to consider others’ position even if it seems 
completely contrary to our own). 
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adaptation, reparation, and renewal. “That is the suffering of religion that is eternally 
pulled back and forth by these two poles: symbol and superstition, faith and magic. 
Therefore, it is called to a constant purification process so that it may remain on a straight 
path and cleanse itself of its blemishes. And by virtue of that, religion should, with 
magnanimity, accept all criticisms brought to it by those from the outside, even they are 
occasionally accusatory or mean. This because, by guarding religion against diversions 
that are liable to knock it off its straight course, they help it to correct its trajectory and 
they become, whether or not they realize and whether or not they intend, a source of aid 
to realize this “contrition” (in the evangelical sense of this word, which is a conceptual 
transformation and a shift in mentality), which religion must continuously pursue, if it 
wishes to achieve its authenticity” (“Religiosity between Faith and Magic”). It is beyond 
doubt that Bendali requires the same stance (i.e. self-criticism) of contemporary culture 
as it embarks on a dialogue with Christianity. He, in this spirit, does not tire in his efforts 
to expose, for example, the extent of reductionism that the Freudians use when examining 
the phenomenon of religion, or that which philosophical atheists use with regards to the 
human being. This critical opposition however, does not hinder him, as he is an Orthodox 
Christian who believes that Jesus of Nazereth represents all truth, from perceiving 
himself as “a seeker of truth until the last breath of life.” This is inexplicable except by 
saying that true dialogue, according to Bendali’s definition, is a process that demands 
great understanding and is characterized by utmost modesty. Only this synergy between 
cognitive objectivity and spiritual humility is adequate to explain how he who is deep-
rooted in truth is enlightened by his partner in dialogue, the Other, and ascertains new 
means of approaching his own truth and understanding it. This is to say that real truth, 
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however deep-rooted you may be, is always deeper and more profound. The truth does 
not belong to you; rather, you belong to it. The Orthodox Kosti Bendali, with his 
characterization of himself as “a seeker of truth,” explains that dialogue, as a cultural 
project, is primarily based in and inseparable from its bearer.  That is to say: you cannot 
remove the substance of the dialogue from the person himself; true dialogue does not 
support any differentiation between knowledge and ethics. 
 Conclusion: What has been presented—by way of summary—attests for the 
extent of agreement between George Khidr and Kosti Bendali in regards to their cultural 
contributions. The importance of this agreement does not lie in the substantive approach 
that Khidr and Bendali share in their views towards philosophy, psychology, literature, 
and other religions (particularly Islam). Rather, it lies in the way they approach the raging 
“outside” culture. I have already touched upon a few of the characteristics of this 
approach, like an abundance of knowledge, an approach to the Other by acknowledging 
him as such, and an existential self-infatuation of Being-in-Itself31. I wish to, in 
conclusion, focus on a point of juncture in the cultural project between Khidr and Bendali 
that seems central to me, and which does not specifically pertain to the approximation of 
the Other, but rather to the approximation of the Self. We have already become familiar 
with the importance of self-criticism in Bendali’s plan, and we have elaborated at length. 
Tens of Khidr’s articles leave no room for doubt that their author is a master of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31Although it is not clear, Qitan may be alluding here, according to one commentator on this article, to the 
concept of Being-in-Itself, a philosophical neologism denoting the “self-contained and fully realized Being 
of objects.” This term is especially discussed in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, who also uses the 
term “Dasein,” which applies specifically to the Being of persons. 
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disassembling and analyzing Christian religiosity and history. Is he not the one that once 
wrote: “From here we plunge, without fear, into all that might be gleaned from 
knowledge, and we take from it unashamedly; we penetrate further and further into a 
knowledge that may shake the foundations of religion in its rigid social and traditional 
sense. Scientific knowledge is always purified. If it is proven, then it is a truth sent down 
by God lying latent in His creation” (If I Told the Story of My Childhood, 2nd Edition, 
2001, pg. 74)? The capacity for criticism and adaptation is not limited, according to 
Khidr and Bendali, to the violence in the history of Christianity and the extremism and 
superstitious spectacularism that may characterize Christianity today. Rather, it arrives, 
and this is the most important thing, at what others might consider the pith of the 
Christian faith. So you ask, for the sake of the development of modern human science, 
about some of the interpretations arrived at by fathers of the church, and you will disdain 
the habitual excess of this legacy, or most of it, in its masculinity, and you will not tire in 
disparaging the mysticism of much of what was written in the hagiography, which is 
what paves the way for intellectual approximations characterized by extreme boldness, 
novelty, and voluntarism. Comprised in the allegiance to the gospel of Jesus, the God—
the one who died and was resurrected, there is then, according to Bendali, an 
immeasurable freedom in dealing with the given Christian legacy itself. I do not suppose 
that I would be wrong if I were to hypothesize that heeding this freedom constitutes an 
indispensable criterion for any Christian or Orthodox cultural contribution worthy of 
mention. But freedom is not merely a condition of entry into the vastness of culture by 
way of religion; rather, it is also in some sense, the last chance for religion to assimilate 
into culture. Whenever the allegiance to that light, “which burst forth during three years 
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on the way to the Sea of Galilee (The Great Light: Places of Prostration 2, 2001, pg. 
101) is associated with the freedom to reexamine thoughts and practices that have 
accumulated for centuries amongst the ranks of those who call themselves followers of 
Jesus of Nazareth, and whenever profound knowledge flourishes alongside boundless 
receptivity, and whenever passion and zeal fuse with creativity and vision, then and only 
then, can the children of the Orthodox Youth Movement find a firm foothold in a creative 
Orthodox culture, a culture of sustenance and inspiration for the people of the East....our 
East.32 Indeed I do not find, in conclusion, a better explanation of this climate than that 
which George Khidr once offered, referring to the freedom with which the fathers of the 
church give and take with one another. “I am addressing the greats amongst us, who 
dwell in my mind, and I take what I take just as a confused son lays hold on what has 
been passed down to him from his father, and his father’s fathers. The heir will enjoy his 
inheritance, but at the same time he will act with it, and make it his own. So I cast off 
their teachings inasmuch as I see that they may have been mistaken, bigoted, or careless 
with them33.  And at times, I silence them, because we take great liberties when dealing 
with our own families, just as the legitimate son does so with his father (Planet of the 
Saints, Places of Prostration 2, 2001, pg. 175).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32I owe a great deal of credit to both Ustath and to Tracer on Word Reference Forums for helping me to 
translate this sentence. Some of the word choice is theirs. 
http://forum.wordreference.com/showthread.php?t=2150795 
33There is a typo in this sentence. The misprinted word either means to say “in them,” or “virulence.” The 
former is assumed, but in the case of the latter, the translation might be: “I cast off their teachings inasmuch 
as I see that they were, in their virulence, mistaken, bigoted, or careless.” 
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 It was left unmentioned last week that Doctor Asaad Qitan is the professor of 
Divinity at the University of Münster34 in Germany, and that his research was presented 
in the celebration of the inauguration of the “Dynamic Forum for Publication and Media” 
of the Orthodox Youth Movement in the Le Royal Hotel, Dbaiyeh on March 1st. 
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 Democracy or Progress: Which Comes First? 
 Abdul-Haleem Fadlallah 
 Some people ask themselves: if the most acute characterization of the current state 
of affairs in the Arab world is “political congestion,” then is Lebanon doomed to stagnate 
and risk its chance to move forward? Or should a distinction be made between two tasks: 
political reforms that can wait until interior issues are resolved and the quorum35 is 
assembled, and sound, completely conceived, socio-economic development projects that 
can be immediately implemented. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34This could not be verified. The Arabic transliteration does not seem to match well with any actual 
University. 
35This is the best I could come up with here. I consulted with some native speakers, and no one seems to 
know exactly what this refers to. 
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 For many however, development is a political challenge just as much as it is a 
socio-economic undertaking. It is even, in some sense, a cultural challenge. This is 
because, in addition to what we know of the human and material role in socio-economic 
growth, successful development is connected with the accumulation of social capital; that 
is, with the existence of public values that encourage people to cooperate voluntarily in 
an active economy, without state coercion. Using data from the 2002 Human 
Development Report, the United Nations found that socio-economic growth problems are 
associated with a lack of rightly guided leadership. In the HDR report, studies—which 
include data from a range of different countries—showed that issues like poverty and 
underdevelopment were often mitigated with an improvement in general political 
performance, a greater public participation it critical decision making, and a more 
widespread sense of accountability and equitability. 
 But our conception of political freedom as a means to societal growth does not 
necessarily mean there is a causative link between the two. The relationship between the 
level of human development and the form of government is neither certain nor clear, and 
the same applies to the development of economic freedoms versus political ones. The 
majority of empirical evidence suggests that there is no significant relationship between 
democracy and socio-economic progress. The democratic model generally produces two 
mutually irreconcilable forces: one working towards economic progress through, for 
example, more investments in human resources, and the other working towards curbing 
growth by forcing the government to, as an example, spend more to win in elections. 
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 If this question were posed differently like: Is socio-economic development an 
incentive for democratization? Or in other words: Can democracy flourish in an unsettled 
and underdeveloped environment? Then answer to this question is also fraught with 
ambiguity, and the interrelationships are not sufficient to say that democratic 
governments always spring from advanced societies characterized by stable growth and a 
general availability of basic social services. 
 It is important that people have access to information, that they have the freedom 
to express themselves, and that they have control over their futures, but this alone does 
not constitute prosperity and fails to alleviate social injustice. Along with these freedoms 
must come an improvement in general political performance and a palliation of other 
societal deficiencies. In some cases, the idea of democracy chalks up to the exchange of 
power between small, exclusive circles—experienced social and financial elite who 
manage to acquire power through manipulating the polls and evading the law. For this 
reason perhaps, we do not see a differentiation between democratic governments and 
authoritarian regimes in terms of balanced tax systems and equitable distribution of 
income. Countries with dissimilar political systems, like China, Mozambique, Senegal, 
and the United Kingdom, have realized roughly the same results in terms of equitable 
distribution. Jordan, a non-democratic country, performed quite well, while Brazil, 
generally accepted as democratic, did poorly. This same relationship holds with respect to 
the relationship between the values of the Human Development Index and the respective 
indexes of democracy and legal sovereignty.  
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 All in all, we find that democracy does not inhibit revenue increase, and likewise, 
a lack of revenue does not inhibit democracy. The results are generally inconclusive: In 
the last two decades, 33 military regimes fell from power and 60% of countries achieved 
freedom of press, but mankind’s condition remains the same, if not worse. In democratic 
nations, worker’s wages are decreasing more than in other countries, and in a country like 
Germany, workers bear 20% of the additional tax burden. In exchange, the wealthy have 
been unburdened of 22% of the taxes, and this is happening in the midst of an 
international competition to lower taxes in favor of globalized capital. 
 Of course, we do not mean to disparage democracy as a viable and constructive 
political framework compared to authoritarianism, particularly since we are discussing 
the Arab world, the countries of which occupied the lowest rankings in the United 
Nation’s Governance Index. Although dictatorships occasionally succeed and achieve 
economic growth, they are unsettled, the elite in power are more disposed then those 
unlike them to make mistakes, and these societies are in constant danger of being thrown 
back into their former, underdeveloped state. 
 The HDR report encourages us to think about developing the idea of democracy 
itself. In 1986, the United Nations created the slogan “The Right to Development,” which 
described socio-economic progress as “an integrated process with political, cultural, 
social, and economic dimensions, paving the way to ensure a person’s basic rights and 
freedoms.” This in turn calls for a critical reexamination of these rights, which demand 
our utmost attention. They are not limited to those rights found in international charters, 
like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; rather, our conception of human rights 
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must evolve to reach a full recognition of a person’s practical needs. A person has the 
right to adequate wages; he has the right to work in appropriate conditions. He has the 
right to healthcare, to insurance against poverty and disease, and the right to be protected 
from war. 
 So to return to where we started, should the democratic process stop to allow for 
growth or the opposite? Which of the two sayings are more accurate? “Let reform come 
later,” demanding that before reforms can be implemented, propitious circumstances must 
come about to allow for them, and that before economic progress can take place, socio-
cultural deficiencies that hinder it must be dealt with. Or, “Let reform come first,” acting 
on the pretext that that will lead simultaneously to reformations in decision-making 
processes, and will improve the efficacy and equitability of production and distribution 
cycles. 
 Political reform and socio-economic development are integrated and 
contemporaneous processes, even if they may not be closely tied to one another, and there 
is no reason not to embark on them simultaneously. There is nothing for us to do but to 
end this stagnancy and begin work. We may trip while treading this path, but we will not 
permit ourselves to be thrown down on a road teeming with those searching for a better 
tomorrow. 
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 Citizenship as an Alternative for Utopian Nationalism and Metaphysical 
Religious Conceptualizations 
 Bassam Do36 
 Are the Lebanese political powers conducting an internal investigation to examine 
their stances, behaviors, and aspirations? Or are they continuing in production, and in 
replication, according to pragmatic logic, striving towards extenuation, as opposed to 
critique and reform? A great deal of news circulates—although faintly—about the 
commencement of such investigations, but they remain within a limited scope. These 
investigations then, are unreliable, and even untrustworthy unless they are public and 
depend upon the principles of disclosure and transparency. They should glean from 
previous experiences Lebanon has past through since what has been nearly nine decades, 
in order that lessons be learned and universal formulas (?) be discovered, and in order to 
end rumination on crises and blood and introspection about violence and doubt which 
have become (i.e. rumination and introspection) like unconscious instinctual tendencies 
that the overwhelming majority of Lebanese practice, influenced by the recurring past, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36Lebanese Political Writer 
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the increasingly dangerous present, and a quasi-deadlocked future. All this so we do not 
say that it, even in this moment, is actually deadlocked, and additionally, so we do not 
say that the conditions of doubt and violence, which escalate in the continuation of the 
current congestion, almost turned into a general social instinct giving people a strong 
impetus to behave harshly and dangerously and to hold political ideas which awaken 
skepticism about the potential of living together, and about the possibility of moving 
from a state of “cohabitation” threatened with division to a state of “citizenry” entrenched 
in the unity of the society in a comprehensive and apt state framework, which would open 
a future horizon, and encompass diversity within unity. 
 If a critical investigation were necessary at all times then it is, in the midst of the 
current crisis, more necessary than ever, but most political powers do not recognize this 
necessity. What this means—with frightening clarity—is that the aversion to critical 
review leads to stagnancy, to hesitation, and to a dissolution of what remains of a role in 
the balancing of power. In regards to the latter however, this is true to the point that 
reaching an actual, national compromise that moves Lebanon from being a “war-zone” 
into being a “nation” is impossible. The most one could imagine in this scenario would be 
a mere political settlement, which is liable to come to nothing, just as all of the previous 
settlements came to nothing, because they did not transcend the shifting political sphere, 
and they did not address what is national and constant. 
 We are in urgent need of a national settlement. This is exactly what we imagine 
should be the pith of the critical investigation that the political powers conduct, or else 
what we see today will repeat tomorrow. Every morrow is close, however far it may be. 
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Every echo is tainted with the possibility of tragedy in the guise of comedy, and every 
tragedy pours forth enough blood to color all Lebanon’s waters. How long will we play 
this game from Hell? 
 The peoples of Lebanon have lived roughly a century and nine decades in a vortex 
of a war that has been resurfacing approximately every ten years since the year 1840 and 
continues until today; that is, we arrived in our current state in 1920 with a nearly 
unsolvable contradiction between our sectarian legacy and outside influences. We have to 
attempt to balance these two in order to make them palatable to all, regardless of 
sectarian and regional differences, and regardless of Lebanon's precarious political make-
up. This is the only way she can become a viable state37. 
 How do we accomplish this balancing act? We should focus of the meaning of 
“nation” and “state” in regards to Lebanon. This meaning continues to be controversial 
and disputed between national and religious schools, whereas experiences in Lebanon 
have proven that the nationalistic bond does not by itself contribute an essential part of 
the meaning of the nation and the state. The religious bond is essentially incapable of 
providing this meaning in a society where numerous different sects wrestle for power, 
without rising at any point from meaning “cohabitation” to meaning “diversity within 
unity,” which actually leads to the concept of “citizenship.” True citizenship is the only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37I was unable to translate this sentence. The provided sentence provided owes credit to Tracer on Word 
Reference Forums. It seems to depart from the original Arabic, but it is much more intelligible. A literal 
translation is as follows: Things will remain this way unless we are able to reconsider the balance of 
power, so as to make it influential at the core of any solution that the provincial/state intersections might 
impose, as long as the our political geography puts us at the very point of these intersections.  
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possible alternative for the Utopian nationalism and the metaphysical religious 
conceptualizations that have been proven inapplicable in Lebanese political life38. 
 The civil, contractual concept of “citizenship” is the foundation to which the 
meaning of “nation” and “state” must return in the case of Lebanon, and it, alone, 
constitutes a middle ground between diametric sectarianism and secularism. But is this 
the concept that spurs the acting political powers today? Is this concept taken seriously 
when they hold meeting and assemblies? The answer is no. It is greatly unfortunate that 
what we see today forces us to notice that the concept of citizenship is thrown aside and 
marginalized and fails to take a meaningful or influential role in any political dialogue. 
And if the percentage of that were to differ from one group to another, then what is any 
dialogue if does not take into consideration the meaning of “homeland” in Lebanon and 
the meaning of “citizenship” in a framework of complete independence and sovereignty 
and the fragile relations with Arab countries like Lebanon, countries which emerged and 
developed during the period of the first and second world wars. However, for some of 
them, not even a half-century has passed since their establishment and political 
formation.  
 If we were to posit all of this in the field of direct political observation, we would 
see clearly that opposition forces did not look to the Arab initiative to remedy the crisis in 
Lebanon from the perspective of making the concepts of “nation” and “state” the priority. 
If that were not true, the president of the republic would have been elected, and he would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38This sentence was translated by Outlandish on Word Reference Forums. 
http://forum.wordreference.com/showthread.php?p=10654134#post10654134 
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have held dialogue-based political and constitutional operations which would have put 
foundations down for a national settlement in Lebanon, and not just for a political one. 
And even if some sort of dialogue were desired before the election of the president of the 
republic, as the opposition states, and even if the sponsorship agreed on that, it has no 
historical or future value unless it is based on an agreement that, “Lebanon is ultimately a 
nation for all Lebanese people,” and that the logic of compromise is what governs 
political life in Lebanon. The balance of power must also reclaim its role and its vigor, 
and become critical in national settlement plans because it moves in this case within its 
national sphere, in its original geography, history, and political and economic society, and 
because in this situation, sects build their statements upon the foundation of Lebanese 
nationalism and do not look past what is interior to the country. They are able to settle 
and live together, and they gradually move from cohabitation to a unified national 
existence. In this way, Lebanon does not remain an open war-zone. The state and 
provincial roles subside and the country withdraws from excess in internal power-
balancing acts, or at least, balance is realized between what is interior and exterior. A 
new political society develops, which embraces internal diversity within national unity, 
and lives in what resembles objective neutrality. This society would preserve Arab 
identity without turning Arabism into a pretext for excess in Lebanese nationalism. As 
balance is realized between Lebanon’s difficult position in the region’s present 
geography and between its potential, there is no holy-war zone based upon foolish 
undertakings which try to seek pretext in the glitter of the extremist religious slogan, 
whichever region is the one to use it. And so that the latter does not cause ambiguity, 
what this point means is not resistance in and of itself; rather, every resistance against the 
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Israeli occupation is legitimate, but resistance must not appoint itself to carry out tasks 
further than the liberation of the Lebanese homeland. It must not fall into contradiction 
between what it appoints itself to do, what the national community can tolerate, and what 
the interior organization has the potential to absorb. We must recognize the specificity of 
this organization, no matter our own convictions. It is an extant reality that reinforces its 
own results and expressions, and it will stay that way for a long time before it changes. 
 It is natural that, facing all this, it might be said that these issues necessitate a 
deep dialogue, and this is true, as no sane person would refuse dialogue. Productive 
dialogue however, is the dialogue that transcends discussion about the presidency, the 
government, and election law and deals with concepts of “nation” and “state” embarking 
on them from the underlying logic of “citizenry.” This dialogue arrives at a national 
settlement more capable of longevity and development. 
 [Picture caption] Drawing by Fatima Murtada 
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